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The publication of this book and the preparatory research leading to 
it were made possible through the interest and support of many indi-
viduals and organizations. The background research involved interviews 
with representatives of 10 business organizations (see list in Chapter B) 
who helped to shape the thinking around the key messages of this book.
On behalf of the project team, I would like to thank these businesses 
for the time they dedicated to share their data, information and experi-
ence with us during our field visits to their facilities, for their contribution 
to distilling lessons learnt from working with inclusive business models, 
and for their openness to share their knowledge with a wider audience.
Financially, the initiative was made possible through generous sup-
port from CTA.
The Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation (CTA) is a joint 
international institution of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group 
of States and the European Union (EU). Its mission is to advance food 
and nutritional security, increase prosperity and encourage sound natural 
resource management in ACP countries. It provides access to information 
and knowledge, facilitates policy dialogue and strengthens the capacity of 
agricultural and rural development institutions and communities. 
CTA operates under the framework of the Cotonou Agreement and is 
funded by the EU. (For more information on CTA visit www.cta.int)
Several individuals contributed to thinking through the initiative from 
the start. I would particularly like to recognize the contributions of 
Don Seville (Sustainable Food Lab), Mark Lundy (CIAT) and Lucia Wegner 
(associate consultant CDI).
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Analysis of Inclusive  
Business Models
Introduction1
The ‘Seas of Change’ learning initiative was launched in April 2012 with an interna-
tional learning workshop which brought together 100 leaders from business, develop-
ment organisations, government, farmers’ organisations and research, for a dynamic 
and frank exchange of experiences, innovations and questions around inclusive 
business models. 
This learning initiative aims to improve understanding of how agri-food markets can 
contribute, at a significant scale, to food security and rural poverty-reduction while still 
building profitable commercial relations. 
Several learning trajectories have been developed since the launch of Seas of Change. 
The Centre for Development Innovation (CDI), Wageningen UR leads the trajectory on 
analysing inclusive business models in East Africa. The research trajectory aims at 
analysing innovative mechanisms of inclusiveness, how they are integrated into the 
business models, how they work, and what is their impact: 
 › at the level of business, and
 › at the level of the wider community.
This primer provides a collection and syntheses of 10 case studies across a wide range 
of commodities in East African countries. Each value chain is likely to be different in im-
plementing inclusive business models and scaling them up. But some general principles 
are beginning to emerge. The aim of this document is to distil some lessons learned 
from the case studies in terms of incentives and mechanisms for inclusiveness, success 
factors and obstacles, and opportunities for scaling up successful models.
All the companies interviewed source from smallholder farmers in disparate social, 
economic and environmental settings. This engagement with low-income families 
varies based on the inclusive  business model adopted. Table 1 below lists the compa-
nies and their respective business models. A brief description of each business model 
can be found in chapters following this introduction. At the end of the case studies, 
a synthesis paper summarizes the lessons learnt regarding:
 › current inclusiveness of the chains
 › possibilities for enhancing inclusiveness in the respective chains
 › success factors for managing and scaling inclusive business models.
This reader also caters to the needs of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
interested in learning from case studies regarding how other companies are engaged 
in inclusive businesses. Furthermore, the learning points from the case studies will feed 
into a manual at the next stage of this learning initiative that will be developed specifically 
for SMEs on how to set up and manage inclusive business models. The authors therefore 
welcome any reactions or recommendations from readers on this subject.
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Business model typology 
in the case of working 
with smallholders
2
In the literature, the terms ‘contract farming’ and ‘out-grower scheme’ 
are often used interchangeably. However, to offer more insight, the analysis 
of the presented case studies follows the thinking of Eaton and Shepherd 
(FAO, 2001) who identified five different contract farming models:
1. Under the Centralized model a company provides support to small-
holder production, purchases the crop, and then processes it, closely 
controlling its quality. This model is used for crops such as tobacco, 
cotton, sugar cane, banana, tea, and rubber. 
2. Under the Nucleus Estate model, the company also manages a plan-
tation in order to supplement smallholder production and provide 
minimum throughput for the processing plant. This approach is 
mainly used for tree crops such as oil palm and rubber.
3. The Multipartite model usually involves a partnership between gov-
ernment bodies, private companies and farmers. 
4. The Intermediary model can involve subcontracting by companies to 
intermediaries who have their own (informal) arrangements with 
farmers.
5. Finally, the Informal model involves small- and medium-sized enter-
prises who make simple contracts with farmers on a seasonal basis. 
Although these are usually just seasonal arrangements, they are often 
repeated annually and their success depends on the proximity of the 
buyer to the seller.
Using this approach, the cases fall under the following models:
Company Sector Country Inclusive/ business model
Dutch Agricultural Develop-
ment & Trading Company 
(DADTCO)
Cassava Mozambique Multipartite model 
Novos Horizontes (NH) Poultry Mozambique Centralized model
Mozambique Fresh Eggs 
(MFE)
Poultry Mozambique Centralized model
Gadisa Gobena Commercial 
Farms PLC (GGF)
Seed Ethiopia Informal model
africaJUICE (AJ) Fruit Ethiopia Centralized model
Depasa Agro Industry (DAI) Sesame Ethiopia Centralized model
Brarudi, Heineken (H) Sorghum Burundi Centralized model
Tongaat Hulett (TH) Sugar Cane South Africa Nucleus estate model




(not contract farming 
model)
4 Dairy Business Hubs (DBH) Dairy Kenya
Centralized model and 
intermediary model
Table 1
Contract farming models in the studied cases
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Research approach3
In analysing the case studies, researchers went deeper into identifying and evaluating 
dimensions of inclusiveness in relation to the business models which were studied.
Most literature considers inclusive business models as those which seek to contribute 
towards poverty alleviation by including lower-income communities within the value 
chain while not losing sight of the ultimate goal of business, which is to generate profits. 
More specifically, as indicated by the World Business Council for Sustainable Develop-
ment, a business model is inclusive when large investors tackle yields, quality, skills 
development, and supply-chain link-
ages simultaneously. As stated by the 
director of africaJUICE ‘Inclusiveness is 
not a cost but is part of our business 
value. A successful business model 
(e.g. inclusive out-grower schemes) 
depends on cultivating good relation-
ships, transparency and a commitment 
to share equally the risks and rewards of the market’. Inclusiveness builds on mutual 
trust between actors, proper incentives for long-term engagement in the value chain, 
transfer of skills, and a balancing of power in decision-making within the value chain.
In the context of these case studies, we consider a business model inclusive when it is
 › Durable: promotes long-term, stable trading relationships;
 › Equitable: increases market access for smallholders with an equitable balance of 
risk, responsibilities and benefits;
 › Efficient: improves financial sustainability;
 › Effective: strengthens purchaser access to consistent supplies;
 › Adaptable: enables flexibility to respond to changing market, social and environ-
mental conditions;
 › Credible: offers real benefits in the form of stable commercial relations that can be 
tracked and reported on.
The research activities included desk research as well as interviews in the field with 
a variety of key actors, such as company representatives, smallholders, and traders 
(where applicable), in order to identify possible pressure points regarding inclusive 
business models.
For the research methodology, ‘Value chain mapping’ and ‘Application of Business 
Model Principles’ (LINK methodology) were applied.
The Business Model Principles from the LINK methodology (CIAT, 2012) were used to 
guide the process of assessing the different business models in terms of inclusiveness, 
and selecting areas for improvement.
‘The new business model 
principles are signposts 
for inclusive and durable 
trading relationships.’
In the report of the Seas of Change international workshop, agri-food markets were 
defined as inclusive when they:
Create opportunities that enable small-scale farmers and their cooperatives 
to become economically viable business partners in supply chains. 
Support small- and medium-sized enterprises to flourish as processors and 
service-providers along the supply chain.
Provide employment opportunities under fair labour conditions.
Establish agri-clusters/centres that help to drive overall rural economic pros-
perity. 
Deliver healthy, affordable, accessible food products and services for low-
income consumers in rural and urban areas. 
Give all stakeholders and, in particular, marginalised groups (small-scale farmers, 
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Principle Description
Principle ❶ 
Chain-wide collaboration with shared 
goals and identified champions  
 › Identified champions in lead firms
 › Regular processes of information flow (formal or informal)
 › Alignment of goals/vision (commercial and development) 
Principle ❷ 
New market linkages
 › Ability to aggregate and reach high-value markets
 › Ability to provide steady and durable market for suppliers
 › Ability to expand core product opportunities 
 › Ability to reach complementary markets for seconds and other products – the 5th quarter
 › Ability to function without subsidy
Principle ❸ 
Equitable and transparent chain 
governance 
 › Transparency (grades, standards, price structure, incentives)
 › Traceability to farm level
 › Risk-sharing function (incl. insurance schemes)
 › Mechanisms include:
 ▪ governance models 
 ▪ shared equity (ownership) models
 ▪ contracts: enforcement and strategy
Principle ❹
Equitable access to services
 › Production-related services available and tailored to small farmers and accessible to women
 ▪ input supplier and dealer models
 ▪ high-quality planting materials 
 ▪ technical support
 ▪ provision of credit
 › Facilitate access to additional services
Principle ❺ 
Inclusive innovation (vertical  
co-innovation, process and product)
 › Mechanisms for getting farmer input and strategic information
 › Renewal of product/market, continuous evolution and diversification
 › Recognition of co-dependency
Principle ❻ 
Measurement of outcomes 
 › Informal or formal feedback mechanism along the chain
 › Regular explicit assessment process  
 › Decisions based on assessment 
 › Assess environmental results (avoid trade-off) Table 2
Inclusive Business Model Principles
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In Chapter B the case studies are described briefly, while Chapter C summarizes 
lessons learnt from the case studies based on the afore-mentioned business 
model principles and the key questions from the four areas of research listed 
above.
 ▪ What have been the drivers of inclusiveness? Who initiated the process of inclusive-
ness? What has been the progress on business goals and the impact on social inclusion 
in the value chain? 
 ▪ Can distinct phases be identified in the development of the inclusive business model? 
What processes helped the company move from one phase to the other?
 ▪ Current inclusiveness – What makes the business model inclusive?
 ▪ Are there specific mechanisms that stand out for promoting or sustaining inclusiveness? 
 ▪ What kind of support has been given to each link of the value chain (company, small-
holders), and how has it (or, how has it not) been of value?
 ▪ What are the success factors, obstacles, weaknesses in creating inclusive business?
 ▪ Are there any major unaddressed issues that could pose a risk etc. (e.g. role of waged 
labour and levels of wages/employment practices, environmental sustainability)?
 ▪ What local or regional policy support exists in the context of exclusiveness?
 ▪ Are there ‘spill-over’ benefits? (From the cash crop in the value chain to other crops on 
the farm, to on-farm paid labor? Through benefits to farmers not participating in the 
value chain? Are there other enterprises generated by the business?)
 ▪ How are women and/or marginalized groups participating in the supply chain? 
 ▪ How willing is the company to invest in making the business more inclusive? 
 ▪ What are the possible areas of improvement 
or expansion?
 ▪ What would the business actors (both com-
panies and farmers’ organizations) like to do if 
they were able to? What would be the benefits 
and risks/costs?
 ▪ What are the incentives for this kind of invest-
ment or change in business model? What are 
the barriers (e.g. credit)?
 ▪ What support or policies from other actors fur-
ther down the chain would be most effective?
 ▪ How is the chain organized? 
What is the model of the inter-
mediary?
 ▪ Who are the key actors? Who are 
the key partners?
 ▪ How do products, payments, 
services and information flow 
through the chain? (Major drivers, 
major bottlenecks; how the sys-
tem functions)
 ▪ What are the bottlenecks and opportunities for scaling?
 ▪ What are the bottlenecks and opportunities for replicating?
1 What is the structure of the industry/sector in the country?
2 How inclusive is the chain?
3 What else might be possible to increase inclusiveness?
4 Is this business model replicable, scalable? Why? Why not?
The key questions asked during the research are:
References
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Agriculture in Burundi employs about 90 % of the 
population, represents approximately 50 % of its 
gross domestic product (GDP), and accounts for 
over 80 % of exports (World Bank 2010; FAO 2009). 
The country has 1 351 000 hectares of arable 
land; about 5.5 % of cropland is irrigated. 
The average holding per household (family size 
of 5 people) is 0.8 hectares. Coffee, tea, beans, 
banana, sweet potatoes, maize and sorghum are 
the principal crops grown in the country. 
Sorghum is one of the most important staple 
foods in Burundi after rice, maize and cassava 
(FAO 2006). Sorghum flour is used for the prepa-
ration of bread, ugali (porridge) and alcoholic 
drinks. Because it is rich in proteins, sorghum 
is also mixed with other cereals (wheat, maize) 
in varied proportions to make flour for baby 
food. New products such as instant soft por-
ridge and malt extracts are great successes. In 
the competitive environment of multinational 
enterprises, sorghum has proven to be the best 





Background information on the company
Brarudi SA
Brarudi SA is the leading beer producer in Burundi. The company is owned by Heineken and the Government of 
Burundi with shares of 60 % and 40 % respectively. It has a production capacity of 2 million hectolitres per annum 
and employs about 660 employees at two factory sites in Bujumbura and Gitega. Brarudi deals with 12 alcoholic 
and non-alcoholic (soft drinks) products. Primus and Amstel beer are the principal products of the company accounting 
for 70 % and 20 % of the entire production volume respectively. Recently Brarudi introduced Nyongera, a beer made 
from locally sourced sorghum. 
EUCORD
The European Cooperative for Rural Development 
(EUCORD) is a Brussels-based non-profit organiza-
tion. It is specialized in promoting public-private 
partnership through projects that provide access 
to credit and low-cost high-quality inputs, create 
value chains, promote education and training, 
and organize farmers. EUCORD is primarily active 
in three program areas: 
Sorghum grows in harsh environments where other 
crops do not grow well, usually without application of 
any fertilizers or other input.  According to FAO (2013) 
average annual production for the last five years in 
Burundi has been around MT 85 000. The low-lying and 
flat areas of the north-western provinces of Muyinga, 
Kirundo, Karuzi, Cibitoke and the central eastern provinces 
of Muramvya, Gitega, Ruyigi and Rutana, are the main 
sorghum growing areas.
Until recently, sorghum production has mainly been for 
own consumption and for home brewing. This trend, 
however, is changing with Brarudi and EUCORD sorghum 
contract farming initiatives which enable farmers to 
grow better varieties as alternatives to malt barley.
Figure 1
Average annual production of sorghum in Burundi
Figure 2
Districts with Brarudi operations
implementation of agricultural value 
chain development projects;
building technical and business capacity 
of NGOs and small enterprises through 
training and partnerships; and
improving the livelihoods of women 











Both social and economic goals drove this move. In 2008 
Brarudi SA launched a new beer product, Nyongera, 
made from locally sourced sorghum. Nyongera in Kirundi 
(local language) means hope and this product marked 
the company’s strategic switch from reliance on im-
ported raw materials, to sourcing from the local economy. 
Consequently, the economic benefit of cost-saving for 
the company has been significant. The fact that Burundi 
is a landlocked country with the nearest port located at 
1 500 km resulted in soaring raw material prices from 
time to time due to increasing transportation and in-
bound logistics coordination. It usually took Brarudi over 
six months to get the required raw material, mainly from 
Egypt, which forced them to stock inventory for two to 
three months, thereby tying up a significant amount of 
their working capital. 
Parallel to the strategic intent of the business, the com-
pany committed itself to fulfilling its corporate social 
responsibility creating sustainable business opportuni-
ties for smallholder farmers. As such the initiative aims to 
improve the livelihoods of 8 000 sorghum producers by 
sourcing 5 000 tons of sorghum.
A nucleus farm model was adopted at the early stage. An agreement between Brarudi and four commercial farmers 
who have 20–80 ha land was signed where the latter agreed to supply seed from their own farms, as well as coordi-
nate production from nearby farmers. These farmers delivered 60 tons for the first year, but the arrangement did not 
continue further mainly due to cost and coordination challenges. Sorghum farming is labour intensive (particularly 
keeping birds away from the crop at maturity stage) and expensive for commercial farmers since they usually live 
away from the farm. 
As a result, the model switched to contract farming with six farmers’ associations and selected model farmer traders 
in areas where farmers are not organized into associations. Under this arrangement Brarudi guarantee a market 
at an agreed price. EUCORD facilitate access to seed, provide training and coaching to farmers on agronomics and 
organization. In return the farmers supply the sorghum to Brarudi, even when the market price is higher than the 
one agreed in advance. 
The logic behind the move The business model
Figure 4
Business model of Brarudi
It usually took Brarudi over six months 
to get the required raw material, mainly 
from Egypt, which forced them to stock 
inventory for two to three months, 
thereby tying up a significant amount of 
their working capital.
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Four distinctive phases can be observed in this business model: engagement, piloting, scaling and autonomy.
Phases in the development of the model
❶ Engagement phase 
Three key activities were carried out during the engagement phase. 
1. Variety selection: variety selection was made in partnership with the national research institute 
and was based on sorghum suitability for beer, yield per ha (includes maturity period) and poten-
tial for scaling up.
2. Linking with farmers and clarifying expectations: once the varieties were selected, EUCORD started 
engaging farmers.
3. Concluding the contract: following a series of engagements, a formal agreement was signed between 
farmers and Brarudi that clarified roles and responsibilities of the parties involved, quality of sor-
ghum (moisture, purity, and uniformity) and price. In order to simplify things, a contract was signed 
between cooperatives and the company in Cibitoke and Bubanza provinces, but in those areas where 
cooperatives already existed, the agreement was made with model farmer traders. 
Two key challenges were encountered at this stage: 
 › breaking the aid-dependence mentality of farmers who were used to getting agri-
cultural inputs for free after the civil war;
 › convincing farmers to accept the proposed package, which is relatively lower than the 
market but stable over time.
❷ Piloting phase 
The piloting phase involved training and coaching on the agronomics of sorghum, coordination of 
production with selected farmers, strengthening capacities of farmer organizations in Cibitoke and 
Bubanza provinces. EUCORD was in charge of these activities. As mentioned above the model started 
with four nucleus farmers in the first year but switched to contract farming with smallholders. There 
were 871 farmers involved in 2011, supplying 200 tons of sorghum to Brarudi.  
The key challenges encountered during the piloting phase were:
 › the agronomics of sorghum, particularly keeping birds away, was difficult for farmers; 
 › the price was not attractive for farmers to produce for the following year;
 › the cooperatives lacked organizational capacity;
 › access to finance.
❸ Scaling phase
Most of the activities undertaken at this stage were targeted at 
increasing the number of farmers within the pilot regions, as well 
as in other potential provinces—Makamba and Rutana. Concrete 
actions undertaken to bridge gaps at the piloting phase included 
price revision, and research on varieties that are less vulnerable 
to birds. In addition, EUCORD conducted a series of training and 
coaching sessions for the cooperatives and member farmers on 
agronomics, financial management, and business management; 
attempts were also made to link cooperatives with financial service 
providers. The number of farmers increased to 1 500 and volume 
delivered went up to 500 tons.  
The key issues at this point were:
 › sustaining the business without the support of 
EUCORD (post-project life cycle);
 › gaps in organizational capacities of the cooperatives. 
❹ Autonomy phase
This is the stage where farmers are able to produce and supply 
to the company without any backstopping from EUCORD or other 
NGOs. In addition, farmers should be able to pay or bargain for 
critical clients such as financial institutions, business development 
and extension agents. They should also be able to meet the quan-
tity and quality specifications of Brarudi. The entire business model 
is considered as sustainable if this stage is reached. For this specific 
case, this has not yet been achieved. 
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A total of 2 000 farmers or 
10 000 family members in 
four provinces have been 
reached by the sorghum 
contract farming project. 
By the end of the pro-
ject, 8 000 farmers or 
40 000 beneficiaries will 
have been addressed. 
Though sorghum remains 
the main priority crop, 
the option of sourcing rice 
is also being considered 
and hence the prospect 
to include more farmers 
within the supply chain.  
The business model focuses on securing raw materials 
for the company, but at the same time aims at improving 
the livelihood of farmers by offering them access to im-
proved seed, technology and know-how. Series of train-
ings and coaching have been conducted on sorghum 
agronomics as part of the sensitization process and 
bridging skills and knowledge gaps. Before this initiative, 
sorghum was a neglected crop and many farmers were 
switching to maize, rice and cassava. Farmers were pro-
ducing using traditional methods and hardly applying 
any inputs. Besides addressing these gaps, the training 
and coaching created a high degree of motivation and 
vision for farmers, as well as government extension and 
research officers.
With this intervention, farmers are able to get a stable 
market for their produce, better returns per hectare and 
a reasonable price. Price for the seed is slightly lower 
than the market price, but has been increasing steadily 
over the last four years from BIF 350/kg to BIF 670/kg.
Over the last three years about 800 tons of sorghum were supplied to Brarudi and 
the plan is to reach 5 000 tons by the end of the 4-year project life cycle (2010–2014). 
Evidence from the field showed that growing sorghum benefits farmers in two ways: 
1. sorghum gives comparatively better returns;
2. there is a stable market for the crop.
Maize, rice, beans and cassava are the main competing crops for sorghum. According 
to information from farmers, the return per hectare for sorghum is better than maize 
and beans and comparable to cassava, but lower than rice. The table below shows a 
quick and rough estimate of return per hectare for the four crops; maize and beans are 
not profitable crops, but farmers grow them for food security and risk diversification.
2
Crop Maize Sorghum Rice Beans
Total cost/ha 0.9 1.2 1.98 0.9
Productivity per ha (tons) 2 2 4 1
Price per ton (million) 0.35 0.67 0.55 0.8
Sales per ha (B.Franc)—million 0.7 1.34 2.2 0.8
Profit Per ha (B.Franc)—million − 0.2 0.14 0.22 − 0.1
Rank 4 2 1 3
Table 1
Main competing crops for sorghum
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Partnership Organization Seed and technology
The contract farming model has strong partnership with 
government research and extension services. EUCORD 
is working as an NGO partner in organizing farmers and 
building capacities. A final step has been made to link 
the farmers with a local micro-finance institution to 
address the access to finance bottleneck. Also, the 
research institute is working with the project in filter-
ing and adapting 14 sorghum varieties suitable for beer 
and to give better yields to farmers. Capacity is built 
not only for farmers, but also for the research and ex-
tension officers whose task it is to sustainably support 
farmers once the project is phased out.
New cooperatives are organized and capacity-building 
efforts are underway by EUCORD. Improving organizational 
capacities of the cooperatives will improve their self-reli-
ance which will also have a positive impact on other crops. 
One of the main challenges farmers mentioned during the 
field research was the lack of a coordinated unit which 
could supply raw materials (seed, fertilizer, etc.) at reason-
able cost, buy the produce and deliver to better market 
places in Bujumbura and other areas. Building capacities of 
the farmers’ organizations will address these bottlenecks 
and create a room for improved bargaining power of farm-
ers and also facilitate access to key agricultural inputs. 
The project is promoting Gambela (white seed sorghum) 
in areas with rainfall of less than 1 200 ml—mainly in 
Bubanza and Cibitoke provinces—while Cilas promoted in 
provinces that have higher rainfall. Cilas is imported by the 
project from Tanzania. In addition, 14 new sorghum varie-
ties are on trial for release. Average yield per hectare for 
Gambela is about 2–3 tons and Cilas gives 3 tons/ha. Both 
Gambela and Cilas have a significant competitive edge 
over other local varieties that give only 0.5 ton/ha. Bird 
repellent chemical (Bird-Off) is imported from Uganda to 
minimize the cost of keeping birds away from crops, and 
threshing technology has been demonstrated to farmers.
Ready for harvest – CILAS sorghum variety
The contract farming 
model has strong part-
nership with government 
research and extension 
services. 
EUCORD is working as an 
NGO partner in organiz-
ing farmers and building 
capacities.
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Physical/natural constraints: 
land shortage, demanding agro-
nomics and irregular climate
The average land holding per family in 
Burundi is 0.8 ha. This tract of land is used 
to grow multiple crops that cater to pro-
duction for household consumption and 
marketable surplus. There is limited utili-
zation of agricultural inputs such as fer-
tilizer, pesticides and herbicides and hence 
yield per hectare is low. In addition, sorghum 
production needs proper land preparation, 
weeding, harvesting, and deterring birds at 
germination and maturity phases. Burundi 
has generally high rainfall, but recently the 
pattern is becoming irregular (excessive or 
short). This has affected areas in Cibitoke 
and Bubanza provinces. 
Social constraints: food security, aid-dependency 
mentality and limited know-how
Farmers sometimes consume the sorghum seed at home during food 
shortages. They also give more attention to other traditional food crops 
such as rice, maize and cassava. The great lakes region has been in civil 
war for a long time during which it has been reliant on aid, creating a 
dependency mentality which makes it difficult to convince farmers to join 
the sorghum contract-farming scheme. These factors, added to the lack of 
knowledge on sorghum agronomics and use of modern technologies and 
practices, make it difficult to convince farmers to grow sorghum.  
Challenges
Economic constraints: finance, quantity and comparative return
Sorghum demands more agricultural inputs—fertilizer, herbicides, and pesticides. 
In order to deter birds, labour has to be deployed for at least two months. Conse-
quently, finance is critical to cater for such costs. Economic return of sorghum, com-
pared to rice or cotton in some cases, is low and hence farmers lose interest. The 
switch from the nucleus farm to contract farming is evidence to this. The quantity 
of sorghum is small for a company of Brarudi’s size, and though the company is serious 
about pushing for a larger proportion of sorghum beer in its product assortment, 
only 50 000 hectolitres per year is brewed from sorghum due to the limited supply 
from local farmers. 
Woman keeping birds away from her Gambela Sorghrum
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New Product Development
Brarudi is considering making rice beer. The company has strategic intent to source 
rice from the local market. This will pave the way for two critical opportunities: on the 
one hand new farmers will be included within the Brarudi supply chain and benefit 
from a stable market, as well as access to new technologies that will improve produc-
tion and productivity. This will have an additional impact on household food security, 
as rice is an important food crop. On the other hand, as rice is one of the competing 
crops for sorghum, existing sorghum-growing farmers will have more flexibility to 
choose between the two crops. 
Access to inputs
Three important technological issues are noted by the farmers:
1. access to seed
2. keeping birds away
3. threshing.
Brarudi can stimulate further inclusiveness by supporting solutions towards each of 
the above. For example, the nucleus farms that stepped out at the first phase could 
be re-invited to specialize in seed production and distribution with closer support 
from the research institute. Also, linking the cooperatives with suppliers of Bird-Off 
(chemical bird repellant) will have the double opportunity of reducing the high labor 
cost of deterring birds and at the same time generating income for the cooperatives, 
and possibly for women if they are involved as agents. A thresher has already been 
demonstrated to the farmers and considerable interest has been shown. However, 
no farmer or cooperative has yet owned one, mainly due to lack of finance. With a 
value-chain finance arrangement, the cooperatives can have a shared thresher.
Possibility to increase 
inclusiveness
3
Woman carrying harvested sorghum to storage place
Opportunities for further inclusiveness
Value chain finance
Discussion with a local microfinance in-
stitution to facilitate loans to the sorghum 
farmers is ongoing. This is an important 
step to attract more farmers, as well as 
address the cash shortage faced by exist-
ing out-growers.  
Stimulate gender inclusiveness
As observed during the field research, a 
number of women working in the field, 
but in most cases the men, are taking a 
lead role in explaining the business sto-
ries. The contract-farming scheme can 
encourage women’s participation in key 
farming decisions by adopting special 
incentives targeted to women e.g. price 
differentiation. 
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Is the business model scalable?4
Brarudi seems determined to scale up this contract-farming scheme.  The company is aiming to reach 8 000 farmers by 
the end of the project year and collect a volume of 5 000 tons of sorghum. Despite the slow start and the fact that 
the initiative is still at pilot phase, the potential exists for further growth and even replication by other organizations.
Household food security is the other important 
determinant of scalability for this kind of business 
model. In subsistence farming, cropping decision is 
highly affected by the extent to which the crop can 
be utilized at household level or how quickly it can be 
converted to cash to purchase food crops. Sorghum 
is both a food and cash crop in Burundi. The crop 
is utilized for bread, ugali and to make traditional 
drinks. However, sorghum is less preferred as a food 
crop compared to maize, rice, beans and cassava. This, 
added to the fact that the smallholders in Burundi 
are highly subsistence with small, average holdings, 
means that food security remains a critical decision 
factor to increase production. 
Profitability for both company and farmers is a key 
determinant of scalability for this kind of venture. 
Usually comparative profitability—return compared 
to sets of possible options—is considered by both 
the company and the farmers. Cost of locally-sourced 
raw material (sorghum) compared to imported malt is 
low and hence the initiative is profitable for Brarudi, but 
the quantity of raw material secured is very small and the 
opportunity for economies of scale is lost. For farmers, 
a quick return is highly valued as a motivating factor 
and serves as evidence for the scaling-up exercise. This 
requires either high-yielding or cost-saving technologies 
or premium price offers. As mentioned earlier, sorghum 
has comparatively better returns than maize and beans.
Technological simplicity implies both the tools 
and practices deployed in the new system. Farmers 
are generally receptive to technologies that reduce 
cost, time and effort. Incremental technologies that 
build on customary wisdom and practices can eas-
ily assimilate into communities. Technology ranges 
from input to point of product delivery (ploughing, 
input utilization, weeding, pruning, pollinating, har-
vesting, packaging, transport and quality). For better 
adoption, farmers need to be intensively trained and 
coached on each hardware and software. Visual or 
graphic presentations or practical demonstrations 
are more effective than conventional trainings and 
stories.
Extended payback period is one of the key 
attributes of investment with smallholders. 
Usually such investment demands spending 
money and time for the first three or four years 
in anticipation of long-term returns. During the 
early period, companies need to have the ability to 
absorb costs and still be able to finance further. 
This is often challenging for smaller or start-up 
companies. However, bigger companies the size of 
Brarudi have the ability to make such investments. 
Investing through the whole production and 
processing chain is costly and often complex 
for businesses. They can be efficient by gearing 
interventions on specific parts of the product 
chain, e.g. purchasing already existing produc-
tion or boosting production by selling inputs for 
an existing demand. In this way, companies like 
Brarudi have more leverage and competence to 
influence the whole production, marketing and 






1 Extended payback period
2 Focused intervention within one part of the chain









Fruit production is an important component 
of Ethiopian agricultural production systems. 
According to CSA data, the country produced over 
540 tons of fruits in 2012, equivalent to 5 billion 
birr. Production has been growing at 7 % annually 
since 1997. Ethiopia has a diverse agro-ecology 
suitable for production of temperate, sub-tropical 
and tropical fruits. It has areas with altitudes 
ranging from 116 m below, to 4620 m above, 
sea level. The country is also endowed with 
abundant water resources of major river basins 
with an annual flow of 123 000 million m³, with a 
groundwater potential of about 2.56 million m³. 
This gives it a potential irrigable area of 3.5 million 
ha with a net irrigation area of about 1.61 mil-
lion ha. 
Given the unique climatic and natural resources, 
almost all types of fruits and vegetables can 
potentially be grown in Ethiopia. But the most 
important ones are bananas (260 000 tons), 
mangoes (73 000 tons), avocado (62 000 tons), 
oranges (48 000) and papaya (43 000 tons) ac-
counting for 91 % of the national fruit production 
(CSA, 2012; Han et al., 2013). 
Introduction1
Harvested passion fruit 
in the fieldRipening passion fruit
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As can be seen in the map below, over ¾ of the country is suitable 
for different types of fruits. Southern territories, Oromia and Amhara 
regions are the major producers of fruits, accounting for 59 %, 31 % 
and 6 % respectively. Compared to their respective estimated potential 
in the production of fruits, the three regions have only achieved 9 %, 
14 % and 1.4 %.
Over 98 % of fruit grown in Ethiopia is consumed fresh in the domestic 
market. The principal fruit market for the country is Addis Ababa and its 
surrounding areas, absorbing 40 % of national production. Per-capita 
fresh fruit and fruit juice consumption in the country is 5 kg/year and 
0.02 kg/year, respectively. Due to the absence of markets, postharvest 
handling facilities and processing industries, a large part of the fruit is left 
untouched, with an estimated 20 % produce waste.
In Ethiopia, fruit processing is limited mainly to extraction of fresh juice. 
Industrial processed and packed juice and syrup is mainly imported. Annual 
demand for industrial processed fruit juice is estimated to be 20 million kg 
or equivalent to USD 20 million. The table below shows the volume of 
imported juice for 2010–1012. As can be seen from the data, imports 







Small-scale farmers are the principal suppliers of fruits in Ethiopia 
(accounting for an estimated 80 % of the national production). Most of 
these producers are located in the South, Western and the Rift Valley 
regions of the country which usually depend on rain-fed systems. Unlike 
other crops such as cereals, fruits are backyard crops for smallholders. 
Figure 1
Fruit production in Ethiopia
Figure 2
Volume of imported juice, 2010–2012
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At commercial level, the main fruit producers are Lower 
Awash Agro Industry (Etfruit), africaJUICE, Jittu Horticulture 
and some private investors mainly along the Awash basin.
Farmers sell their fruit to local traders either harvested 
or on the field. In some cases the farmers are organized 
into trading cooperatives. Both local traders and the co-
operative union sort and ship the produce to the regional 
or central market. In most cases, negotiations are done 
with regional or central buyers before the produce leaves 
the store, to minimize the high risk of perishability. Few 
mango and papaya trading unions are connected to pro-
cessors in Addis Ababa or sometimes export to neigh-
boring countries such as Sudan and Djibouti or Somalia.
Over 60 % of the fruit collected by local traders is trans-
ported to Addis Ababa, while the rest is consumed at 
local and regional levels. Nearly all the fruit that comes 
to Addis is traded at the Piassa Fruit and Vegetable Mar-
ket Centre and then distributed to other wholesalers, 
hotels, restaurants and retail markets, as well as to con-
sumers within the surrounding areas of the city. Since 
there are no cooling systems, only fresh products are 
traded at the Piassa market. Usually products of high 
quality are supplied to supermarkets for international 
and high-income consumers.
Bigger commercial farms such as Lower Awash Agro 
Industry and Jittu Horticulture have their own distribu-
tion and retail outlets in Addis. Etfruit (retail branch of 
Lower Awash Agro Industry) is the most prominent chain 
retailer of fruit in Addis Ababa. In the urban areas, in 
particular in Addis Ababa, there are sufficient quantities 
of fruit at markets, but demand for fresh fruits is limited 
given that most consumers cannot afford them. Except for bananas, fruit 
is consumed by middle and higher income classes, which represent no 










































































Key actors in the fruit juice sub-sector in Ethiopia
26
IntroductionEthiopia africaJUICE
The chart below shows the overall business model of the company. The main sources for input for the processing 
plant currently are the company’s own farms at Degaga and Menberehiwot. The mango supply comes mainly from 
unions and large-scale commercial farmers based in Southern and Western Ethiopia, in Arbaminch and Assosa areas. 
Nearly all of the concentrated juice is exported to The Netherlands. Though the company mainly exports juices to the 
international market, it also supplies smaller quantities to international hotels in Addis Ababa and other major cities. 
Background information 
on the company
AfricaJUICE is a Dutch-based tropical fruit producer and 
processing company with an ambitious target to become 
a major producer and exporter of tropical fruit juices, 
purees and concentrates from selected countries in Africa 
to the larger markets of Europe and the Middle East. 
The company started operations in Ethiopia in 2008 by 
acquiring state-owned farms in the Upper Awash Valley. 
Since then, it has invested over € 12 million to reha-
bilitate and expand the previously state-owned fruit 
farms and establish a fruit processing plant. A total of 
2 400 employees, mostly women, work for africaJUICE. 
This investment involves the development of a dedicated 
plantation of 600 hectares of yellow passion fruit; an 
additional plantation of 600 hectares of other tropical 
fruits such as mango and papaya; and the construction 
of a new fruit processing facility. The company has set up 
a fruit processing plant with a capacity of 6 000 kg/hr of 
passion fruit and 3 000 kg/hr of mango.
AfricaJUICE farms and factory have been developed to 
be at the leading edge of sustainable development and 
aim to be a benchmark for how foreign direct investment 
is delivered in Africa. An integral part of the project is the 
active promotion of an out-grower scheme, resulting in 
new producer cooperatives (in total approx. 1 300 hec-
tares) becoming suppliers to the new processing plant, 
as well as part shareholders of its local Ethiopian plan-
tation and processing business. In effect, this gives the 
cooperatives efficient access to export markets and much 









































Business model of africaJUICE
For the next three years the company is planning to establish at least three production locations across Africa. Focus 
currently is on expanding the product range and passion fruit plantings. The approach is to secure the delivery of this 
project and then replicate the success of the model in other locations in Ethiopia and across Africa. These other loca-
tions will both expand the volume potential of the company’s existing products and diversify the product range into 




Approx. 13 out 
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It started with 13 ha, currently it is 10.5 ha, and the 
plan was to grow to 54 ha by end of 2014, 80 target 
households; when fully operational: 700 ha, and 
700 households
ADDITIONAL COMMENTARY ON VC
Supply of inputs
Company is providing inputs for farmers on credit 
bases: seedling, fertilizer, wires, poles, water, 
irrigation system.
Markets
The company exports juice concentrate to the EU; 
prices of international market is very unstable; 
there are not many buyers (only 2 companies); 
main competitions comes from Latin-America
Processing
Farmers collect fruits and deliver them to the 
collection centre; quality inspection is done at point 
of delivery; company has own storage on factory 
side. So fare, there is no quality rejection not to 
further discourage farmers. Company needs to 
collect fruits for 3-4 days to have enough input for 
batch processing.










Value chain of africaJUICE
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The passion fruit  
out-growers model
The Out-grower Incubator Program that partners with 
local farmers to supply fruit to africaJUICE for processing 
is an important strategic component of the company 
business model. The program is supported by ICCO, 
Rabobank Foundation and GIZ, and implemented by 
local partners to supplement the supply of fruit to the 
processing facility and extend community participation. 
It aims to promote the development of 700 hectares of 
out-grower farms involving over 700 households in Upper 
Awash by 2015.  
The out-grower scheme started in 2010 on 13 ha of 
farmland as a demonstration to surrounding farmers. 
This was completed in 2013 and now another 10.5 ha 
involving 16 households are growing and supplying pas-
sion fruit to the company. The project team is working 
to expand coverage to 54 ha (88 households) by the end 
of 2014. The first phase of the project was based on 
furrow irrigation, but the 10.5 ha functioning now and 
all the expansion plans will be based on drip irrigation 
which is considered water-efficient. The requirement for 
taking part in the out-grower scheme is to have land and 
the willingness to grow passion fruit with the requisite 
commitment and diligence.
Under the existing out-grower arrangement, africaJUICE 
provides new technologies such as access to water, 
fertilizer, chemicals, trailers, poles and other materials 
required to grow passion fruit on a credit basis. The 
out-grower project team provides technical support 
(agronomic advice, cooperative management and mo-
bilization) to the farmers. On the other hand, the farmers 
are fully responsible for taking care of the day-to-day 
management of the crop including planting, weed-
ing, pollinating, pruning and collecting fruit. In order to 
maximize their returns, farmers are allowed to grow dif-
ferent pulses and vegetables intercropped with the pas-
sion fruit. The intercropping is said to be essential for 
the purpose of ensuring that farmers remain profitable.
Financial support
Rabobank
Financial & Technical support 
in Organization
ICCO
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Guaranteed market @ floor + price




Key actors of the out-grower project
The program is supported by ICCO, 
Rabobank Foundation and GIZ, and 
implemented by local partners to 
supplement the supply of fruit to 
the processing facility and extend 
community participation. It aims 
to promote the development of 
700 hectares of out-grower farms 
involving over 700 households in 
Upper Awash by 2015.
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Current inclusiveness 
of the chain
AfricaJUICE out-grower incubation project can be seen as the first well-structured model 
in Ethiopia. The project started well with a series of stakeholder engagement efforts 
involving farmers, local authorities, regional and national government, as well as de-
velopment organizations that advocate inclusiveness. As passion fruit was a new crop to 
the local farmers, the company tried to set up demonstration plots on farmers’ land to 
raise awareness and give practical advice. 
Managing expectations and priorities
Besides the two principal actors—company and out-grower 
farmers—there are a number of other organizations in-
volved in the passion fruit out-grower scheme. ICCO, 
Rabobank and GIZ supported the scheme technically 
and financially while Oromia Regional Government 
(Cooperative and Marketing Agency, Bureau of Agri-
culture) is involved as regulator and mediator between 
the two. Local and international BDS service provid-
ers—(FFARM, FCE, F&S, Fair Trade) are also involved in 
coaching and training farmers. Conceptually the chain 
structure (of both the main actors, supporters and facilita-
tors) is quite good, but it seems that this has brought 
undesirable effects such as conflicting priorities of part-
ners, high expectation at the early stage and a feeling of 
being over-crowded with visitors—leading to loss of trust 














1. Chain wide collaboration
2. Effective market linkages
3. Fair and transparent
governance









AfricaJUICE provides a guaranteed market for the farmers based on floor pricing. Farmers get this minimum price 
even when international prices are lower, but adjustments are made when international prices increase. This has 
two important benefits:
1. On the one hand, it creates a stable market for farmers who traditionally suffer from unstable markets for their 
vegetables and fruits. 
2. The floor price is an important factor for the farmers to minimize risk. By so doing the company transfers the risk 
to itself. As per the existing agreement, prices are adjusted on a monthly basis taking international markets into 
account, but the floor price changes only once in a year.
Innovation within the model seems on the high side. Starting from the company business model itself, passion fruit 
is a new product to Ethiopia and the processing factory as well as export of concentrated juice to Europe is quite 
different. Likewise incorporating out-growers as a strategic component of the business with technical backstopping 
and guidance is not common in Ethiopia. Generally, farmers are trained and encouraged to practice innovative ways 
of doing things such as weeding and intercropping. 
Fair and transparent governance, including details regarding roles, responsibilities and expectations in terms of 
price and quality, are stipulated in the contract. In addition, the company, in partnership with development organizations 
(ICCO, Rabobank and GIZ), has assigned a dedicated out-growers incubator project office with four people who work 
with farmers on a fulltime basis. Efforts are also ongoing to obtain fair trade registration for the farmers. 
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Challanges
Agronomics and complementary technologies
Farmers are generally open to complementary innovation rather than disruptive 
ones. In a new agricultural venture, it is important to thoroughly account for existing 
wisdom and practices in land preparation, crop management, post-harvest manage-
ment and delivery. If both the product and the management are new, not only will 
the resistance be greater, but the likelihood of mistakes that stifle quick wins would 
also be high. Passion fruit for africaJUICE out-grower farmers is a good example in 
this context. The agronomics of passion fruit is much different from that of traditional 
crops such as maize and sorghum, as it needs more days for weeding, pruning, pollina-
tion and seed collection; farmers need to work on their field for nearly 10 months in a 
year, as opposed to 2–3 months for maize. Furthermore, although the drip irrigation 
system is optimal, it is not appreciated by the farmers, mainly due to lack of water for 
the passion fruit and intercrops, and also because the technology is not as common 
as furrow irrigation. 
Progress  
monitoring
There was also a baseline 
survey at the beginning of 
the project to profile the 
livelihood and income of 
the farmers involved in 
the project. However, a 
second-round impact as-
sessment has not been 
conducted mainly be-
cause the project has not 
progressed as originally 
planned.
Lack of trust
Though there are efforts to enhance fairness and transpar-
ency, there seem to be a lot to improve in building mutual 
trust and confidence. A number of farmers complained about 
the lack of information about how prices are set for their pas-
sion fruit and how costs are accounted for the inputs (ferti-
lizer, chemical, water, pools, trails etc.) that are provided by 
the company. In addition, farmers mentioned the unfulfilled 
promises (yield/ha was not as expected), the limited decision-
making power of people assigned to them, and slow attend-
ance to problems on the ground. The farmers also noted that 
the price for passion fruit was not sufficient to compensate 
them for their efforts. The cost and irregularities around inputs 
supplied by the company resulted in poor yields for the farm-
ers. Though a promise has been made and some actions have 
been undertaken to link farmers with financial service provid-
ers, accessing financial resources has yet to be realized. 
Implementation of the  
innovation concept
Looking at facts on the ground, it seems 
that operational bottlenecks have seri-
ously stifled the innovation concept. 
During discussions with cooperative 
members and leaders, a number of 
them complained that the company was 
not providing them sufficient water, 
the drip system did not work, the ag-
ronomics of the crop were complicated 
and more farmer days were required 
on the field for pollinating, pruning 
and collection, while the comparative re-
turns with maize and other fruits and 
vegetables was low. 
Lack of transparency in pricing
Though the guaranteed market and floor 
price are seen as positive by farmers and 
stakeholders involved, there are a number 
of concerns that came out during the field 
research. According to the farmers’ co-
operative leaders, prices are not regularly 
reviewed. For instance over the last three 
years only a few updates were made. 
Farmers also complained about their lack 
of access to the global fruit magazine 
price index, even though the company had 
promised to disclose this information in the 
local language on a monthly basis.
Access to water is seen as a major fac-
tor for out-grower farmers in the first 
phase. Some also valued the ‘pay as 
you sell’ credit arrangement, as well as 
the job opportunities created for them 
on the farm and in the company factory. 
The farmers also have access to busi-
ness development services including 
expertise from abroad. Despite the cost 
and irregularities in supply, the com-
pany’s attempt to arrange supply of 
inputs is seen as positive. 
Economic return per hectare is the 
key index for measuring the outcomes 
of this venture. Generally, this is well 
known and predictable. The fact that a 
minimum price is set at the start means 
farmers can estimate their yields and 
work out roughly what to expect in 
terms of returns. Normally harvesting 
and delivery takes place on a daily 
basis for 10 months and farmers are 
paid every two weeks.
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 › Managing expectations and building trustful 
partnerships
Expectations are usually high when an international 
company enters into the kind of venture africaJUICE has 
established. Without fully understanding the costs of 
running an operation such as africaJUICE, farmers expect 
the company can provide them inputs such as fertilizer, 
chemicals, seedlings, etc. for free or at minimal cost. 
Furthermore, they expect the company to pay higher 
prices for produce. With many donor organizations and 
international or local experts engaging farmers, these 
expectations are set to rise. Consequently, it is impor-
tant for the company to start lean and to be clear and 
assertive about what they can and cannot provide. In 
this regard it is worth understanding the socio-cultural 
context of farmers in order to craft communications in 
line with their social values. 
 › Stakeholder engagement
Engaging with stakeholders and creating mutual under-
standing is not difficult in the early stages or when the 
project is functioning smoothly. The main challenge is 
to maintain the momentum when operational bottle-
necks emerge during the implementation phase. In the 
business model, there are three categories of stakehold-
ers involved in the out-grower scheme: the principals 
(company and farmers), the partners and the facilita-
tors. Engagement with all these groups on a different or 
shared platform is important. A deeper dialogue between 
the company and farmers should be based on factual 
and assertive assumptions about what the company can 
offer, what the farmers need to contribute, what aspects 
Success factors 
are going to be different in the new venture, what will 
happen when either party do not meet expectations etc. 
It is important to have someone who understands the 
values and principles of the company, such as a more 
progressive representative of the farmers and possibly 
have a third party (government) as well to participate in 
the series of dialogues. Engagement with government 
and donor organizations should focus on laying mutual in-
tervention strategies that maximize the benefit to farmers 
and to the company. As much as possible, issues under 
discussion should not be disclosed to avoid raising ex-
pectations.
 › More business drive
In any out-grower scheme the bottom-line should be the 
business—returns for the farmers and the company. At 
the early stage, such results may not be visible or may 
be difficult to forecast, but more time and effort should 
be made to deeply understand the potential economic 
returns when starting the venture. Once the business re-
turn is properly analyzed, decisions and choices should 
be left to the principal actors (company and farmers). 
Sometimes strong involvement of development part-
ners at the early stage may bring undesirable impacts 
such as reducing trust and clarity between farmers and 
company, as development organizations focus more on 
the process side rather than the end result. Also, in 
the Ethiopian context, involving government is very im-
portant as they are generally supportive of this kind of 
venture, but care should be taken not to use this platform 
solely for promotion. 
 › Enhancing farm-level income—Intercropping
The guaranteed and stable market access for passion fruit 
may be an innovative model, but the cost of production 
and farm management makes it comparatively less profit-
able for farmers. Intercropping of passion fruit with crops 
like onion, pepper, cabbage and haricot bean gives substan-
tial and quick returns for the farmers and compensates for 
the lost income from growing passion fruit. Consequently, 
steps have already been taken to support farmers to adopt 
intercropping, but performance of the intercrops has been 
low due to shortage of water, which comes only a few days 
in a week through drip irrigation. If the water shortage is 
addressed, there is a high chance that farmers can achieve 
both year-round income from passion fruit sales and twice 
the amount of sales from other crops. 
 › Focus on products that meet the range of 
farmers’ cropping decisions
Ethiopian farming systems are mostly based on multiple 
cropping as a way of risk diversification. Decisions on 
crop mix depends on a complex set of parameters, the 
most important of which are household food security, 
economic return, susceptibility of crop to different 
risks, impact on soil fertility and farming simplicity. As 
such it may be important for the out-grower model to 
focus on crops that fit at least three of these factors.
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Moving from field to backyard
Passion fruit needs intensive management 
and such management is easy when the 
crop is near home. Family members can eas-
ily monitor the crop and can do the pollina-
tion, pruning and collection that are critical 
and long spanning activities. Besides the 
flexibility, a significant amount of time is also 
saved as the farmers don’t need to go to the 
field every day.




Most of the people working on africaJUICE’s 
main farm are women, which is one of 
the strong points of the company farms. 
However, participation of women in the 
out-growers field is minimal. Generally, 
women are more productive on crops that 
demand intensive farm management and 
hence there is a big opportunity to stimu-
late women’s participation and improve 
yields in the out-grower project. 
Out-grower scheme for other 
fruit types
There is potential for the company to ap-
ply the out-grower scheme to other fruits. 
Fruits like papaya and mango require rela-
tively less attention than passion fruit, give 
a higher yield per hectare and are also used 
by the company as export produce. Conse-
quently, they can be used as inputs in the 
out-grower scheme. 
Input distribution by  
cooperatives
Currently the company supplies inputs 
such as fertilizer, chemicals, trailers, pools 
etc., but going forward there is an opportu-
nity for the cooperatives to engage in this 
business themselves.
 › Values centered on relationships rather than 
formal agreements
In Ethiopia, social relationships are valued over con-
ventional business formalities such as legal contracts. 
Farmers tend to abide by the rules of the game when they 
have social respect for the organization. Consequently, 
having strong social ties such as spending time within the 
community, attending social events e.g. weddings and 
funerals, corporate social responsibility in education and 
health, are all heart-winning factors for sustained business 
relationships.
 › Quick wins (at any cost)
Farmers want to see returns from the new venture as 
quickly as possible, to alleviate their doubts or satisfy 
their expectations. Farmers usually maintain their belief 
in the venture when the first hit is a success, but quickly 
give up when early results are not good. In this regard, it 
is important to provide all the resources (water, fertilizer, 
chemical, agronomic support etc.) on time and in full for 
maximum returns. 
 › Lead farmers could serve as innovation heads
Not all farmers are equally responsive to new technology 
and new ways of doing things. Having a team of lead 
farmers for innovation is very helpful in generating quick 
wins progressing faster during difficult periods.
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Is the business model scalable?4
Commercial viability refers to three 
elements: 
1. comparative return
2. payoff period, and 
3. cash inflow during the point of 
critical need. 
Farmers generally compare the return 
they had in the past with the current 
venture, as well as with ranges of crops 
they can grow under the new sys-
tem. Their judgment about the market 
is usually based on the high price sce-
nario that mostly prevails prior to the 
planting period. Long-term impact of a 
stable/guaranteed market is less visible 
for them than the one-time maximiza-
tion. As such, the payoff from the early 
sales and waiting time between planting 
and first harvest, are critical viability 
indices. Cash inflows during September 
(when the children go school), January 
(when land lease is paid to government) 
and holidays such as Christmas, Easter 
and Ethiopian New Year, are important 
factors that affect decisions and emo-
tional attachments.
The company is determined to scale up the out-grower scheme to an additional 56 ha 
(88 households) by the end of 2014 and this number is expected to rise to 700 ha (1 000 house-
holds) in the next five years. Despite the different critical issues, africaJUICE out-grower 
project is one of the most structured and well-designed inclusive models in Ethiopia. 
Four factors seem to be critical for successful scaling of the business model:
1. Considering impact on household food security
2. Simplifying the technology
3. Revalidating commercial viability
4. Building trust and emotional attachment with farmers.
Building trust and emotional attachment between the company and the farmers is 
important in a highly relationship-based society like Ethiopia. The businesses need 
to reach the heart and minds of people through open dialogue and proven actions 
to remove some of the doubts. In this regard, focusing on corporate social respon-
sibility, engagement platforms, and getting support from community elders and 
influential figures could prove useful. Supporting schools, clinics, and other public 
institutions within the district usually influences farmers and encourages a sense of 
commitment. Ongoing engagement platforms with farmers, government and other 
important stakeholders also helps to address recurring and emerging bottlenecks 
such as contractual issues (price, quality, cost sharing), expansion strategies, and di-
vision of roles and responsibilities. For effective engagement platforms, maintaining 
people within the platform for a long period could help reduce the cost of learning 
and normalization. 
In subsistence farming, food security is 
a key farming decision factor. As such, 
food crops like maize, teff and sorghum 
are prioritized as these crops are utilized 
at home. The amount of additional land 
available for these crops significantly influ-
ences the willingness of farmers to commit 
to long-term out-grower agreements. In 
addition, when taking the decision wheth-
er to grow a crop, farmers consider the 
following:
1. Marketability of the new product 
(should be readily convertible to cash).
2. Possibility to purchase other availa-
ble and affordable food crops in the 
market. If farmers use the land to 
produce crops they cannot consume 
themselves, they need to be able to 
buy food crops in the market.
Technological simplicity implies both the 
tools and practices deployed in the new 
system. Farmers are generally receptive 
to technologies that reduce cost, time 
and effort. Incremental technologies 
that build on customary wisdom and 
practices can easily assimilate into com-
munities. Technology ranges from input 
to point of product delivery (ploughing, 
input utilization, weeding, pruning, pol-
linating, harvesting, packaging, transport 
and quality). For better adoption, farmers 
need to be intensively trained and coached 
in each hardware and software. Visual or 
graphic presentations or practical demon-
strations are more effective than con-




The following table gives an overview on the different dimensions of each factor, 
and evaluates each factor in terms of importance and required action.
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Scalability Indicator High Score Assessment for this case Importance Need for action
Household food 
security
 › Product home use  › Passion fruit is not utilized at home Medium
 › Availability of additional land and labor to 
grow food crops
 › Farmers in the area have additional (TAKE OUT tract of) land  
(area under passion fruit accounts for 25 % of their land) High
 › Marketability of alternative cash crop  › Guaranteed market with minimum price High
 › Availability and affordability of food crops in 
the local market
 › Maize, sorghum are available at fair prices during harvest period 
but price goes up at off-season High
Technological 
simplicity
 › Cost and time saving  › 4 man-days per month for 10 months High
 › Building on local wisdom and practice  › New crop and new farming system (imported from Latin America) Medium
 › Agronomic simplicity (farmer friendliness)  › Planting, weeding, pruning, pollinating, harvesting all are labor 
intensive High
 › Technical coaching and training  › Dedicated out-grower team and external consultants coaching 
and training farmers High
Commercial viability  › Comparative return/ha  › Passion fruit and intercrop have comperable return to that of onion 
and tomato, but the former requires more upfront investment High
 › Payoff period  › First sales come after 9 months and goes to 3.5 years Medium
 › Cash inflow at key times  › Passion fruit gives continuous cash inflow for 10 months after first 
harvest, but other crops are one-off Medium
 › Cost of new technology (labor, material, etc.)  › Production cost per ha for passion fruit is higher than many crops High
Trust and emotional 
attachment
 › Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)  › africaJUICE and its partners provided irrigation system Medium
 › Engagement platforms  › Outgrower coordination team engages farmers on daily basis 
and also closely work with local authorities High
 › Support from Key figures/Elders  › One model farmer strongly advocates the model but there is 
need to get more farmers on board High
Assessment of scalability
Color Keys • should be addressed to scale-up• immediate attention/intervention is needed
• should be improved to scale-up
• close monitoring is needed
• should be maintained to scale-up
• things are going well
Figure 7
Scalability matrix for africaJUICE Out-growers Incubator Project
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Agriculture accounts for 41.4 % of the total Ethiopi-
an GDP and 84 % livelihood (World Bank, 2006). 
Seed is one of the most crucial elements in 
the livelihoods of agricultural communities. Sus-
tained increase in agricultural production and 
productivity largely depend on the development 
of new and improved varieties of crops. Increas-
ing quality and usage of improved seed has the 
potential to dramatically increase Ethiopia’s 
annual crop production. For example, by adopt-
ing commercial seeds in combination with best 
practice techniques on a quarter of the current 
crop area, research indicates that farmers could 
increase production and productivity by twofold 
(Dercon, 2009).
The total annual demand for seed in Ethiopia in 
2013/14 is estimated to be over 2.7 million tons 
or equivalent to USD 1.13 billion in value (MoA, 
2013). Average annual growth rate for the last 
seven years has been 59.4 %. The lion’s share of 
this demand comes from small-scale farmers. 
Total supply of improved seeds for the 2012/13 
harvest year was 0.11 million tons, equivalent to 
4 % of the estimated demand.
Introduction1
Hybrid maize Cows grazing in the field
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The seed supply system in Ethiopia can 
be divided into two broad categories: formal and informal systems. The formal 
system is divided into public and private 
seed (companies and producers). These 
are enterprises that are legally licensed 
to produce and sell seed of food and 
cash crops. The private seed producers, 
public seed enterprises, and the (inter)
nationally operating seed companies 
are involved in the production of certi-
fied seed using known sources of basic 
improved and released seed varieties. 
The informal seed sector has two main sub-components: farmer-saved and local seed business. This sector accounts for over 90 % 
of the market share. Unlike the formal sector, there is no licensing and certification here. The farmer-saved seed comprises both 
local varieties as well as improved varieties that have been accessed through the formal distribution system. Local seed business 
constitutes a seed system in an intermediary position, between formal and informal systems. Since seed in this system is not neces-
sarily certified, varieties being both local and improved, dissemination varies from bartering to commercial approaches.      
Value chainThe Ethiopian seed system has been con-
fronted with several challenges; among the 
main problems are: 
 › lack of proper linkages between differ-
ent actors involved in seed systems;
 › inadequate supply of good quality seed 
at affordable prices; 
 › focus on a few crops (e.g. maize and 
wheat) in the formal system; 
 › beneficial crops (such as pulses and 
oilseeds) remain orphans;
 › low level of private sector involvement 
in the formal system; 
 › inefficient seed promotion, distribution 
and marketing mechanisms; 
 › weak variety release and seed quality 
assurance system.
 › cheap and readily available;
 › built on indigenous knowledge;
 › adapted to local agro-ecology;
 › simple and allows use of seed 
after primary adaptation test;
 › no robust quality assurance 
mechanism and seed is not 
licensed.
 › based on a series of trials and certi-
fication that takes up to 3-5 years;
 › supplied and distributed by licensed 
enterprises;
 › there is a regular quality assurance 
and monitoring mechanism;


















The strategic focus of 
Ethiopia’s seed sector 
is to develop seed for 
food crops (maize, teff 
and wheat) and cash 
crops (coffee, sesame 
and horticulture).
The overall structure of the Ethiopian 
seed sector is illustrated in the diagram 
below. The Ministry of Agriculture 
(MoA) is responsible for assessing na-
tional seed demand and supply, as well 
as developing strategies to address any 
shortages, in partnership with the re-
gional bureau of agriculture. The strategic focus of Ethiopia’s seed sector is to develop 
seed for food crops (maize, teff and wheat) and cash crops (coffee, sesame and horti-
culture) (EARO, 2002; MoARD, 2004). As it stands now, the Ethiopian Institute of Agri-
cultural Research and the Regional Agricultural Research Institute are the main bodies 
developing seed varieties. Variety development takes place both at research centers 
and on farmers’ lands.
Figure 1
Stucture of the seed sector 
in Ethiopia
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The main products are cereals (teff, wheat and 
hybrid maize); Almost all farmers are located in the 
surroundings of Ambo (radius of 10-15kms)
ADDITIONAL COMMENTARY ON VC
Supply of inputs
Gadisa Gobena Farm supply seed to the outgrowers, agronomic 
extension support. Currently, farmers get fertilizers, herbicides 
and pesticides from the Union, but very soon, they will get the 
chemicals from the Farm Centre. Farmers get trashing machines 
from Gadisa Gobena Farm.
Markets
Until recently, all the seed was sold to the Ethiopian 
Oromia Seed Enterprise. But this year, the company 
got authorization to directly deliver to farmers and 
farmer organizations.
Processing
Gadisa Gobena Farm does the supervising of 
trashing by farmers to ensure quality control. After 
trashing, seed are transferred to Gadisa Gobena 
Farm for cleaning and packaging. Gadisa Gobena 
Farm distributed 350 tons of seed produced on own 











Value chain of Gadisa Gobena 
Commercial Farms PLC
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The dairy and animal husbandry business is based at Ambo town and Horo. The farm owns over 50 local breed and 
15 hybrid milk cows with an estimated annual milk volume of 108 tons distributed to residents of Ambo town at a 
comparatively fair price. Besides the milk, GGCF distributes hybrid calves and provides an insemination service to lo-
cal farmers. Recently, GGCF started a feed processing plant (machines have been imported and waiting for a power 
transmission line to be erected). The feed processing plant will have an annual production capacity of 1 000 tons and 
will generate 100 employment opportunities. The target is to supply feed to local farmers and dairy producers. GGCF 
has a strategic advantage in feed production because they can produce maize and soybean (key feed ingredients) on 
their own farm. The ultimate target going forward is to build a milk processing plant.
The apiculture and forestry development businesses are based at the Horo farm which occupies an area of 500 ha of 
forest with over 50 bee hives. Forestry development has been cited as an exemplary model for its contribution to 
environmental rehabilitation. After years of environmental protection, the availability of natural ground water in-
creased and springs that were previously dried out started to flow. GGCF produces 20 tons of honey which is sold at 
the central market. Beside its own farm, the company collects honey from surrounding farmers. The farmers are given 
technical training and lent honey-collecting equipment. 
Background information 
on the company
Gadisa Gobena Commercial Frams PLC (GGCF) is based 
in Ambo town in Oromia Regional State. It was estab-
lished in 1993 and currently has over 600 ha of land at 
Ambo and Shambu areas. The company is engaged in 
four major businesses:
1. seed multiplication and distribution
2. dairy and animal husbandry
3. apiculture
4. forestry. 
Recently, GGCF added a farm service center to its product 
portfolio. Overall, it has employed 100 people and dealt 
with over 1 000 household farmers in the region.
Seed multiplication has two models: own farm and out-
grower. The company has 500 ha of land dedicated to 
improved seed production while the out-grower farm is 
about 50 ha. The most common seeds grown and dis-
tributed by GGCF are maize, teff, wheat and chickpea 
varieties. GGCF distributed 370 tons of seed produced 















































Volume of distributed seed
Figure 3
The business model of Gadisa 
Gobena Commercial Farms PLC
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The farm service center is a new initiative supported by a USAID project. The center is 
a one-stop farmer’s shop where all kinds of products and services (improved seed, 
pesticides and herbicides, fertilizer, farm equipment, veterinary and artifical insemina-
tion [AI] services) are sold. This business is, in a way, unique to Ethiopia. The products 
and services are intended to be co-created with the farmers. Farmers will be trained 
and introduced to new technologies and their application. 
GGCF has been working with small-scale farmers in seed multiplication both as seed 
supplier-buyer and in the out-grower scheme. The company is one of the few licensed 
private seed-growers in Ethiopia and has been supplying improved hybrid maize, teff 
and wheat to local farmers at affordable prices. Currently, GGCF is supplying seed to 
over 100 farmers in West Shewa and East Welega zones. GGCF has a strategic vision 
to serve communities in a commercially viable way by delivering improved varie-
ties and agronomic support. The company supplies seed from its own farm and 
out-growers’ land. Under the existing out-grower arrangement, the two parties (the 
company and the smallholder farmer) sign a contractual agreement that stipulates the 
farmers should contribute land, labor and day-to-day management of the field while 
the company provides seed, agronomic advice and a threshing service. The agreement 
also states that the smallholder should, in principle, sell to the commercial farmers at 
the prevailing market price. The costs incurred by the company are normally recovered 
from the final price. In the supplier-buyer relationship, GGCF provides after-sales ser-
vices such as coaching and extension support to farmers who purchased seed from the 
company. There is no formal agreement in the delivery of these after-sales services.
Both business and social factors drive the engagement between Gadisa Gobena Farm 
and small-scale farmers. Despite high regulation and a price ceiling, GGCF sees the 
seed sector as an opportunity that fits its business model of working with small-scale 
farmers. Given the chronic shortage of seed in the area where GGCF is based, the 
company stepped in to fill the supply gap. For the farmers this is an opportunity to get 
access to improved seed at affordable prices equivalent to that of the local unions or 
public seed enterprises.
The business case for the out-grower model is to share risk as well as diversify the 
supply chain for GGCF. The mix of out-grower farmers is determined based on the will-
ingness of farmers to open up to new initiatives. In most of the cases, these farmers are 
model farmers who are more open to new technologies and socially respected within 
the community.
Besides the economic aspects, there are also social causes driving this business model. 
Mr Gadisa, the owner and manager of GGCF, is a strongly social entrepreneur, who is 
emotionally attached to agricultural families. He believes that he can make a difference 










































































Key actors working with Gadisa 
Gobena Commercial Farms PLC
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Clarifying expectations and 
emotional attachment
At the heart of creating more empowering 
relationships between buyers and farmers’ 
organizations (and between farmers’ organi-
zations and farmers) is a shift in attitude and 
expectations. To move forward, it is im-
portant that companies perceive farmers 
as active partners and not passive benefi-
ciaries. At the same time, farmers need to 
understand the commercial interests of the 
business, which go far beyond philanthropy. 
In general, there is a social or philanthropic 
sentiment among small-scale farmers in 
Ethiopia when a private business approach-
es them for partnership. This is mainly 
because of the old paradigm of aid-driven 
support resulting in dependence syn-
drome, and to some extent it also relates 
to the socialist thinking where people rely 
on government systems.
Current inclusiveness of the chain
The experience of GGCF in the seed sector seems to 
be half of a success story. The seed distribution system 
seems commercially viable. The overall seed demand 
has been increasing by over 20 % during the last two 
years. Farmers who planted Gadisa Gobena Farm seed 
think that the quality is better than seed from public 
enterprises such as the Ethiopian Seed Enterprise and 
Oromia Seed Enterprise. The after-sales service (consul-
tation on planting, weeding and harvesting, and provi-
sion of harvesting equipment) is strongly appreciated as 
a good method of technology and knowledge transfer. 
The fact that the farm is close to farmers is also seen as 
a positive factor that creates emotional attachment and 
a sense of belonging. In addition, price is seen as compa-
rable to that of the public seed enterprises. GGCF has a 
very strong experience in training and coaching farmers. 
Coaching and trainings are conducted both on-farm and 
off-farm at least four times a year. Farmers attend field 
days held at the GGCF or at model farmers’ fields so that 
farmers can visualize the difference in improved seed, 
share best practices and inspire each other, receive 
training and coaching about the importance of improved 
seed and agronomic support. The backward and forward 
feedback within the system is very positive.
However, the venture also shows weaknesses. Although 
there is a general claim that household income has in-
creased, there was hardly any quantifiable evidence to 
substantiate this claim. The venture has been heavily 
dependent on traditional cereals such as hybrid maize, 
wheat and teff. This is partially understandable as vari-
ety development in Ethiopia is carried out by govern-
ment research institutes, but the venture could have 
done better in replenishing diversity with better value 
crops. Even within the existing crop range, introduction 
of new varieties is relatively weak. For the last three 
years mostly the same varieties have been targeted and 
there are currently no more in the pipeline. The level 
of commitment, particularly on the smallholder side, is 
another area that needs improvement. Seed production 
demands extra effort and cost in terms of input appli-
cation, agronomic follow-up and post-harvest handling. 
However, these factors are considered overwhelming on 
the part of the farmers. Consequently, the out-grower 
business has declined over the last two years due to lack 


















3. Fair and transparent
governance
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Getting into the heart and mind of farmers requires a series of deep dialogue and 
proven actions. In Ethiopia, social relationships are valued over conventional business 
formalities such as legal contracts. Farmers tend to abide by the rules of the game 
when they have social respect for the person in the organization. As such, having strong 
social ties such as spending time within the community, attending social events such as 
weddings and funerals, corporate social responsibility (CSR) support in education and 
health, are heart-winning factors for sustained business relationships.
Engaging in public-private partnership
Effective public-private partnership is a critical success factor in the Ethiopian business 
context in general and in the seed sector in particular. On top of the traditional role of 
defining and enforcing generally binding laws and providing infrastructure and market 
intelligence support, government has a number of direct roles within the seed sector. 
Private seed producers are reliant on governments for the following:
 › supply of seed varieties (variety development and release is solely controlled by 
public research institutes);
 › price is regulated by government;
 › public seed enterprises are usually principal buyers and used as distribution chan-
nels by private seed suppliers; 
 › quality assurance and certification are carried out by government entities. 
In addition, government has a strong influence on farmers’ cropping decisions through 
public extension agents and local administrative bodies. Due to all these reasons, en-
gagement with government bodies is a highly critical success factor. In addition to 
government, there are a number of non-governmental organizations working in the 
seed sector: the Local Seed Business (LSB) unit of the Wageningen UR Centre for 
Development Innovation (CDI), USAID, Gates Foundation on value chains and nitrogen 
fixation, and AGRA on variety development. These organizations could help in facilitat-
ing access to finance for the farmers, providing business plan training and also linking 
GGCF with international seed companies.
Ongoing coaching and follow-up 
Building a small-scale inclusive business requires a large amount of information. This 
begins as the overall approach is being conceived, and over time a new business will 
need detailed information on existing models and solutions, market data, technical in-
formation about products and practices that might be integrated into the business, and 
more. This information derives from many different sources, and it is difficult to assess 
its overall availability, as environments differ across the region. However, it is clear that 
access to information in Africa remains constrained by a lack of communications con-
nectivity, and that data specifically related to the low-income market is limited.
Compared to grain production, seed production demands robust extension support: 
proper land preparation, fertilizer and seed application to the right specification, weed-
ing and regular agronomic follow-up. There should also be proper care at harvesting 
and threshing as well as post-harvest management.  For all this to happen there must 
be regular coaching, follow-up and training for farmers.
Quick return and increasing scale
When companies consider investing in starting or scaling inclusive business models, they 
compare the expected rates of return with those of alternative investments. Inclusive 
business investments may have lower expected rates of return because the cost or risk 
of doing business at base-of-the-pyramid markets is high, anticipated margins are low, 
and/or a long time horizon is needed to break even. Base-of-the-pyramid markets may 
also be so new and unfamiliar that expected rates of return cannot be calculated with 
enough certainty. Both of these circumstances make it difficult for corporate decision-
makers to justify the opportunity cost of investing in starting or scaling inclusive business 
models when other investments with higher, more certain rates of return are available.
However, generating quick profit is a very important success factor when the business 
partner has limited access to internal and external sources of finance. Profit serves as 
a quick win to build confidence of farmers and motivate the business partner to con-
tinue the business engagement. GGCF is an example of emerging companies that have 
limited financial capacity and hence the quick return from the seed business is one way 
of sustaining the engagement. 
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Including fruits and vegetables 
in the seed assortment
One possible area for further inclusive-
ness is to introduce new seed assortment, 
particularly fruit and vegetable seed. Ambo 
is located within a 200 km radius of Addis 
Ababa where there is a big market op-
portunity. The agro-ecology is suitable for 
growing vegetables such as potato and 
onion, and fruits such as mid-land apple. 
Having fruits and vegetables in the seed 
business is interesting both from a market 
viewpoint as well as for gender empower-
ment. From the market side, fruit and 
vegetables fetch a high value per hectare, 
while from the empowerment perspec-
tive it is mainly women who are involved 
in fruit and vegetable farming, which pro-
vides an important source of income for 
households. 
Possibility to increase  
inclusiveness
3
Forward integration with the 
feed processing plant
The other opportunity is in creating a mar-
ket for forward chain integration. The com-
pany is setting up an animal feed process-
ing plant which uses maize, soybean and 
chickpea as the main ingredients. This will 
create an opportunity for farmers growing 
these crops. For GGCF, it will also create an 
opportunity to act as an input supplier as 
well as a market for farmers. Furthermore, 
by supplying the right seed and providing 
extension support, including post-harvest 
management, the quality of raw materials 
can be improved.
The farm center will serve as a one-stop shop and knowledge 
transfer hub 
In addition to the seed business, the farm centre is another big opportunity for 
enhancing inclusiveness. It is a model one-stop shop launched in six places within 
Oromia region. The project is supported by USAID and based on farmers’ needs. It 
is planned to serve as a one-stop shop for farmers where they can get seed, fertilizer, 
herbicides, pesticides, veterinarian services, AI and training on agronomic prac-
tices as well as rental of machinery. It will also serve as an off-farm training and 
coaching center. This provides an interesting opportunity for resource-poor farm-
ers to enhance their agricultural knowledge and information as well as obtain all 
the necessary inputs to help them increase their income, improve their livelihood 
and ensure sustainability by enhancing their resource use efficiency (water, forest, 
cropland and grazing land). 
Out-grower scheme for apiculture and 
distributor scheme for milk
The dairy and apiculture businesses also have potential 
for enhancing inclusiveness in the form of out-grower 
or distributor models. The honey out-grower model is 
very popular in Ethiopia. The fact that the honey market 
(domestic and export) is untapped means that GGCF has 
a big window of opportunity to increase its current vol-
ume by having out-grower farmers. For the dairy busi-
ness, the company can step out of distribution, which 
is logistically complex, by subcontracting the activity to 
women’s self-help groups.  
‘Having fruits and vegetables in the seed busi-
ness is interesting both from a market view-
point as well as for gender empowerment. 
From the market side, fruit and vegetables 
fetch a high value per hectare, while from 
the empowerment perspective it is mainly 
women who are involved in fruit and vege-
table farming, which provides an important 
source of income for households.’
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Scalability indicators
Is the business model scalable?4
Any agricultural technology should be packed with the right know-how and relevant services. The fifth 
scalability indicator is packaged service, which refers to access to finance and to business development 
services (both upstream and downstream). Farmers have a shortage of cash to buy seed and agricultural inputs 
that are the key success factors. The economic development of low-income communities is vulnerable to the 
financial shock of adverse events such as crop failure, serious illness, death and natural disasters. Such shocks 
can wipe out years of steady progress by a household in a matter of months. These communities also have lim-
ited access to insurance products that could help them manage these risks more effectively.
1 Impact on household food security
2 Commercial variability
3 Technical simplicity and adaptability
4 Public-private partnership
5 Packaging and relevant services 
Household food security is the most important determinant of scalability for the GGCF seed business. In 
subsistence farming, cropping decisions are highly affected by the extent to which the crop can be utilized at 
household level, or how quickly it can be converted to cash to 
purchase food crops. Gadisa Gobena Farm is currently dealing 
with cereals such as teff, wheat and maize that are main food 
crops in Ethiopian households. Ambo is a relatively surplus-
producing area and hence there is room to expand the seed 
assortment to include cash crops such as fruits and vegetables. 
Commercial viability has three components: market 
size, market distribution and profitability. Data about 
trends are hardly available, but with the growing economy 
and increasing technology penetration the demand for seed 
is growing. On the farmers’ side, market linkage is extremely 
important. In addition to market size, access to seed is very 
critical for farmers mainly because the farmers are widely 
spread, which leads to high transportation and logistics 
costs. Currently, over 90 % of the seed distribution is made 
through unions and cooperatives. The best viable option, as 
it now stands, is to maintain distribution through farmers’ 
organizations (unions and cooperatives). Profitability for 
GGCF, as well as smallholder farmers, is the other impor-
tant scalability factor. Currently the seed margin is fixed by 
government at 20 % and, as such, cost minimization is key 
to achieving better profitability. Farmers need either high-
value crops that can compensate for the lost opportunity 
in grain crops, or food security crops. A quick win is highly 
valued by farmers as it serves as evidence for the scaling-up.
The third scalability factor is technical simplicity 
and crop adaptation. When scaling up technologies, a 
major challenge for farmers is getting the full understand-
ing of the technology and its related benefits. Generally, 
farmers don’t want to spend too much time and energy 
on crops with a high cost of production (input, agronomics 
and post-harvest) and limited immediate returns. An in-
cremental technology that builds on existing wisdom and 
practices has more acceptance than radical technology. 
Likewise, cropping decisions are significantly determined 
by the risks associated with crop adaptability to disease, 
shortage/excessive rainfall and other natural calamities. 
The fourth important factor is public-private partnership. As mentioned before, government has strong 
hands in the seed business, including price-setting and influencing the type of crop decisions through exten-
sion agents and local authorities. It is the sole research and extension service provider. In addition to govern-
ment, cooperatives and unions are the other public partners. These organizations are the major distributors of 
agricultural inputs, including fertilizer and seed, to small-scale farmers. Linkages with traditional NGOs such as 
USAID and the Gates Foundation, as well as seed-related project initiatives like the Local Seed Business of CDI, 







Ethiopia Gadisa Gobena Commercial Frams PLC Is the business model scalable?
Success factors/Criteria for a high score Score for seed business Decision factor for scaling




 › Product can easily be consumed at home.
 › Product can be converted into cash or other  
food items.
 › The household is already into excess production. 
 › Teff, maize and wheat are the top three food security 
crops in Ethiopia.





 › There is enough and/or a growing market for the 
product.
 › The market can be served with prudent marketing 
and a distribution network.
 › The product is profitable for both the commercial 
farmer and the smallholder.
 › Alternative seed portfolio (fruits and vegetables).
 › Focus on cost saving.
 › Think of woereda outside the home market.
 › The seed business is highly untapped and growing at 
an average of 25 % per annum.
 › Farmers are sparsely distributed and most have 
limited road access.
 › Teff, maize and wheat are profitable but perform less 




 › Aligning with government seed strategy (focal crops).
 › Linkage with cooperatives and unions as sales and 
distribution channels.
 › Synergy with development organizations and projects.
 › Increasing production and productivity of food 
security crops is a top priority for government, and 
all the three products fit into this agenda.
 › Ambo Union is one of the strongest in Oromia region 
and can reach millions farmers.
 › Many development organizations (Gates Foundation, 
USAID and LSB) are working in the sector within the 
area.
0.2




 › Farmes can access finance with soft colateral.
 › Repayment grace period (post-harvest repayment).
 › Low cost of finance (interest + transaction cost).
 › Robust extension and agronomic support.
 › Crop insurance.
 › Farmers can get a loan via the cooperative but it is 
inconsistent and untimely.
 › Interest rate is over 15 % (3 % above the commercial 
lending rate).
 › There are government extension agents in each 
locality but there is a large competence gap.
0.1
Assessment of scalability Figure 5







Oilseed crops are important components of 
the Ethiopian economy. They support the liveli-
hoods of over 4 million small-scale farmers and 
businesses involved in trading, transportation 
and oil crushing, as a source of employment and 
income generation (UNIDO, 2009). According 
to Central Statistical Agency (CSA, 2012), the 
country produced 0.73 million tons of oilseeds 
on a total of 0.77 million hectares of land. The 
Ethiopian oilseed sector has an estimated annual 
turnover of USD 1 billion. Together with pulses, 
the sector accounts for 25 % of export earnings. 
Oilseed crops generated over USD 480 million 
in 2012 and their export value has doubled over 
the past five years (ECRA, 2007/2012). 
Sesame is the most important export seed, ac-
counting for 90 % of oilseed exports. The Ethio-
pian white sesame seed is used as a benchmark 
for grading internationally. Besides sesame, an 
increasing trend in the export of noug seed, 
groundnuts and soybean has been observed over 
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Ethiopia is the fourth biggest producer (preceded by Myanmar, India and China) of 
sesame seed in the world. Sesame accounts for nearly 55 % of the total oilseeds pro-
duced in the country (CSA, 2012). In the period between 2007 and 2011, production 
increased by 119 %, up from 149 387 to 327 741 tons. The average productivity per 
hectare in the period between 2007 and 2011 was 0.885 tons/ha and showed a marginal 
increase of about 1.8 %. The potential yield of sesame is still much higher than the 
actual yield with improved agronomic practices (Wijnands et al., 2009). Sesame export 
has dramatically increased in the last five years, on average by 56 %; the export amount 
in 2012 was over 7.6 billion birr (ECRA 2012 report). The massive boost in production 
arose from bringing new land into sesame cultivation. According to CSA (2012) a total 
of 763 893 farmers were engaged in sesame production in the 2011 planting season.
The major sesame producing regions of Ethiopia are situated in the northwest and 
southwest lowlands of the country. However, due to the increasing export demand 
and government interest, production is expanding to other regions in the eastern and 
Figure 1
Production of Oilseed Crops in Ethiopia  
Figure 2
Average Annual Production of Sesame for ‘Meher’ Season 2007/08 – 2012/13
 
 
south-eastern parts of the country. Tigray (mainly Humera), Amhara (around Metemma) 
and Oromia (Wolega) are well known high-production areas of sesame. However, Southern 
Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region (SNNP), Gambella and Benshangul Gumuz 
are also involved in sesame production because of the promising world market demand.
Over 80 % of the sesame production is by small-scale farmers, but currently large-scale 
investors are entering this farming business. There are three sesame varieties commonly 




These varieties are suitable for various applications. For instance, Humera, which is the 
t-85 variety, is internationally popular for its predominantly white and comparatively 
large uniform seeds, its sweet, nutty taste and sweet aroma. These features make it 
suitable for bakery products. Humera is also used as a reference for grading on the 
international sesame market. 
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Figure 3
Earning from Sesame Export (2007–2011)
Source: ERCA, 2012
Table 1
















Earning (USD million)Since 2010, the Government of Ethiopia made it mandatory that sesame trading can 
only be conducted at primary transaction centres and at the Ethiopian Commodity 
Exchange (ECX). Based on traded quantities, producers are also able to export sesame 
seed independently or through a cooperative. All sesame traded on the ECX floor 
is categorized into the three varieties: Humera, Gondar and Wollega. The sesame for 
each type is graded 1–4, depending on the level of admixture, damaged seeds, moisture 
content and colour. The purchase price of sesame for export is largely determined by 
the evenness of colour, taste, dryness and purity. The oil level is mainly important when 
selling the sesame to the oil industry.
There are two major producer groups: 
1. Small-scale farmers account for 80 % of total production. Most small-scale farmers 
are organized into cooperatives and hence they deliver part of their products to 
the cooperatives/union who trade through the ECX or export on their own. Other 
small-scale farmers sell to local licensed or unlicensed traders. The licensed traders 
deliver to ECX local stores and trade with exporters or local processors, while the un-
licensed traders either sell to the licensed traders or smuggle the produce to Sudan.
2. Large-scale farmers mostly produce for export by adding value through cleaning 
and de-hulling. Occasionally they also sell to local processors or to the ECX. 
According to the Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority (ERCA) and CSA, nearly 
80 % of the sesame produced in Ethiopia is exported to the international market. This 
makes Ethiopia the second biggest exporter of sesame seed after India. Earnings from 
export quadrupled between 2007 and 2011, and the crop is the country’s biggest 
foreign currency earner after coffee. Within the period 2007 to 2011, the country 
exported a total of 1.1 million tons of sesame seed for a total value of USD 1.3 billion 
within the same period.
Ethiopian sesame has proven to be suitable for a range of processing industries. The 
Humera variety is appreciated worldwide for its aroma and sweet taste. This type has 
large, uniform white seeds, which makes it very suitable for bakery products. The Gondar 
type is also suitable for the bakery market which requires a high level of seed purity 
that sometimes proves to be problematic. The major competitive advantage of the 
Wollega type is its high oil content which reaches up to 56 % (compared to a maximum 
of 52 % for other varieties).  China, India and UAE are the top three destinations for 
Ethiopian sesame.
Although some value addition takes place in the country (i.e. de-hulling), the majority 
of the exported sesame is traded in raw form. The most common domestic processing 
of sesame is done by individuals or small-scale companies engaged in the preparation 
and packaging of a food product known as ‘Baltina’. At commercial level, companies 
such as Selet Hulling, Depasa Agro, Ambasel Trading and Fronti Plc are engaged in 
hulling and oil extraction.
Company Ownership Processing Location
Selet Hulling Ethio-Dutch Joint 
venture (JV)
de-hulling Legetafo 
Depasa Agro Plc Ethio-Dutch JV de-hulling Burayu
Ambasel Trading House Plc Ethiopia de-hulling Gondar
Fronti Plc** Ethiopia edible oil Gondar
Selam Baltina Ethiopia sesame flour Addis Ababa
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Background information on the company
Depasa Agro Industry was established in 2008 by Ethiopian and Dutch investors. The 
key business of the company is processing and exporting of hulled organic sesame, 
mainly to high value markets in the EU, USA and Japan. The company has 20 employees 
and an export volume of 5000 tons of hulled and raw sesame on average. The pro-
cessing plant is located in Addis. The company processes and exports solely Humera, 
a hallmark of quality sesame on the international market. Recently, the company 
has been developing a new business to process sesame and chickpea for the export 
market. An agreement has been signed with two chickpea cooperatives, Lume Adama 
and Becho Woliso, located in Oromia region.
Depasa Agro Industry adopted contract farming and out-grower models to secure its 
raw material and ensure compliance. In this regard it is a pioneer in legally-binding 
contract farming in Ethiopia. The company started contract farming agreements with 
three cooperatives: Adebay (Miebale) and Bereket (Maebel), and a third one which 
failed to keep its promises and later withdrew. The two primary cooperatives have 
over 3350 member farmers and 67 000 ha of land. By taking this step, the company 
Figure 4
Business model of Depasa Agro Plc
has overcome the raw material shortage for its hulling factory and, as a result, it has 
started to pay its debts and become profitable. Currently, the company practises the 
out-grower scheme. As Ato Elias, the owner of the company told us, his experience in 
agronomics and his professional network added to his educational background in agri-
culture, has helped him a lot. He started the company with no investment capacity and 
so chose to work with an investor who wanted to invest in agriculture. Depasa and its 
sister company have become one of the best performing exporters in Ethiopia today. 
Depasa Agro adopted contract farming and out-grower models from the start, but the 
company went through a difficult period implementing these schemes. In order to set 
up the out-grower scheme, the Ethiopian law required companies to have their own 
nucleus farm. At that time Depasa was not in a position to own land and start farming. 
In addition, there was no binding legal framework for contract farming. Companies 
could sign informal agreements with farmers, but enforcement of such agreements 
was impossible. In the midst of this situation, the company decided to sign an informal 
contract-farming agreement with three cooperatives in Humera. At the same time, it 
started lobbying for a legal framework for farming engagement. After a two-year struggle, 
the founder managed to put the issue forward to the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, 
by whose direct order the company was permitted to engage in contract farming. Depasa 
became the pioneer in the adoption of contract farming in Ethiopia and also set the 
legal foundation for a number of other companies that followed suit.
Alongside lobbying for a legal framework, the company also engaged farmers at 
grassroots level and signed an informal contract with three farmers’ cooperatives. 
The criteria for selection were: 
 › farmers with bigger holdings, and
 › farmers with connecting land.
The direct formal relationship is between the company and the cooperative, but the 
company has power in selecting farmers for inclusion in the contracting scheme.
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Figure 5
The value chain of Depasa Agro Plc
The sesame value chain in-
cludes numerous supporting 
service providers and facilita-
tors. For example, research 
institutes provide high-yielding 
varieties such as Setit and Hu-
mera 1. There are farmer train-
ing centres (FTC) to demon-
strate new varieties of seed, 
technology, pre- and post-
harvest preparation and pre-
vention. The Bureau of Agricul-
ture (BoA) monitors farmers 
and provides extension and 
agronomy services. Different 
NGOs (SBN, ACDI-VOCA, Agri-
terra) provide capacity-build-






Located In Humera area ( 970 km 
distance from site)
Approx. 3350 out 
growers 










2 outgrower cooperatives are involved in sesame 
production. There are 2 people on the ground 
providing agronomic services in organic farming and 
supervision to ensure quality and prevent side 
selling. Currently, there is also a demonstration 
plot, where farmers can learn from the example 
(technological application. 
ADDITIONAL COMMENTARY ON VC
Supply of inputs
The company provides advanced interest-free 
financing for planting, weeding and harvesting 
activities
Markets
High-value organic export markets.
Processing






5000 tons/year for export
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Current inclusiveness of the chain2
Access to services Access to market and supply
As per the current contract, Depasa Agro Industry guarantees a market 
for out-grower farmers and provides agronomic support on good farming 
practices and quality management. The company also gives interest-free 
loans to the cooperatives as working capital for weeding and threshing. 
The cooperative distributes the loan to farmers by adding a 3 % transaction 
cost. In 2013, more than 1600 households benefited from 9.1 million birr 
in interest-free loans during the weeding and threshing period.
Development projects such as ACDI/VOCA, Agriterra and SBN also provide 
some generic support towards this model, but sometimes these interven-
tions have distorted the market by creating suspicion between actors. 
Depasa Agro also has strong links with its customers in Japan, Europe and 
America and since the company is supplying organic sesame, there is sup-
port for organic certification and traceability.
Depasa Agro has dedicated staff on the ground intended partially to 
support innovative practices by farmers. The company has demonstration 
plots at two locations in the region. The purpose of these plots is mainly 
to promote innovative practices and use of best technology for sesame 
production. Farmers in these areas indicated that Depasa Agro has im-
proved their knowledge on planting, use of fertilizer, crop rotation and 
product harvesting and handling. The company also maintains ground-level 
presence to facilitate farmers’ learning. 
On average, the company needs to collect 3000 to 15 000 quintals of sesame per year.
The primary cooperatives collect farmers’ produce on behalf of the company at the market price plus 
85 birr. The local market price for sesame is determined by the international market price which can 
be accessed via the ECX. For the farmers this set-up has dual benefits:
1. The price they get from the company is higher than the market price. 
2. They have a secure market, which is sometimes difficult due to fluctuating demand and inaccessi-
bility of the ECX. Farmers who have a volume of 50 quintals and above can deliver their sesame to 
the nearest ECX warehouse. However, as most ECX warehouses are located in towns, coordinating 
logistics and transporting produce to these warehouses is difficult for the farmers. Not only does it 
take long to unload produce at ECX stores, farmers are also unhappy with the grading system. De-
lays at the ECX collection point raises the transport cost, which forces retailers to lower the sesame 
purchasing price. In comparison Depasa Agro Industry gives them clear advantage of price as well 
as purchasing at farm gate. Many other farmers showed interest to be part of such an arrangement. 
The fact that the company is dealing with cooperatives also has two important benefits for the com-
pany and for the farmers:
1. Cooperatives are the smallest unit of farmer organization and they are present at grassroots 
level which eases the traceability of products.
2. There are fewer administrative hurdles when dealing with cooperatives, though they lack mana-
gerial capacities. 
The cooperatives are also members of Setit Union where they can get access to alternative markets. 
There are ECX warehouses and ECX-licensed traders in the region where farmers can deliver their 
products. Farmers are not restricted to supplying to Depasa alone, which gives them the flexibility to 
look at other options. But there are some challenges related to geographical bottlenecks due to the 
location of the farmers i.e. 970 km from the central market. 
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1. Chain wide collaboration
2. Effective market linkages
3. Fair and transparent governance
4. Equitable access to services
5. Inclusive Innovation
6. Measurements of outcomes
Inclusiveness score - Depasa Out-grower 
Farmers Buyer
 › Commitment
At the start of the operations, the absence of binding laws for contract farming and the impossibility for 
farmers to get access to finance from banks, resulted in a huge loss for the owners of the company who 
lent money to the farmers. One of the cooperatives sold the produce to a third party and did not pay 
back the initial loan. After 2 years of lobbying at different governmental levels, the owner succeeded 
in recuperating the pre-financed money. The other two cooperatives have maintained their loyalty and 
continued to work with Depasa.
 › Shared goals and vision
Before the partnership started, there was intensive discussion with relevant stakeholders including 
farmers, local authorities, BoA, regional and national government, as well as development organizations. 
The main challenge at the take-off stage was to create common understanding among the different 
stakeholders who often had conflicting priorities.
There is a regular consultative platform between the company and farmers’ cooperatives. There is also 
a high-level regular engagement between the general manager and government officials at national and 
regional levels on ongoing issues. 
 › Certification
Depasa Agro Industry is a fair trade registered company and hence, fair and transparent chain govern-
ance is very important. Under the existing arrangement the company pays higher than market price. 
In return, the cooperatives supply the sesame in labelled form indicating which pack comes from which 
farmer. 
 › Access to information
In addition to market and pricing, farmers also have access to information from different sources such as 
the ECX, mobile networks and other NGOs and development partners working in the region.
 › Stable relationships
The partnership between Depasa and the cooperatives in Humera started in 2012. Though there was no 
baseline established at the beginning and no formal tracking of the venture’s impact on the livelihood 
of farmers, many farmers as well as the company appreciated the stable relationship. Nevertheless, the 
cooperatives noted that the credit they were receiving was not sufficient. 
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Product Development
Depasa Agro Industry is expanding its business into ta-
hini processing. The company is trying to replicate the 
same business model with different cooperatives for the 
supply of chickpea. The new product will consist of 50 % 
sesame. This creates a further opportunity to include 
additional farmers in the scheme. 
Farming technologies and seed
Sesame is highly sensitive to improved farming prac-
tices such as planting, weeding and harvesting. Depasa 
Agro has a big opportunity to introduce shared manual 
harvesting machines which will reduce harvesting and 
threshing loss, and increase yield by 10–15 %. On its own 
nucleus farm, Depasa can also focus on growing seeds 
for its suppliers and this can have an impact on quality 
and productivity.
Possibility to increase  
inclusiveness
3
Sesame field in vegetative stage
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The Depasa Agro Industry contract farming model seems to function very well. The key 
scalability factors relevant for this business model are the following: 
Owners’ experience
The founder and owner of Depasa Agro Industry Plc is an agronomist by profession 
and has served in different governmental and non-governmental offices before he set 
up his own business. This has played an invaluable role in the existing business engage-
ment with farmers. From the discussion with him, four distinct personal attributes were 
observed: 
1. passion and energy for agriculture;
2. perseverance in dealing with long and complex issues, for example, lobbying 
nearly two years to get approval for contract farming;
3. thorough knowledge of how the Ethiopian system functions;
4. extensive network from grassroots to ministerial level. 
Ground-level presence
There are four key advantages of having ground-level presence for both out-grower 
and contract farming models:
1. It signals the seriousness of the company in the business and boosts the confi-
dence and trust of farmers.
2. It helps to foster innovation and learning on both sides; farmers receive coaching 
and practical support while the company gets a deeper understanding of grass-
roots community practices, beliefs and values.
3. It builds the emotional attachment that usually governs business with small-scale 
farmers, rather than following the formal approach.
4. It fosters quick responsiveness to emerging issues, for example, in cases where 
other interest groups may try to create doubts about the business partnership and 
when this happens it is extremely important that a representative of the company 
is there to clarify and defend issues.
Public-private partnership
There are strong hands of government involved in the sesame sector. It is mandatory 
to trade on the ECX floor, but exceptions are made in the case of commercial farmers and 
unions who can directly export their own produce. Public institutions control supply 
and distribution of seed, fertilizer, pesticides, herbicides and other inputs, as well as 
provision of extension and research services. In addition to enforcing contracts, author-
ities can also influence farmers’ cropping decisions through extension agents, which 
impacts on company planning. Consequently, private-public partnerships are very im-
portant, and can exist at national, regional, zonal and district levels. Generally, govern-
ment is highly supportive of export-oriented agro-processing businesses, though not 
all actors within the hierarchy may have the same level of understanding and commit-
ment. In such cases, the involvement of senior officials and engagement of grassroots 
authorities are key factors for success.
The fact that Humera sesame is a leading international brand means that there are a 
number of competitors for the seed, for example, Setit Union, Tigray Marketing 
Federation, Selet Hulling, Guna Trading, Ambasel Trading and many other ECX-licensed, 
as well as non-licensed traders (who usually deliver to the licensed traders or illegally 
export to Sudan and Eritrea). Usually these entities have conflicting interests and may 
lobby against such long-term business engagement. In this regard, it is also important 
to have a well-functioning private-private partnership platform that works on a sustain-
able code of business conduct and synergy amongst private actors.
Is the business model scalable?4
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Advance financing
Sesame has a very short planting and harvesting win-
dow. Most farmers in Humera plant within a one-week 
difference which results in critical shortage of labour for 
planting, weeding, and harvesting. The Ethiopian saying 
‘you won’t attend your mother’s funeral if your sesame 
is ready for harvest’ sums it up. Farmers need hired labour 
for weeding, harvesting and planting, as family labour is 
not sufficient. Most of the labour comes from the high-
land areas of Gojam, Gondar and Tigray and is usually ex-
pensive. Access to finance is therefore very critical either 
to pre-finance farmers for such activities, or to arrange 
value-chain financing by guaranteeing loans with banks. 
Unfortunately, the latter is not the preferred option as it 
incurs interest over time and accessibility is challenging.
Focus on relationships 
Having a legally binding contract is important to minimize 
risks related to pre-financing, but even more important 
is the soft relationship with farmers, cooperatives and 
authorities at the grassroots. Farmers attach a higher 
value to this relationship than the contractual obliga-
tion, partly because they may not understand the impli-
cation of defaulting on a contract, but also because they 
may be misguided by other interest groups. Maintain-
ing good relationships with key groups enables smooth 
business operations.
Harvested sesame
‘…you won’t attend 
your mother’s fu-
neral if your sesame 








After years of decline, highlighted by the col-
lapse of Kenya Cooperative Creameries (KCC) 
in 1997, the dairy industry in Kenya has been 
growing over the last decade (TNS, 2008). The 
dairy sector accounts for 3.5 % of Kenya’s GDP 
and 40 % of the national livestock GDP¹. During 
the last eight years the growth rate of the dairy 
sector was estimated to be 4 to 5 % annually, re-
sulting in a yearly production of roughly 5 billion 
liters. Smallholders account for approximately 
80 % of this production. Various estimates set 
the number of households involved in the 
dairy sector at 700 000 (SNV, 2013), although 
other appraisals go up to 1.8 million households 
(TNS, 2008). Since the sector employs many 
women and youths and contributes to nutrition-
al and food security, it can be seen as a key sector 
for pro-poor economic and social development 
(SNV, 2013). 
Around 55 % of all milk produced in Kenya is 
marketed, while 45 % is used for home consump-
tion, feeding calves or sold to neighbors. 
Introduction
Tanykina Dairy Plant Ltd.
1
¹All statistics concerning the Kenyan dairy sectors should be 
regarded as estimates (TNS 2008 and SNV 2013).
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Of the marketed milk, it is estimated that only 32 % reaches the market through formal 
channels. The formal milk market in Kenya is dominated by a few large players such as 
New KCC, Brookside and Githunguri Dairy. 
The Kenyan dairy sector has huge potential. Currently, the average yearly consump-
tion in Kenya is estimated to be 145 liters per person, whereas the WHO recommends 
a yearly consumption of 200 liters. Together with the increasing population, this gap 
presents a huge opportunity to grow the national dairy market. Moreover, the sector 
has potential for export to Eastern and Southern Africa, as well as the Middle-East 
(SNV, 2013). 
Regardless of this potential, there are also challenges which have implications specifi-
cally for pro-poor economic and social development. Given that the informal channels 
operate outside the legal framework, no taxes are paid and no health or hygiene 
standards are enforced, resulting in a distortion of the  business environment for the 
dairy sector. Nonetheless, the informal market has its place in the sector. In areas 
where the formal market is non-existent, field interviews indicate that the informal 
dairy sector provides incentives for increasing production, rather than hampering the 
sector’s growth. Moreover, in Kenya there is a mismatch between dairy production and 
processing. During the rainy season milk production exceeds the processing capacity, 
while during the dry season processors cannot source enough milk to use up their 
processing capacity (SNV, 2013).
Despite growth, dairy productivity in Kenya is low compared to international standards. 
This is mainly caused by poor and inadequate feeding and breeding practices. Feed-
ing practices are hampered by the availability, quality and cost of feeds. Regarding 
breeding, artificial insemination (AI) is still not adopted as the main breeding prac-
tice in many areas (TNS, 2008).
There are several other challenges, most of them derived from the fragmented nature 
of the Kenyan dairy sector, both on the supply and marketing side, as well as in the formal 
and informal channels. This fragmentation hampers growth and competitiveness of the 
dairy sector (TNS, 2008 and SNV, 2013). 
Background information on the company
One of the schemes designed to overcome the fragmentation in the Kenyan dairy sector 
was to introduce Dairy Business Hubs (DBHs). Dairy Business Hub is a term primarily 
linked to the East African Dairy Development (EADD) Project; other terms used to 
described the same idea are ‘input supply and service hubs’ (Jaleta et al., 2013) and 
‘chilling and business hub’ (SNV, 2013). The idea is an example of an inclusive business 
model and a ‘new’ way of organizing the dairy sector for smallholders—inclusive inno-
vation. The concept is commonly used in Eastern Africa to enhance the development 
of the dairy sector. DBHs are set up ‘…either as a single business entity supplying inputs 
and providing services, or the existence of several business entities supplying inputs 
and/or providing services in a specific geographic area serving beneficiaries’ needs. 
These different entities could be private, cooperative, or public owned. They may or 
may not coordinate with each other in running their business.’ 
Benefits gained
DBHs can improve both input and output marketing opportunities for smallholders. 
By linking several supply chain actors together in a DBH, transaction costs can be 
decreased and smallholders can gain access to more formal markets. Expected benefits 
for smallholders are increased profit resulting from economies of scale, ease of busi-
ness and bargaining power. Farmers can gain more leverage during negotiations and a 
check-off system allows them to use services before income becomes available in cash.
Input providers, service providers and processors can benefit from DBHs using the 
opportunity to cooperate with large groups of smallholders in an economically viable 
way. The aim is to develop DBHs in a way that enables them to become sustainable 
businesses after an initial investment in capacity-building, infrastructure and equip-
ment. Using a centralized service center, transaction costs should decrease and supply 
and demand should become more balanced. Additionally, service and input suppliers 
will be able to serve more clients and have more security regarding payments.
Expected indirect outcomes of establishing DBHs are that the transaction costs will drop 
sector wide as a result of increased efficiency, and that traded volumes and quality will 
be boosted by the availability of better services and input (Van der Lee and Giani, 2013).
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Meru Central Dairy Co-operative Union
Meru Central Dairy Co-operative Union was founded 
in May 2005 by 19 affiliated cooperatives. Cur-
rently the union serves around 30 000 members, 
of which 10 000 are active suppliers grouped in 
cooperatives (affiliated and non-affiliated), self-
help groups and individuals. The aim of the or-
ganization is to serve their suppliers, giving them 
the best possible services and prices. Currently the 
union is supported by SNV, mainly in the area of 
extension.
Tanykina Dairies Ltd.
Tanykina dairy plant is located in the North Rift, al-
most 35 km west of Eldoret. Tanykina was registered 
in 2003 and started its operations in 2005 with the 
support of Heifer International. In 2008 it became 
one of the pre-existing hubs in the EADD project. 
Tanykina serves over 11 000 smallscale farmers and 
aims to empower its members to improve and sus-
tain their milk production. Moreover it facilitates 
farmer participation in the dairy value activities, 
enabling them to benefit from the value chain by 
adopting a hub model. In addition to transporting, 
bulking, chilling and marketing milk, the Tanykina 
hub facilitates services such as a healthcare scheme, 
financial services and farm-related services.
Metkei Multipurpose Company Ltd.
Metkei chilling plant was established in 2009 and is located in Keiyo 
district, roughly 70 km southeast of Eldoret. Metkei is one of the 
DBHs established from ‘scratch’ by EADD. Currently it has 2524 mem-
bers registered as shareholders, 6881 as milk suppliers and around 
3200 active suppliers. Metkei sources milk through hired trans-
porters, cooperatives, individuals and middlemen. Alongside 
transporting, bulking, chilling and marketing milk, the hub offers 
agrovet, artificial insemination and financial services to its suppliers.
Muki Farmers Co-operative Society
Muki Farmers Co-operative Society (FCS) is located in the 
central province of Kenya. It was established in 2001, growing 
out of the milk department started in 1998 as an additional 
activity of Muki SACCO. Muki FCS has around 11 500 mem-
bers, of which 5050 are active. Next to Muki SACCO, the co-
operative is closely collaborating with Muki Investment and 
the processor Kinangop Dairy Ltd. These four entities work 
together to protect the farmers’ interests and to empower 
them economically. Similar to Meru Central, this cooperative 
is supported by SNV; in the past TNS provided business 














The following four Dairy Business Hubs 
were studied in Kenya:
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All DBHs perform similar operations. However, it can be deduced from the brief descriptions that 
they have different backgrounds and consequently different organizational structures.
Figure 1 gives a representation of the DBH model. The solid lines represent the flows of milk in the chain 
and the dashed line represents the service delivery. Farmers can deliver their milk to the DBH; most 
farmers use a transporter, but when they live close to the DBH, they can deliver the milk themselves. 
Transporters might be organizations, meaning that cooperatives or self-help groups arrange the transport. 
Usually the milk is bulked at the cooperative level or other collection centers before it is taken to the 
DBH. Another option is for the DBH to employ transporters at a flat rate, or hire private transporters who 
are paid for each liter of milk they deliver. In Metkei milk might even be transported by middlemen (hawkers) 
who buy the milk from farmers paying cash and then sell it at a higher price to Metkei (or somewhere else). 
Metkei tolerates this practice because they do not want to lose milk from their dairy chain.
Value chain
Figure 1
Simple representation of the DBH model
After the milk reaches the DBH, it can be chilled and sold to a processor, or to the informal mar-
ket. Or if the DBH has the facility, the milk can be processed. Meru Union and Muki FCS have their own 
processing factories and Tanykina processes some of its milk into traditional products such as mala and 
yoghurt. Usually a combination of the former takes place. Meru Union have an agreement to sell milk 
to New KCC when they are not able to process all of it. As yet Muki FCS does not have enough market to 
sell all their milk and therefore part of it is sold to Brookside and New KCC. Tanykina sells to different 
processors (currently Buzeki and Sameer) and to the informal market, and also processes a small share. 
Only Metkei sells all its milk to one processor, Daima.









Metkei Multi-purpose Company Ltd.
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Figure 2
Value chain of Dairy 
Business Hubs
DBHs can be registered as companies (Tanykina 
and Metkei), unions (Meru) or cooperatives (Muki). 
After the milk reaches the DBH-level it can either be 
chilled and sold to a processor, or processed by the 
DBH in case they have the facilities. Excess milk can 
be sold to the informal market.
Meru Union and Muki FCS have established their 
own processing facilities. Meru aims to process all 
the milk themselves, however Muki lacks market for 
their processed milk, therefore part of the milk is 
sold to processors. Metkei sells all their milk to one 
processor (Daima), whereas Tanykina sells to  
different processor and to the informal market.
The most important channel for DBHs is the formal 
market where processed milk is sold. The DBHs mar-
ket are threatened by the informal market where 
unprocessed milk is sold, even though sometimes 
they use this channel to market excess milk. Another 
threat is processors that source directly from the 
farmer or cooperative level.
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Current inclusiveness of the chain
A cooperative or DBH unites the power of many smallholders in order to benefit from 
economies of scale regarding inputs, services and outputs. The drivers of inclusion that 
can be identified in the various DBHs are: 
 › DBHs are founded and (partially) owned by farmers, who still influence the strategy 
of the organization.
 › The need to create a large farmer and supply base in order to bulk a substantial 
amount of milk, to attract cheaper services and to improve the negotiation position 
towards buyers.
 › Creating a competitive advantage over other milk buyers to attract farmers.
On the one hand, DBHs compete for farmers/milk against other milk buyers such as 
middlemen, other farmers’ organizations and processors. Strategies used to attract farmers 
include offering good prices and/or services. On the other hand, DBHs need to have a 
strong negotiation position towards input suppliers, service providers and processors. 
2
Promoting collaboration
In theory, DBHs are an ideal platform for bringing together all chain actors (farmers, 
DBHs, processors, input suppliers and service providers) and promoting collaboration 
between them. In reality the DBHs seem to mainly protect the interest of farmers, 
who often are involved both as suppliers and shareholders. However, the relationship 
between an average farmer and the DBH seems to be mainly based on milk supply 
and service delivery. This is illustrated by the large gaps between registered and active 
suppliers. All hubs have difficulties keeping the farmers loyal. Although there might be 
other reasons (e.g. dry cows) for a supplier to be inactive, the most important is that 
the farmer has started selling to another buyer. Two farmers who started selling to a 
processor indicated that their main reason was price. One of the farmers was still using 
some services provided by the DBH as there were no barriers to accessing them. Farmers 
that have remained with their DBH indicate that they prefer a stable market; others say 
that the presence of a DBH is important, stating that ‘As Muki  […] established the milk 
factory and has permanent offices in the village, I can be sure they will stay’. 
Incentives to join the chain
Within the EADD project, the aim was to give farmers a sense of ownership over their 
DBH. The community had to write a proposal in order to receive support from the 
project. After receiving the proposal, EADD studied whether the proposal was feasible. 
The conditions that the community had to meet for EADD to assist them included a 
minimum of 1 000 registered farmers contributing at least 10 % equity (estimated 
at 1–1.5 million KSh) of the total project cost. These conditions were part of an effort 
to give farmers a sense of ownership over the DBH project, but considering the high 
percentage of inactive members, it is questionable whether the incentives were enough.
Aggregation of supply
In Meru and Metkei, the link between the DBH and a large share of the farmers is 
established through cooperatives. In Metkei, the cooperatives were used as an easy 
place to reach groups of farmers. 
One of the ‘village banks’ connected to Tanykina Dairy, 
Kipkarren Branch
61
Kenya Dairy Business Hubs Current inclusiveness of the chain
Currently, the main function of the cooperative is to bulk milk and supply it to the DBH. 
In Metkei, the cooperative and its members are registered as one supplier, and the 
lump sum is paid to the cooperative which redistributes it to its farmers. Metkei is not 
able to influence the price that is paid by the cooperative to the farmers. In some cases 
the cooperative competes with the DBH, providing its own services to members, for 
example, running their own agro-vet shop. 
Upgrading
The relationship between the processors and the DBH is similar to that shared between 
a seller and a buyer. When working together, both DBHs and processors could benefit 
from a stable relationship, increasing efficiency along the chain. Initially the processors 
felt threatened by the hubs, because prices of raw milk would increase. Moreover, both 
sides act as competitors as many DBHs are moving up the value chain by going into 
processing, whilst processors are moving down the value chain by establishing their 
own collection centers. 
 › Both Muki and Meru have already established their own processing factory, which is 
their most important outlet. Muki still sells part of its milk to Brookside and NKCC, 
because they are not able to find a market for all the milk they collect. Meru Union 
has a contract with NKCC to take their milk in case of emergency, meaning NKCC will 
pay a rather low price for it.
 › Tanykina used to deliver to one of the major processors, but found that they were 
not honoring their contracts. Therefore the manager of Tanykina now prefers to 
cooperate with smaller processors, who are more flexible (e.g. regarding supply 
shortages) and honor their contracts. Moreover, the CEOs of smaller processors are 
present during contract negotiations, as opposed to major processors who would 
send an employee with no authority to negotiate. The manager of Tanykina believes 
they are able to maintain better relationships with smaller processors, and currently 
they are delivering to Sameer and Buzeki. The contracts between those processors 
and Tanykina contain a clause for extension. Furthermore the contracts agree on 
prices, volumes and quality standards. As the dairy business is volume-based, the 
processors seek consistency in supply. Therefore, the contracts contain penalties in 
case agreed volumes are not supplied, and in which case a lower price will be paid 
by the processor.
Access to input supply
Another good initiative, more closely related to dairy production, is the cooperation 
between the extension team and input suppliers. Representatives of input suppliers are 
invited to train farmers on certain topics, lowering extension costs for the DBHs and pre-
senting the input suppliers with an opportunity to market their products. These initiatives 
are good examples of collaboration between the service sector and the DBHs, although 
overall this seems to be an underused opportunity. Most of the services offered by the 
DBHs are started and operated by the DBHs themselves. Although in some cases this might 
be profitable, not using established businesses and expertise presents risks for the DBHs.
Access to market
The DBHs have partly succeeded in providing better market opportunities for their 
members. Farmers indicate that they are facing little risk when selling their milk to 
DBHs, whereas in the past processors have proved to be unreliable partners (e.g. late 
payments). Nevertheless, DBHs have not succeeded in guaranteeing the highest price 
for their members, illustrated by the fact that members are side-selling to other proces-
sors or involved in the informal (cash-based) market. The bigger picture is that DBHs 
are forcing processors to pay higher prices. 
Innovation/upgrading
Two of the DBHs, Meru Union and Muki FCS, have their own processing facilities. Many 
farmers support the idea of having processing facilities at DBH level, because they feel 
this will result in higher prices. However, the establishment of processing facilities in 
Meru and Muki has not resulted in significantly higher prices paid to farmers. 
The manager of Tanykina indicated that the company had gained negotiation power, 
as they are offering something processors want. Tanykina has switched to selling to 
smaller processors, because smaller processors are more flexible in terms of negotia-
tion and better in respecting contracts. 
Metkei seems to have the most stable relationship with their processor Daima. Daima 
indicated that Metkei milk is used for the production of a specific product requiring a 
higher quality milk. If the manager of Metkei is offered a higher price by another 
processor, he will first contact Daima and inquire if they will go above that price. 
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Moreover, the contract with Daima goes further: Daima 
contributes 0.20 KSh per liter delivered and also pays for 
the maintenance of the tanker that is owned by Metkei 
and used to transport the milk from the DBH to the facto-
ries. Nonetheless, the manager of Metkei indicated that 
he is looking for innovative ways to add value to their milk 
(e.g. Milk ATM). 
Transparency
The quality assurance manager of Metkei described the 
problem-solving process at their DBH. The quality check 
at the DBH consists of five tests: organoleptic (human 
sense), lactometer, alcohol, acidity and 10-min Resazurin 
test. Once a month Metkei sends a sample to an inter-
national laboratory in Nairobi to make sure the milk 
complies with the standards established by the Kenyan 
Dairy Board. The processor also performs quality tests 
at DBH level, meaning that a staff member of the pro-
cessor checks the quality before the milk leaves Metkei. 
Once the milk is accepted, it becomes the responsibility 
of the processor. The same idea holds for the acceptance 
of milk by the DBH. Processor rejection is very rare ac-
cording to the quality manager and it should be avoided, 
because it would mean that Metkei is obliged to pay the 
farmer even without receiving any payment themselves. 
When milk is rejected by the DBH, it is possible to trace 
its origin back to farmer level. For farmers that supply 
their milk individually, this is very easy. For cooperatives 
or milk that comes through transporters, it is more diffi-
cult as a 50-liter can might contain milk from eight to ten 
farmers. In that case the extension team will visit those 
farmers in order to locate the problem and afterwards 
they will support the farmer(s) to solve it. 
Services
The DBH delivers services to farmers, usually through an 
agent, which might be a cooperative, service provider 
(e.g. AI specialist) or NGO. The types of services pro-
vided by DBHs include: 
 › Transport, chilling and marketing;
 › Extension;
 › Agrovet;
 › AI services; 
 › Veterinary services;
 › Cow insurance scheme;
 › Milk testing; 
 › Administrative services (for cooperatives);
 › Buying semen and bulked feeds (for cooperatives);
 › FSA (Financial Services Association), SACCO or Vil-
lage Bank;
 › Healthcare scheme. For example, on realizing the 
need for a community healthcare plan, Tanykina 
started an online search for partners to support them. 
After discovering that the national insurance scheme 
was not an appropriate alternative for their members, 
Tanykina got together with Health Insurance Fund (HIF) 
and PharmAccess to establish TCHP—a healthcare 
scheme. With the support of PharmAccess Founda-
tion, five health centers in the Tanykina area where 
upgraded by providing materials and training. Although 
the scheme is 25 % subsidized by donors, it is a good 
example of how a DBH can cooperate with the ser-
vice sector.
Usually farmers are able to access the services offered 
by the DBH on check-off. However, this is only possible 
for farmers who are active suppliers, meaning those 
currently delivering milk. The check-off system entails 
that whenever a farmer uses a service (e.g. inputs, AI, 
insurance) from the DBH, the corresponding costs will 
be registered and deducted from the milk payment at 
the end of the month. At Metkei and Muki, the services 
are available to all farmers in the area on a cash basis. 
The reasons for offering their services to all farmers are 
to attract new ones and to serve the community, as the 
hubs also have social objectives. Next to the advantage 
of accessing the services through the check-off system, 
Muki recently started to subsidize the AI service for mem-
bers, giving them a 100 KSh discount.  
The DBHs run some of the services, while others are out-
sourced to service providers such as AI specialists. For 
example, Muki owns two agrovet shops and has several 
others as outlets. Moreover, some services are generat-
ing profits for the DBHs while other services operate at 
break-even. The primary reason for DBHs delivering ser-
vices to their members seems to be to attract farmers 
and keep them loyal. Another reason could be that the 
service runs profitably for the DBH. A final reason could 
be in order to increase the milk quantities. 
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One of the strong aspects of the DBHs is that the check-off system allows 
farmers to use services or buy inputs before cash becomes available at the 
end of the month. When the farmer wants to use a service, the service 
provider can check the creditworthiness of the farmer. This is based on 
the amount of milk that the farmer has supplied so far and the services 
he has taken. At the end of the month, the costs of the services will be 
deducted from the payment. Cooperatives (Metkei and Meru) are usually 
registered as one supplier, therefore the check-off system also has to pass 
through the cooperatives. Usually, non-members or inactive farmers are 
not excluded from the services provided by the hubs; however, they cannot 
use the check-off system. Muki FCS is trying to incentivize membership by 
subsidizing the AI service with a reduction of 100 KSh for members.  
The interviewed farmers seemed to be able to access the available ser-
vices without trouble. Although in some areas the farmers were located 
quite far from the hub or the nearest service point, usually through informal 
ways they were always able to get the services. However, farmers are not 
always informed about the services that the DBH is offering. Similarly at 
Metkei, some farmers indicated that they would like to access services 
that, according to the manager, were already available. Another challenge 
regarding services was that farmers indicated that feed, and feed supple-
ment, were too expensive for them.
The access to extension services seems to be less equal, partly due 
to limited resources and to choices made by Tanykina. For example, at 
Tanykina the extension team was reduced from six to two after EADD 
stopped financing it. Consequently, Tanykina started to focus efforts on 
the 20 percent highest producers, labeled ‘strategic farmers’. The reason 
for doing this is because they believe this approach will be more effective 
in securing a stable supply base. Providing training on invitation is not 
uncommon as one woman  in Meru stated. Another issue revealed by a 
local capacity-builder of SNV is that participants in trainings are usually 
men, while women typically remain in charge of managing the dairy busi-
ness at home.
Meru Union Muki FCS Tanykina Metkei
Registered as Cooperative Cooperative Company Company
Founded 2005 2001 2003 2009












































Processing Yes Yes Only traditional No
‘Moreover, they take members out for training on invitation, 
but I have never been able to access one. I do not know why, 
because I have stopped teaching and they could have al-
ways invited my husband. There are people who always go 
and those who never go, I do not know the criteria they use 
for choosing.’ (Female farmer in Meru)
*Offered on cooperative level
Table 1
Key characteristics of the Dairy Business Hubs
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Innovation
Farmers indicated that there are two ways for them to exert influence 
on the DBH. The first is by electing the board members and the second 
method is through the Annual General Meeting (AGM). 
Important decisions in the DBHs are taken by the board of directors, while 
the management is responsible for executing these decisions. The boards 
always consist of representatives from different areas or cooperatives. 
Board members are elected by the farmers and usually serve for a period 
of three years, meaning that one-third of the board is changed every year. 
In theory, the farmers are represented by the board member from their 
area or cooperative. However usually average farmers are not elected 
to be board members. During the AGMs, the farmers are informed on 
developments of the DBH. Moreover, the plans for the coming year are 
discussed and farmers are able to give their input. When the DBH has plans 
to make an investment, the farmers have to agree and in case there is no 
consensus the decisions will be taken by voting.
Another method for farmers to influence the development at the hub is 
that they can choose to invest or not. Sometimes, when a hub is start-
ing a (new) service, they will ask the farmers to contribute by offering 
shares. Recently, when Metkei started an FSA, farmers were requested to 
buy shares at 300 KSh. In case farmers do not support the new service by 
buying shares, the hub will not be able to execute their plan or will have 
to look for other means of finance. These mechanisms are ways in which 
farmers can actively influence the development of their DBH.
Farmers can also passively influence the development of the hub. As-
suming that the services made available to farmers are actually based 
on business (and not subsidies), it is essential that these services are de-
manded by farmers. When farmers are not interested, the services will 
not survive. 
Measurement of success
Regarding the EADD hubs, it is clear that the program is monitoring its progress, a task mainly per-
formed by ILRI. According to an employee of ILRI, the monitoring task was characterized by a shift 
from M&E (monitoring and evaluation) to MLE (monitoring, learning and evaluation). 
Farmers are informed about the performance of the hubs during the AGMs. According to one farmer 
at Metkei, balance sheets are presented to farmers. Another shareholder of Metkei, who has decided 
to sell his milk to NKCC, indicated he would like the company to be more transparent about their 
performance. He believes the figures are manipulated so that farmers cannot understand them; he 
thinks he should be receiving dividends, but according to the numbers presented a loss was made. 
Exclusion
Some drivers of exclusion could also be witnessed mainly regarding the extension service and the 
board structures: 
 › Tanykina has scaled down their extension service since the EADD project is no longer financing it. 
Instead of six, they now employ two extension officers. In order to make their extension system 
more efficient, they have started to focus their efforts on around 600 ‘strategic farmers’—the 
20 % with the highest daily supply. They have taken this measure in order to create a stable supply 
base. Meru Union currently relies on SNV for extension, while SNV has selected several high 
potential cooperatives to work with. 
 › In all cases the board of the DBH was elected directly or through representatives by farmers. 
Although the Kenyan constitution states that (in cooperatives) at least one third of the board 
should consist of women, in reality boards contain mostly older men. Similarly, youths are also 
underrepresented on the DBH boards. 
 
Meru Muki Tanykina Metkei
Number of board  
members 10 12 13 13
Number of women  
on the board 1 1 2 0
Table 2
Women on DBH boards
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Possibility to increase 
inclusiveness
3
In addition to board representation and improving exten-
sion services, increased transparency is key to success. For 
DBHs which do not have their own processing facilities, 
the weakest link in the value chain is their relationship 
with processors. Processors consider DBHs a threat to 
their business, and so resulting in poor linkages between 
these two parties, with potentially negative impacts on 
the long-term sustainability of DBHs. This weak relation 
prompts the DBHs to look into opportunities to start 
their own processing ventures, which is a risky invest-
ment because of the high initial costs, the competition 
from much bigger processors and the fact that the ex-
pertise required is entirely different. NKCC has opened a 
new department responsible for managing relationships 
with their suppliers. This department is headed by a for-
mer employee of Heifer International who participated 
in the EADD project. One of the actions undertaken by 
this department was to benchmark the price along the 
value chain. Initially farmers accused processors of tak-
ing an excessive share of the milk price. The department 
investigated costs made along the full value chain and 
agreed with the farmers on the share of the milk price 
that was received by each actor. After the prices were 
benchmarked, pricing stopped being an issue. Actions 
like these can improve the transparency in the value 
chain leading to more trust between chain actors.
Sign presenting overview of Tanykina Dairy Plant Ltd.
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Other external factors limiting the ability to scale commercially
All hubs are struggling to keep farmers loyal to them and prevent side-selling to other 
buyers. Especially in milk-deficit areas or places close to urban centers, there is strong 
competition from the informal market. Recently a new VAT act was passed in Kenya 
raising the prices of processed dairy products compared to raw milk. Such measures 
can limit the potential for scaling DBHs and the Kenyan dairy sector in general.
It might be more challenging to scale the hub approach to other countries. EADD has 
adapted the hub approach, for example, in Uganda where they have started pre-
bulking hubs. There, it was not appropriate for farmers to start bulking milk, either 
because they already received high prices or because of their geographical spread; 
therefore farmers are connected through services and not through bulking. This shows 
that the hub approach is a flexible one, a fact that naturally increases the potential 
scalability of the concept.
Commercial viability of the business models
All cases have benefited to some extent from external aid. In case of Tanykina and 
Metkei, the EADD project was a major contributor. EADD did not plan to give gifts; 
the total costs for the hub establishment were financed through 10 % farmer equity, 
30 % interested-free loan provided by the project and 60 % commercial loan. Muki FCS 
was established through a split from Muki SACCO, but this hub was championed by a 
rich local entrepreneur, who is still the major shareholder. In the case of Meru Union 
it is not entirely clear how the hub was established, although it also originated from a 
SACCO. The hubs were not only supported for the start-up costs, but also received aid 
from various partners, usually for extension, capacity-building and materials (motor-
bikes, ICT, production machinery). It is unclear whether the support has enabled the 
hubs to grow faster or whether it is necessary to keep them economically viable.
Is the business model 
scalable?
4
Scaling can be subdivided in ‘scaling up’ and ‘scaling out’. ‘Scaling up’ refers to growing 
numbers of people, activities or products without changing the underlying structure; 
‘scaling out’ means replicating the intervention (in this case operating as a dairy busi-
ness hub) in a different context. Both scaling processes are relevant to dairy business 
hubs. Scaling up could, for example, mean including more farmers, handling higher 
amounts of milk or venturing into new services for farmers or into new parts of the 
value chain. Another idea coined to upscale the DBH approach is to consolidate several 
hubs into a cluster, centralizing common services that can profit from economies of 
scale (SNV, 2013). Scaling out would involve establishing a dairy business hub in a new 
area or country. 
The three typical ways for a business model to go to scale (business growth, expansion via 
partners, and business model replication) are potentially viable for DBHs. Farmers may be 
interested to start benefitting (more) from the approach. Processors may be interested in 
lowering the transaction costs in their collection chains by using DBHs. The government 
may be interested in scaling the DBH approach in order to regulate the dairy sector. And 
finally, development partners may be interested in scaling the DBH approach, because it 
is a promising way of facilitating pro-poor economic and social development.
In reality, there are plans to scale the DBH model within Kenya and several other East 
African countries. However, only the future will prove whether this approach will be 
successful and, most importantly, sustainable. Key issues to scaling include:
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Market demand
This challenge does not relate to the DBH approach, but it does apply to the services 
that are offered through the DBH. Newnham (2013) stresses that it should not be as-
sumed that a ‘need’ translates into sustainable (market) demand. The two important 
challenges for smallholders in Kenya are feeding and breeding. Regardless, many projects 
focused on feeding or breeding (AI) have failed. Adding to Newnham’s statement, 
it should not be assumed that smallholders always aim to perform ‘best practices’. 
For example, AI is not accepted in all cultures, therefore it makes no sense to start 
offering farmers AI services where it is culturally not acceptable.
Access to growth capital
Regarding the DBHs, the highest costs are typically the start-up costs. In case of Tanykina and 
Metkei the EADD project helped to finance these costs; 10 % of total project costs were obtained 
through farmer equity, 30 % from an interest-free loan provided by the EADD project and the re-
maining 60 % from a commercial loan. The idea is that after helping with the establishment of the 
DBH, the business will grow and become sustainable without external funding. The other two hubs, 
Muki FCS and Meru Union, grew out of other (financial) organizations. In the case of Meru Union the 
government helped the DBH to clear an outstanding loan with the organization it split from.
Given that the hub approach is designed for smallholders—and it is unlikely that the farmers’ organi-
zations will be able to cover the start-up costs—scaling out will depend on the interest of potential 
partner organizations such as development partners, banks and the government. Another option 
would be to have hubs established by the processors or by private entrepreneurs, rather than by 
farmers. Once the hubs are established they can start scaling up, extending their business.
The first option for investment finance is to request the farmers whether they are willing to con-
tribute. Farmers can sometimes invest in shares when a new service is established.
Another option is to partner with other organizations, as illustrated by Tanykina with their health-
care plan and visa cards. As a Meru staff member indicated: ‘We are able to receive a lot of support, 
because everybody wants to be associated with the development of an upcoming company’. Moreo-
ver, there seems to be an internal driver within the DBH model to grow; more services attract more 
farmers and vice versa. However, farmers will only be able to use extra services if their (dairy) income 
grows. Nevertheless, a pitfall would be that farmers reduce farm inputs in order to use other services. 
Is the business model scalable?
Structural and capacity constraints to business 
growth
Legal structure
The hubs that were established or supported by the EADD consortium are 
registered as companies. In Kenya several options for registration exist, 
but the Company Act was preferred over the Cooperative Act because it 
limits government interference. Under the Cooperative Act, DBHs will be 
restrained to a certain catchment area and not allowed to make a profit.
Management capacity
Challenges regarding management are more difficult to overcome. Accord-
ing to some people working for the EADD project, capacity-building of 
DBH board members was one of the main challenges. Because the board 
is established through democratic elections, it may not necessarily consist 
of people who know how to run a business, but of people who are popu-
lar or respected within the community. EADD tried to overcome these 
challenges by facilitating capacity-building of existing board members 
and establishing structures to make sure new board members receive 
training as well. Another measure was that during the project, a business 
advisor from TNS was present at all board meetings in order to give ad-
vice. A TNS employee stated that it is critical to find a balance between 
the development of the business and the development of the board.
Gitongho Dairy FCS, one of the cooperatives affiliated to Meru Union
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Unstable trading relationships
A factor that might make processors and private entrepreneurs reluctant to invest in the sector is unstable trading 
relations. For example, why would you invest in training if you cannot be sure those farmers will be producing for you?
Overall, the DBH approach has a lot of potential for scalability, especially within Kenya. This potential is increased by 
the interest of development and commercial partners in the hubs. A threat to the scalability of the model is the weak 
link with processing companies, a challenge that both SNV and EADD have identified and that will be considered in 
future projects.
References
• Jaleta, M., Gebremedhin, B., Tegegne, A., Jemaneh, S., Lemma, T. and Hoekstra, D. (2013) ‘Evolution of input supply and service hubs in dairy 
development at Ada’a milk shed in Ethiopia’. Development in Practice 23:249-263.
• Newnham, J. (2013) ‘Scaling inclusive business: Why do some successful inclusive business pilots fail to scale?’  Business Innovation 
Facility, Issue 10. 
• SNV (2013) ‘Dairy Sector Policy Study and Capacity Needs Assessment of Stakeholder Associations’. 
• TNS (2008) ‘The Dairy Value Chain in Kenya’. 
• Van der Lee, J. and Giani, A. (2013) ‘Case description dairy business hubs Kenya’. Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR. 
Economies of scale for the business model
The DBH model is based on economies of scale. A bigger scale will allow a DBH to offer more, better and cheaper 
services. But the opportunities to create economies of scale do not stop at the individual DBH. SNV (2013) argues 
that in order to improve the financial performance of a hub, consolidating several hubs into a cluster should be 
considered. Some of the services that could be handled at cluster level are already identified: 
 › Price negotiations.
 › Bulk purchasing of feeds and other agro-vet products. Some chilling hubs have invested in feed mills. With a cluster 
model, economies of scale as well as hub profitability can be enhanced.
 › Bulk storage of feeds and other products.
 › Veterinary, AI and extension services.
 › Financial services.







Cassava is the most important staple food 
in Mozambique. Four provinces in central and 
northern Mozambique (Zambezia, Nampula, 
Cabo Delgado and Niassa) produce over 85 % of 
the country’s cassava production (FAO, 2010). 
Due to its adaptation to poor soil conditions and 
virtually no requirements of costly inputs, cassava 
is mainly cultivated by small-scale growers. Classi-
fied as a subsistence crop, nearly 65 % of all small-
holder farmers in Mozambique grow cassava, 
90 % of which is destined for home consumption. 
Despite the sustained impact of cassava on 
millions of households, the government of Mo-
zambique has been reluctant to promote spe-
cific state regulations and policies targeting the 
cassava sub-sector. The trend changed in 2011 
when SABMiller launched the first commercial 
cassava-based beer, Impala. The central govern-
ment had agreed to reduce the excise rate for 
the newly created beer. The measure has already 
had a positive impact for thousands of small-
scale farmers in Nampula and represents a key 
measure for transforming the cassava sector in 
Mozambique.





DADTCO started in 2002 with the innovative idea of providing a new fresh market for 
small-scale cassava growers. Taking off in Nigeria, the business activities have been 
expanded to Mozambique and Ghana. Future planning aims at further growth in other 
countries and their markets, including Zambia, Tanzania and Kenya.
The goals of the innovation (www.DADTCO.nl) were:
 › engaging with farmers as business partners to 
create a commercial and profitable cassava pro-
duction/market; 
 › increasing smallholder farmers’ sustainable pro-
duction; 
 › improving income of farmers through increased 
cassava production and sales; 
 › addressing post-harvest losses and adding value 
by processing cassava near the farms.
In order to shift cassava from a subsistence to a cash crop, the Netherlands’ Directo-
rate–General for International Cooperation (DGIS), the International Fertilizer Develop-
ment Center (IFDC) and DADTCO launched a public-private partnership (PPP) known 
as Cassava +.
DADTCO Mandioca Moçambique Lda (DMM)
DADTCO Mozambique started its operations in Nampula in 2011. By 2013, the company 
had introduced a second AMPU in Nambui. Since its establishment, the AMPU located 
in Nampula has collected cassava at least once from about 4 600 small-scale farmers in 
proximity (max. 50 km) to the AMPU sites. At the moment, DADTCO sources from two 
main districts: Ribaue and Murrupula. The AMPU stays on each site from 4 to 6 months, 
moving on to the other site once the harvest campaign is finished. AMPU will be 
returning to the sites each year. At the time of writing this case study (2013), DADTCO 
commenced the construction of a third AMPU site in Meeuburi.
Background information on the company
While being a key dietary staple broadly cultivated across Africa, cassava has remained 
a subsistence crop. Inefficient transport and processing facilities, low market demand 
and rapid spoilage after harvest were the common denominators for poor market link-
ages of cassava growers in Africa. In order to unlock the door to commercialization, 
Peter Bolt, the founder of DADTCO (Dutch Agricultural Development & Trading Company) 
devised a new technology that brought the cassava processing factory to the farmers. 
The patented Autonomous Mobile Processing Unit (or AMPU) processes the perishable 
cassava cake into a product that can be stored up to 6 months before being used as raw 
material for many food items as well as for industrial applications.
Farmers unload their harvested cassava from a DADTCO’s 

















Growers harvest cassava between 6 and 24 months 
after planting. The optimal harvesting for the AMPU 
is 8-12 months. The method of transport rests in 
growers’ hands: if cassava is transported directly to 
site, growers will earn over 25% more than those 
who depend on company trucks.
ADDITIONAL COMMENTARY ON VC
Cassava growers
Ribaue and Murrupula are the Nampula districts 
chosen to accommodate the AMPU sites. 5 
Mobilizers coordinate the harvest and transport of 
raw cassava to the processing sites. Until today, 
near 4,600 growers have supplied cassava to 
DADTCO. Average supply of cassava per grower 
oscillates between 500 kg and 2-3 Tons. IFDC’s 
services are supported by funding from the 
Directorate-General for International Cooperation 
(DGIS) of the Netherlands
Markets
Cassava cake is then transported to the Cervejas de 
Mocambique factory site. Brewing company uses 
the cake directly in the brewing of the world’s first 
commercialized cassava-based beer. The result is a 
30-40 percent cheaper beer than other mainstream 
lagers.
Processing/storage
Within 24 hours after harvesting, AMPU processes 
raw cassava into cassava cake. A Byproduct can be 
stored up to 6 months thanks to the significantly 
decrease in the water content ( 50 percent). 





2 AMPU sites 
(sourcing areas)
TRANSPORT to the 
processing site arranged 
by company
TRANSPORT to the 
processing site arranged 
by grower
DADTCO keeps in STORE 
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Value chain of DADTCO
Value chain Figure 1 details the actors and processes involved in the value chain (VC). 
Additional commentary can be found at the right side of the figure. 
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❶ First phase 
Reaching out to farmers
With the new company established, and with a newly 
acquired client, Cervejas de Moçambique (CDM) and 
AMPU sites set up, DADTCO faced the first big challenge 
of reaching out to small-scale farmers and ensuring that 
farmers understand DADTCO’s business model.
DADTCO aims to source from cassava growing areas lo-
cated near the AMPU sites. However, before the sourc-
ing of cassava takes place, DADTCO must present its 
business case to the community leaders and farmers’ 
organizations in the intended area of penetration. In 
cooperation with staff from the International Fertilizer 
Development Center (IFDC) and government agricul-
tural extension officer(s), DADTCO organizes a series 
of explanatory meetings about the company, collec-
tion points or price. In addition, the team spends time 
with the audience addressing remaining questions or 
doubts. After these sessions, DADTCO and community 
leaders normally come to terms on the harvest period, 
collection points and the role of DADTCO’s extension 
officer as a point of contact.
❷ Second phase 
Organizing the  
supply chain
On average, AMPU stays 
on one site for four to six 
months before moving 
on to the next site. Dur-
ing that period, the sourc-
ing must be organized in a 
way that all famers who 
are willing to sell their 
cassava can harvest and 
deliver the product to the 
collection point or directly 
to the AMPU site within 
24 hours after harvest. 
This phase is crucial for 
farmer inclusion: a reli-
able sourcing process 
builds up trust needed for 
prosperous cooperation 
between the company and 
farmers.
❸ Third phase
Catalyzing changes (current phase)
After several months of material and intangible investment, DADTCO and partners are 
now in a position to transform the cassava sector in Nampula. During the transition 
from subsistence to commercial cassava farming, DADTCO and IFDC identified three 
major aspects:
1. Local vs improved varieties: local varieties are prone to pest and disease occurrence, 
a more fibrous core, lower starch content and yield potential. Improved varieties 
address these problems and offer a new commercially viable alternative to growers.
2. Increasing yields through more efficient spacing: cassava growers in Nampula use 
a 2 x 2 meter planting scheme. To increase yields, IFDC and DADTCO recommend a 
1 x 0.75 or 1 x 0.8 meter spacing. The recommendation is to have 10 000 cassava 
plants in 1 ha, or the equivalent in a given area.
3. Good management practices: cassava can be grown on most soils. However, the 
crop has a reputation of depleting a large amount of nutrients from the soil, which 
often results in acute reduction in soil fertility. To avoid further soil depletion 
DADTCO and IFDC suggest including an alternative crop to rotate with cassava. 
Partners also emphasize the importance of good weed management, prevention 
of soil erosion, appropriate growing cycle, and potential uses for cassava leaves. 
Though currently limited to plot demonstrations, another topic in IFDC’s curricula 
is the use of fertilizer. 
As a combined result of the ongoing activities, DADTCO’s and IFDC’s forecasts expect 
that yields will increase from the current 3–5 tons per ha to 15–25 tons per ha of 
cassava in the future (without the use of fertilizer). A large part of this increase will be 
improved cassava with high starch content and high dry matter content. 
The DADTCO-IFDC partnership has followed an approach of identifying, approaching 
and promoting long-lasting relationships between cassava growers and DADTCO.
Current inclusiveness of the chain
Phases in the development of the model
2
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DADTCO’s innovative and collaborative approach is cre-
ating an emerging market for fresh cassava in Nampula. 
At the core of the business lies the Mobile Processing 
Unit, an exciting and versatile innovative machine de-
signed to process fresh cassava into cassava cake onsite. 
How does this innovation help small-scale growers to 
generate income? 
First, growers’ overall acceptance of this new business 
has been overwhelming, with an increasing number of 
them showing interest in supplying cassava to DADTCO. 
This is due to careful organization of the supply chain 
and providing a reasonable price.
Second, DADTCO’s partners, IFDC and the Ministry of 
Agriculture, follow up with the growers on the objectives 
of improving management practices and introducing 
improved varieties. 
Third, having a strong relationship with the sole buyer, 
CDM, is instrumental for consolidating a viable com-
mercial sector. If this commercialization channel came 
to an end, the inclusion of growers in the business would 
decrease. 
Price
Although growers’ aspiration is always to receive the highest return, DADTCO provides a reasonable and steady price. 
DADTCO pays 1.5 MZN/kg of cassava collected at the growing area and 2 MZN/kg of cassava delivered by growers 
themselves to the AMPU site. Usually, the company issues the payment to the growers on the site. 
In the case of sun-dried cassava—the only market alternative for growers to cash in—the revenues are 10–15 % higher. 
However, discounting the labor invested and considering a conversion rate of 1 kg fresh cassava = 0.25 kg of dried 
cassava, growers are better off when opting for the fresh market.
Sharing improved local varieties and best practices with farmers
It is in the interest of both DADTCO and small-scale growers to work closely together towards a vibrant and reliable 
cassava sector. Concerned players agree that this transformation needs to be supported by improved local varieties 
and better management practices. In this way, DADTCO would get a steadier and high starch-content supply of improved 
cassava. Additionally, growers would pave the way for a successful transition to commercial cassava farming. 
On the road to cassava development, IFDC plays a central role. The NGO takes responsibility for the training of farmers 
and facilitation of improved seeds. The former revolves around provision of training on topics such as best crop prac-
tices (i.e. proper weeding and spacing), intercropping or land management. Training takes place in the sourcing areas 
and brings together growers from different regions and community leaders. IFDC estimates that around 3 000 farmers 
have been trained in cassava management practices since the training program started in 2011.
With regards to improved seeds, IFDC holds the patent for 4 cassava varieties that were purchased from the IIAM 
(Mozambique Institute of Agricultural Research) in 2011. A year later, IFDC contracted Corridor Agro Limited (CAL) 
to multiply 11 hectares planted with new varieties in Namialo. Stems were later distributed among 100 lead growers 
under the condition that 80 % of new stems had to be given to 5–6 other cassava farmers. Those farmers receiving 
the new varieties must also follow the 80/20 rule. With this initiative, DADTCO and IFDC set their hopes on an ef-
ficient dissemination system. DADTCO representatives estimate that cassava farmers will start supplying improved 
cassava in 2014. 
What makes the business 
model inclusive?
Mechanisms that promote inclusion
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Threat to food security
Improvements in productivity are linked to increased 
supply of cassava in Nampula. However, until those yield 
increases are improved, the area continues to gamble 
with its food security. Further compounding this prob-
lem, is that farmers focus on the immediate short-term 
opportunities and sell much of their increased produc-
tion in bulk. While this does benefit the farmer with cash, 
it also often places the farmer at risk in regards to food 
security. This may cause food shortages later on during 
the year. Another issue that might threaten food securi-
ty is the harvesting time. Sometimes, households face a 
dilemma on harvesting; selling the cassava when income 
is needed rather than at its optimal growth. DADTCO’s 
harvesting preference oscillates between 8–16 months. 
However, no specific threshold has been set. As the 
market for cassava is open to cassava harvested at dif-
ferent stages, households’ needs might well cause food 
shortages later on in the year. Unintended risks like these 
must be addressed quickly in an effort to harmonize and 
align business practices and food security.
Natural hazards 
In the likely event of drought or floods, small-scale grow-
ers turn to their ‘insurance’ crops. As a survivor of fires or 
droughts, cassava offers a vital source of food to millions 
of families. DADTCO understands that the threat of hun-
ger may harm the company’s future activities.
Supply chain management
When harvested, cassava spoils within 48 hours. Ac-
cordingly, DADTCO must coordinate the collection and 
transport to the site very carefully. Here, the roles of 
mobilizers and supply chain managers are key since 
they understand the timing and logistics needed in 
sourcing cassava from small-scale growers. As the com-
pany grows, such issues need to be given more attention 
and a larger amount of resources.
Need for research and monitoring
Unchaining the commercialization of cassava in Mozam-
bique requires a deep understanding of the social-
economic-environmental impact on local households. 
Related assessments should include topics such as gen-
der relations, access to services, and/or use of gener-
ated income. A monitoring and evaluating system would 
also help to avoid undesired effects on food security or 
increased alcohol consumption.
Dependence on a sole buyer
The prosperous commercial relationship between 
DADTCO and SABMiller, parent company of the subsidiary 
CDM, extends into other countries. CDM and DADTCO’s 
good understanding and alignment have helped to con-
solidate the inclusion of growers into a new market. 
Despite that, the cassava market has been limited to 
processing of cassava cake entirely sold to CDM. In 
addition to this market dependence, the potential of 
DADTCO’s mission ‘to initiate a cassava revolution’ is as ambitious as challenging. Many factors come into play and, 
if mishandled, may hamper drastically the inclusion of growers.
the cassava flour and starch industry in Mozambique 
remains far from being fully realized¹. Therefore, if rela-
tions begin to stagnate, it is growers who will experience 
first-hand the consequences of a volatile market with as 
yet no feasible alternatives.
Appearance of new large-scale farmers
Apparently, DADTCO’s resounding success has awakened 
a great level of interest to invest in cassava production. 
Reportedly, new ‘growers’ will be in possession of large 
numbers of hectares (ha) of land, and forecasts predict 
30–40 t/ha of improved cassava at harvest. In principle, 
investors would set their sights on DADTCO as its sourc-
ing policy entitles any growers to supply their cassava 
confidently. However, pushing away small-scale growers 
from the fresh market is still far from reality. DADTCO’s 
sourcing needs are expected to grow. Thus, there would 
be room for new, bigger growers to enter the sector. Never-
theless, in the medium term DADTCO will inevitably face a 
sourcing dilemma—whether to rely entirely on small-scale 
sourcing, or to introduce a joint scheme (small-large 
scale) sourcing from both small and large-scale farmers.
Providing training and knowledge to all 
small-scale growers
Small-scale farmers are scattered in villages and are not 
organized. This lack of organization (hence the impor-
tance of community leaders) limits the reach of IFDC’s 
extension services. In addition, IFDC has  limited capacity 
to fully leverage its curricula within a reasonable time-
frame. Increasing the number of growers in the near 
future will raise even more concerns on this side. 
Challenges
¹At the time of writing this report, DADTCO and a Japanese 
Multinational Corporation were in talks to set up a starch 
factory in Nampula. 
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So far, 4 600 small-scale growers have benefited from DADTCO’s innovative operation in Nampula since 2011. 
Projections for 2014 point to a continuation of the upward trend. To help shed light on the success resulting from 
growers’ inclusion in the company, the following key factors were identified:
 › Success of the beer produced from cassava cake
Launched in November 2011, Impala beer (product of CDM) is the world’s first commercialized cas-
sava-based beer. It is brewed using 70 % cassava and its price in the market is 30 % cheaper than main-
stream lager. This is made possible by a reduced tax rate agreed with the government of Mozambique. 
The sales of Impala are increasing rapidly, and now account for more than 5 % of CDM’s production. For 
2013, the production target was set at 365 000 hector litres. Therefore, the good reception of the Impala 
beer makes the supply of cassava essential to the continued success of the business.
 › Partnership between IFDC and DADTCO
Both entities work in unison to bring about positive changes in Nampula’s rural 
households. DADTCO manages the cassava value chain and IFDC  is responsible for 
the knowledge transfer of best agricultural practices and dissemination of improved 
genetic material. As a consequence, the inclusion of growers in the business model 
has a natural follow-up in terms of extending the services provided by IFDC. 
 › Effective supply chain management
As challenging as it gets, organizing the cassava harvest, pick up, transport, 
cake processing and transport to the CDM factory has been carried out 
with great diligence.
Success factors
‘Impala beer is the world’s first 
commercialized cassava-based 
beer. It is brewed using 70 % cas-
sava and its price in the market 
is 30 % cheaper than mainstream 
lager. This is made possible by a 
reduced tax rate agreed with the 
government of Mozambique.’
Family place their freshly harvested cassava in 25-30 kg plastic, 
blue containers before weighing
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DADTCO and small-scale farmers move forward together 
in the shift from subsistence to commercial farming. 
However, apart from creating a new fresh cassava mar-
ket, a number of areas were identified that can consoli-
date and strengthen the relations between small-scale 
growers and DADTCO.
Cassava in animal feed
Dried peel of cassava is widely used as an ingredient in 
animal feed. Although livestock production in Nampula 
remains at a modest level, the provision of dried peel 
by DADTCO can enable cassava farmers to diversify 
their economic activity and ease their dependence on 
the agricultural production. 
Water for irrigation
The mobile processing unit consumes high volumes of 
water. Once the processing ends, waste water drops in 
a deep borehole disposal. To make better use of the 
waste, DADTCO considers installing a filtration system 
so that the filtered water can later be used for irrigation, 
thereby helping to promote a sustainable environment. 
Possibility to increase inclusiveness
Family loads the freshly harvested cassava roots onto trays before weighing
3
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A robust fresh cassava market is forging in Nampula. The growing success of the Impala beer reassures DADTCO to 
promote commercial cassava production. Therefore, its business partners, the small-scale growers, will continue 
to thrive under the current conditions. The demand for cassava cake is rapidly increasing, an unequivocal indication 
of the upcoming trend: more growers obtaining higher yields with improved varieties. DADTCO’s penetration in new 
sourcing areas builds upon the good organization of the supply chain at previous stages. However, understanding and 
handling a greater supply base will inevitably require an in-depth analysis of the sustainability of the activity. Aspects 
such as price, transport, training, environmental performance, social inclusion and economic impact will need to be 
assessed and monitored in a continuous fashion. The underlying rationale is that the model must continue to deliver 
the expected social-economic and environmental impact to the actors involved.
On the other hand, the demand across Africa for cassava 
byproducts—such as high-quality cassava flour (HQCF), 
starch and glucose—is expected to rise due to urbanization 
and global increases in grain prices. As in Mozambique, 
cassava cake is the only byproduct with a thriving indus-
try. Starch and flour industries are yet to be developed, 
although their realization in the short- to medium term is 
certain. When that point is reached, the market demand 
will increase drastically, thus benefitting Mozambique’s 
small-scale farmers.
Is the business model scalable?
Workers deposit fresh cassava on the conveyer belt— 
the process continues with the washing & peeling phase
4
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The current business model in Mozambique builds on the success of 
DADTCO’s first experience in Nigeria. To shift from subsistence to com-
mercial cassava farming across Africa, DADTCO will make use of part-
nerships and the value chain approach that have been recently applied in 
Nigeria, Mozambique and Ghana. In this equation, SABMiller represents 
a reliable and strategic partner to continue developing the commer-
cialization of cassava in Africa. 
Is this business model replicable? 







Egg production in Mozambique has been growing 
for several years. From 2004 to 2012 production 
increased by 80 %, climbing to 96 % for the pe-
riod 2009–2012. Maputo Province accounts for 
51.3 % of the total egg production in the country, 
followed by Manica Province with 41.4 %, and 
Nampula with 5.4 %. In 2012, the family sector 
had contributed to 14 % of total egg production 
(10 135 259 dozen). 
While national egg production is rapidly growing, 
the import of eggs for consumption into Mozam-
bique is also enjoying steady growth. In 2009, the 
number of table eggs imported from neighbor-
ing countries such as Zambia, South Africa and 
Malawi amounted to 10 000 000 dozen. Due to 
the high cost of layers, feed and facilities (layer 
houses), FAO estimates that 90 % of the eggs 
consumed in the country are cheap imported 
eggs from neighboring countries. These eggs 
are said to be inferior in quality.
Eggs are collected and placed on 
cardboards before transportation 
to the distribution centre.
Introduction1
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IntroductionMozambique Mozambique Fresh Eggs
Background information on the company
August 2005 was the start of today’s most successful chicken operation in northern Mozambique, New Horizons. 
But while business laid the groundwork for growth, part owner and entrepreneur Andrew Cunningham mulled 
over other business ideas. Since the early stages of the broiler operation, he and his colleague Wilfred van der Kooi 
realized the potential market for table eggs in Mozambique. At the time, New Horizons was already producing layer 
chicks and animal feed for external companies.
After several meetings with relevant actors within the sector, New Horizons partnered with brothers, Bruce and 
Kim Dooyema, part owners of Center Fresh Egg Farm, a privately held chicken egg company in Iowa, USA. The brothers 
had learned about New Horizons’ interest in starting an egg operation in Mozambique, and as they are also com-
mitted to using business to combat poverty, an agreement was swiftly reached. Shortly after, another partner, 
Eggs for Africa, joined the venture.
The shareholding of the newly formed company, Mozambique Fresh Eggs 
(hereafter referred to as MFE), would be shaped as follows:
Despite staggering growth, the sector is still a long 
way from reaching its ceiling. In 2011, FAO stipulated 
that the total quantity of eggs consumed in 2011, in-
cluding those imported, was 7 990 998 dozen, which 
corresponds to an average availability for consumption 
of about 4 eggs per person per year. Recent commu-
nications with the interviewees reveal that the con-
sumption per capita per year is double this number 
today, yet far from the average national consumption 
in countries such as South Africa (156 eggs per capita 
per annum) or Zambia (48).
Eggs can be bought either fresh at markets and shops, 
or cooked from local vendors who roam the streets daily.
Figure 1
Shareholding of Mozambique Fresh Eggs
‘Recent communications with the 
interviewees reveal that the con-
sumption per capita per year is 
about 8 eggs/person today, which 
is far from the average national 
consumption in countries such as 
South Africa (156 eggs per capita 
per annum) or Zambia (48).’
Center Fresh Egg Farm
owning 50 % of the new company. 
They would provide the capital needed to  
start the business.
Eggs for Africa 
with a total share of 25 %. 
This company would commercialize  
the eggs produced.
New Horizons 
with a total share of 25 %. 
They would be in charge of producing 
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Mozambique 
Fresh Eggs
Located in one area ( 15 km 
distance from MFE’s site)












To  look after the layers properly, growers shall 
assure water supply, regulate feeders, control 
mortalities, monitor that biosecurity requirements 
are met and collect egg from the nests about five 
times per day. One technical officer supervises 
farmers’ work on the site daily.  
ADDITIONAL COMMENTARY ON VC
Supply of inputs
The processes of hatching and rearing takes place in 
MFE’s premises. Later,  16-18 weeks-old hens are 
placed in the growers’ farm. Together with birds 
farmers also receive medicines, feed, littler and 
vaccinations from MFE. 
Markets
Eggs for Africa can sell the fresh egg to shops and 
local markets in Nampula and surroundings or to 
local vendors at the door.
Storage
MFE collects roughly 7,600 eggs per day on average 
from the growers (collection occurs twice per 
week). Note that eggs are transported from the 




Daily supervision( 1 
extension officer + head of 
operation: Wilfred van der 
Kooi)
Sale at the door





Chicken run* - Bamboos






- Steel in the roof
-Equipment nest houses
*BUILDING A CHICKEN RUN, WHO 
PROVIDES WHAT
Figure 2
Value chain of Mozambique Fresh Eggs
Value chain As in the case of New Horizons, MFE has designed an out-layer model by which 12 small-scale farmers look 
after 500 specialized layer chicks for 55–60 weeks on average. Layers produce eggs (according to a laying curve), 
which are collected and transported to Eggs for Africa premises, the company that will market these eggs (in ad-
dition to the ones produced at their premises) in Nampula. Figure 1 depicts all segments of MFE’s value chain.
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As a newly established company (late 2012), MFE is still adapting the business model 
to the local conditions.
Initial (current) phase
The out-layer scheme is anchored on three pillars:
Because the layers’ production cycle lasts between 52–56 weeks, MFE decided to launch 
the out-layer scheme with a sizeable number of growers (12) to monitor results and 
address problems more efficiently. One thing that illustrates the newness of the opera-
tion is that only one grower is nearing the cycle’s completion as of end 2013.
Mozambique Fresh Eggs (MFE) builds on the principles that have driven New Horizons 
over the years. Wilfred van der Kooi, MFE’s managing director, also believes that Africa 
must become productive in a sustainable and profitable way. According to this view, 
much of the money invested in Africa by international organizations, donors or NGOs 
has failed to address the bigger picture and take a more balanced approach. Instead, 
Agri-businesses in Africa should be seen in terms of adding value to the environment: 
farmers can be solid actors in any business models if they are properly motivated to do 
what they do best. But for this to happen, leading actors must walk the extra mile, 
or in other words, they must have faith in the approach, going beyond short-term 
profitability.
In the words of van der Kooi, three factors should shape how inclusive businesses in 
Africa are conceived: 
1. Market linkages and partnerships: often skillful small-scale farmers struggle to 
find suitable markets for their crops. In contrast, private companies possess the 
capacity to access modern and developed markets. Hence agri-business and farm-
ers can capitalize on each other’s strengths by establishing fruitful partnerships.
2. Capital: this is another constraint for farmers wanting to start their own business. 
A company, however, can allocate or invest resources when needed.
3. Knowledge: this is where farmers can make a meaningful impact on the business 
and, by extension, on their lives. To give an example: before MFE was created, 
New Horizons produced eggs for consumption on a small scale. Mortalities oscil-
lated between 10–15 birds per week. Today, mortalities have dropped significantly 
thanks to the growers’ good management.
Current inclusiveness of the chain
Drivers for inclusion Phases in the development of the model
1. Growers must be located near the company’s premises (maximum 
15 km). In addition, any candidate that aspires to join the company 
must comply with the following requirements:
 › access to land ( being in possession of land title);
 › access to water;
 › family members must be willing to help with the activity;
 › growers must show a contagious motivation.
2. Every grower is provided with layers, 
equipment and some materials to build 
the chicken run. MFE will make daily 
visits to the farms. 
3. The financial model revolves 
around three variables: mor-
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In contrast to the poultry operation, proper manage-
ment does not guarantee egg-layer chickens will lay in 
accordance with the projected laying curve. In reality, 
the growers and the company are better off when the ac-
tual laying curve comes closer to the projected one. For 
this reason, MFE has sought a perfect alignment between 
growers and business since the project inception. This 
translated into the following effective mechanisms:
Financial back-up 
Commercial egg production requires in the first place bio-secure, equipped chicken runs. As depicted in 
Figure 1, MFE provides most of the material and equipment needed, although growers also contribute some 
of their own materials. Financially speaking, setting up a chicken run is an investment worth USD 5 000 (layers 
aside), and the expenses are covered by the company. MFE is nevertheless entitled to remove all materials 
in case of continued poor performance or theft. Therefore, without the financial back-up growers would face 
insurmountable challenges.
Daily supervision 
One technical supervisor tours all farms daily. Areas that need continuous monitoring are the number of eggs 
produced, feed/water consumption and mortalities, and other minor features. Should problems arise, 
MFE can tackle and resolve the issue before it escalates. 
Financial model
The underlying rationale is clear: layers must produce eggs close to their maximum potential (laying curve), 
at a low feed consumption ratio and mortalities should not surpass 7–8 per week. If all these things are in 
place, growers can earn up to 3–4 times the minimum salary in Mozambique (MZN 2 000). In other words, the 
model rewards good management and penalizes low productivity. If layers are consistently producing eggs 
well below their potential, MFE discounts that negative differential in the payment. In other words, growers 
that produce say 15 % below their potential will suffer a 15 % cut in the profits over the period in question. 
MFE reserves the right to terminate the contractual relationship with growers if low productivity persists.
In-kind benefits 
In addition to the monthly payment, growers also receive between 10–15 eggs per week for home consumption. 
Moreover, MFE plans to donate all equipment and building materials to growers after 4 or 5 successful cycles. 
This measure should motivate growers to work towards a better future for themselves and their families. 
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MFE is dedicated to ensuring a smooth in-
clusion of growers into the company, thus 
challenges derive from the normal course 
of business: delivery of feed or vaccinations 
in a timely manner, efficient egg collection 
and high layer performance.
However, side-selling can be an obstacle 
to increasing grower inclusion. Growers 
manage on average 500 layers, which are 
expected to follow the projected laying 
curve. Yet, layers often seem to lay below 
their potential. In principle, the reason 
behind this would seem to be poor man-
agement of water and/or feed. However, if 
these factors are under control, experience 
shows that growers are involved in the 
side-selling of eggs (or even birds). Even 
though it is hard to calculate the number 
of eggs sold or their destination, MFE has 
no choice but to remove all the birds, take 
away the moveable building materials and 
terminate the relationship. To avoid temp-
tations MFE lets growers keep between 
10–15 eggs per week so their families can 
enjoy the product of their labor.
Although the company has only been operating for a year, the recent success is a result of the following:
 › Improved layers
The cycle of layers lasts 74 weeks counting from birth to the end of the 
productive cycle. MFE places birds on the farms at approximately week 17, 
once the rearing period is complete. This phase is crucial for achieving a 
high laying percentage in the production phase. 
 › Company expertise
General Manager Wilfred van der Kooij has been producing table eggs 
himself for many years and knows everything about the business. Together 
with the technical officer, he tours the farms daily, monitors the activities 
and counsels growers on the best management practices. The result is 
sustained production throughout the farms.
 › Effective division of tasks 
As explained in the first section, three partners share the ownership of 
the company and each has its role to play: New Horizons manufactures 
the animal feed, Eggs for Africa commercializes them and Center Fresh 
Egg Farm provides the financial muscle to build chicken runs and keep up 
with payments. Seemingly, all these mesh together nicely for the benefit 
of the business and its growers.
 › Understanding of family/cultural issues 
Throughout its 8 years of existence, the parent company New Horizons 
has gained a profound understanding of community standards and cul-
tural values. This knowledge played an instrumental role when setting up 
the fresh eggs operation. Aspects such as selection of growers, training 
and supervision were diligently addressed beforehand.
Challenges Success factors
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Due to the nature of the business, MFE dedicates part of its time to smoothing the 
process of grower inclusion in the company. As in any other egg operation, MFE must 
ensure that the production scheme is a near-flawless system by which the production 
flow meets the projections. If actual levels of production deviate from the objective, 
both the company and growers will face immediate problems. When proper inclusion 
is achieved, MFE will effectively capitalize on the growers’ adequate management, 
which will in turn reinforce the relationship between the growers and the company.
What can be done to foster inclusion today? To carry out the activity, growers are 
provided with layers, building materials, equipment, feed and even daily supervision. 
The only input growers need to be able to afford is water. 
Often, growers struggle to get the water from nearby boreholes to the farm. This 
collection and transport takes place several times per day. Therefore, securing water 
supply would undoubtedly ease the burden on the growers. The rationale is that, 
with all inputs secured, growers can attain the objective of producing eggs at the 
required pace, consuming the right amount of feed/water and maintaining low bird 
mortalities. To quote the words of Wilfred van der Kooi: ‘If good farmers keep up the 
good work, they will soon find themselves caught in a profitable business with plenty 
of opportunities to continue growing’. 
As in the case of New Horizons, the use of manure at the end of the cycle might foster 
inclusiveness by virtue of an extra source of income. Manure can be recycled in the 
coming cycle, used as fertilizer for crops or sold to neighboring farmers. Therefore, 
growers need to become more aware of the beneficial impact that manure can have 
on the farm and take advantage of the situation. 
Possibility to increase 
inclusiveness
 ‘If good farmers keep up the 
good work, they will soon 
find themselves caught in 
a profitable business with 





Mozambique Mozambique Fresh Eggs Is the business model scalable?
 › Efficient commer-
cialization
The company in charge 
of the egg marketing, 
Eggs for Africa, has 
years of experience in 
the sector. When ap-
proached, they showed 
willingness to handle a 
larger amount of prod-
uct whenever feasible. 
Their diligence and mar-
ket presence are in-
strumental to the suc-
cess of the company.
Yes, although with exceptions. There are some technical 
challenges associated with the out-layer model that could 
prevent new schemes from having comparable success.
Above all, the hatching and rearing process must be 
carried out by skilled personnel with suitable equip-
ment. Anything that limits either the hatching or subse-
quent chicks’ growth will affect their ability to lay well. 
Both processes take place on the company’s premises, 
where personnel have been trained by professionals 
with extensive experience in the poultry business. 
Once laying hens have reached sexual maturity at 
16–18 weeks, MFE proceeds to place them at the grow-
ers’ farms. This step precedes the other major challenge: 
making sure that birds lay close to their potential or laying 
curve. Growers must provide feed and water in a timely 
manner, as well as ensure the continued health of the lay-
ers. Any deviation from these practices will cause a drop 
in the number of eggs produced, which in turn will have 
an impact on business profitability. Also in an activity such 
as fresh egg production, side-selling should be handled 
cautiously. The company needs to trust the growers’ good 
will, although it should never be complacent in this area. 
In short, to successfully replicate the business model there 
must be a widespread belief that involved communities 
is the way to go, as well as technical knowledge, finan-
cial capital and the willingness to engage with small-scale 
farmers and local communities, although this is likely to 
be at the expense of short-term profitability. 
 › No structural or 
capacity constraints 
to growing
As the business grows 
financing, logistics and 
data management is-
sues set the limits to 
further development. 
At this early stage, how-
ever, an expansion of 
the supply base re-
quires slight increases 
in overhead costs (in-
vestment on chicken 
runs aside) weighed 
against high potential 
benefits. Logistical and 
data management as-
pects are shown to be 
under control.
Is this business model 
replicable? 
MFE planned to expand their supply base to 8 more growers by the end of 2013. The target is to have 20 growers, 
each managing nearly 1 000 birds on average. If this target is met, egg production would fluctuate between 
15 000 and 17 000 eggs a day, which would make MFE one of the largest fresh egg companies in Mozambique.
Mirroring the factors that New Horizons considered for scaling up its business model, MFE has taken into account 
the following aspects:
Is the business model scalable?
 › Desire for greater 
impact
MFE could have decid-
ed to simply increase 
the amount of birds 
that each grower is 
producing. Instead, the 
company is committed 
to reaching out to more 
families that could ben-
efit from the activity. 
This measure finds its 
rationale in the vision 
of the business: a suc-
cessful agri-business for 
and by the local com-
munities. 
 › Market demand
The national consump-
tion of fresh eggs oscil-
lates between 8–10 eggs 
per capita per annum, 
well below other Afri-
can countries’ stand-
ards. With regard to 
market competitors, 
low-quality eggs from 
neighboring countries 
(e.g. eggs from Malawi 
into Nampula) are the 
only competitive force 
at the moment and 
consumer acceptance 
is said to be dropping 








The poultry sector in Mozambique has undergone 
major changes in recent years. In 2005, the 
national chicken industry was on the brink of col-
lapse. Inflation in the local economy and avian 
flu outbreaks in South Africa had left the poul-
try sector adrift (FAO, 2012). In the light of these 
events, Brazilian chicken saw a surge in the num-
ber of imports, many of which were later flagged 
for low quality and unclear origin.  
In 2005 with a view to promoting local economic 
growth, Technoserve, a non-profit organization 
that develops business solutions to poverty 
around the world, launched a program to pro-
mote locally produced chicken. At the time of 
project inception, local growers produced only 
⅓ of total local consumption. In 2012, local grow-
ers provided 85 % of the total consumption.
Today, as in other African countries such as Zim-
babwe or Angola, poultry consumption is on the 
rise. With an increase of 21 % over the 2000–2010 
period, the government of Mozambique expects 
future demand to triple in the next 10 years. Pre-
sumably, increased demand will create significant 
business opportunities through the value chain.
Technical officer Miguel explaining 




Background information on the company
Novos Horizontes (New Horizons)—hereafter referred to as NH—covers a stretch of 
300 hectares and is located 15 km east of Mozambique’s third largest city, Nampula. 
It was established in 2004 and started operations in 2006. At the time of its creation, 
Andrew Cunningham and his brother Peter were the sole shareholders. In 2010, an 
American investor joined the business, expanding to three the company’s ownership. 
Nearly nine years into its existence, NH employs over 300 workers and has the fol-
lowing business operations:
 › Breeder chicken operation 
Eight chicken houses host around 56 000 chickens. Eggs produced go to 
the next phase/process i.e. hatching. 
 › Hatchery 
Hatching machines breed approximately 90 000 eggs per week into 
day-old chicks, of which 50 % are sold in the market and the other half 
placed in the out-growers farms. 
 › Out-growers 
The heart of the business, small-scale farmers look after the chickens 
for the cycle period (6 weeks of production + 2 weeks of cleaning).
 › Abattoir 
Six-week-old broilers are slaughtered and frozen prior to sale to 
wholesalers and retailers. 
 › Feed mill 
Animal feed is manufactured and distributed to the different business 
operations. 




Located in 4 areas ( 30 km 
distance from site)
Approx. 190 out 
growers 












To  look after the chicks properly, growers shall 
assure water supply, regulate feeders, control 
mortalities and monitor that biosecurity 
requirements are met. Five technical officers 
supervise farmers’ work on the site daily.  
ADDITIONAL COMMENTARY ON VC
Supply of inputs
The processes of breeding and hatching takes place 
on NH’s premises. Later, near 40,000 hatched chicks 
(day-old) are placed in 15-20 farms every week. 
Together with birds farmers also receive medicines, 
feed, litter and vaccinations from NH. 
Markets
NH sells the frozen product to wholesalers and 
retailers in Nampula.
Processing
NH collects 40,000 birds every week from about 15-













Value chain of Novos Horizontes
Value chain Although the company’s revenues stem from different business segments, the out-growers scheme represents the bulk of 
profits. To make sense of the growers’ activity within the company and to explain the current inclusiveness of the chain, 
a detailed value chain diagram is shown in Figure 1. Additional commentary can be found at the right side of the figure. 
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A man of faith, courage and business vision, Andrew Cunningham is determined 
to make a real and significant impact on the local community. He believes today’s 
African society must be developed for a more promising future and certainly not at the 
expense of the poorest. On the road to development, he considers that business in the 
agricultural/livestock sector should be the vehicle for people’s personal and profes-
sional empowerment in Africa.
As a farmer with more than 20 years in the sector, Cunningham has always included 
small-scale farmers in his businesses with resounding success. His collaboration with 
farmers started in 1996 back in his mother country Zimbabwe. Together with his 
brother Peter, Andrew put in place a successful poultry and ostrich enterprise.
However, in 2004 he and his family felt the call to move to Mozambique and start a new 
operation. The reason that led to this decision was rooted in a business diversification 
strategy. With a convulsed political situation shaking Zimbabwe’s economic sectors, 
Andrew and his bother decided to expand business boundaries and set up another 
operation in a foreign country. The reasons for which they chose Mozambique were:
 › Andrew and his family had spent some time in the country back in the 
early 90s. During that time, they came to grips with the language and 
basic cultural issues. 
 › Commonly, a chicken business is set in a location where grains (maize 
or soya) for feed are available at a relatively low price. The north of 
Mozambique fulfilled this requirement. 
 › To replicate the model used in Zimbabwe, the chosen location required 
small-scale farmers spread across the area. Northern Mozambique 
satisfied this requirement as well. 
 › The new site had to be located near a large city with a growing poultry 
market and good communications to ease transportation.
Owner’s vision
Considering all the above, Nampula in northern Mozambique seemed the best pos-
sible option. Today, NH can boast of making a constant developmental impact in the 
area. Nearly 200 local families earn an average income three times higher than the 
minimum salary in Mozambique (MZN 2 000), and NH plans to produce more chickens 
in the future.
However, despite its current business success the company has gone through difficult 
moments in the past. Mr Cunningham recalls: 
‘During the first two or three years the company made big 
losses; however, we never lost sight of what was important 
for us: to have a positive impact on people’s lives through a 
successful agri-business’. 
There is no doubt that efforts have paid off handsomely so far. 
Side view of a broiler house
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Current inclusiveness of the chain
Drivers for inclusion
New Horizons (NH) was born out of Andrew Cunningham’s 
keen sense of business and profound Christian faith. 
Although for some these may seem contradictory, he 
believes that business in Africa must procure a develop-
mental impact on the local economy, and the best way 
to accomplish this is through local empowerment.
In his view, to achieve a consistent business develop-
ment in Africa, entrepreneurs and national/international 
organizations should consider the following principles:
The combination of the above principles led to the creation of ‘Novos Horizontes’. With regard to the importance that 
those principles had in the company’s success, realizing the potential of small-scale farmers has been very instrumental. 
In the words of Andrew Cunningham, it is on this principle that the company has built its solid position in the market.
Development in Africa must be directed at sustainable business growth. Often, international aid, NGOs and 
international organizations fail to provide good results as far as the long-term sustainability of African 
enterprises is concerned. Investment should occur in a way that benefits all actors in the chain and has a long-
lasting effect on their economies.
Focus the growth of the business on market opportunities. In contrast, the life of input-driven systems barely 
lasts more than a year, with controversial results. Here, an understanding of the environment surrounding 
the forthcoming developmental action is crucial.
The world needs to realize the potential of small-scale farmers. When the company was set up, the Cunninghams 
realized that for the business to be prosperous, they would need a vast range of farmers: those with more 
means to sustain an important investment if needed up front, and those who, despite their lack of capital, possess 
the skills and motivation to be efficient farmers in the future.
When development impacts are the objective, parallel activities should be designed to foster entrepreneur-
ship and innovation among growers. 
‘Ecosystem for success.’ In America, the population benefit from a stimulating environment in which to do 
business. If equipped with the appropriate skills and financial muscle, entrepreneurs can strive with apparent 
ease. Despite this enabling environment, entrepreneurs in America count for less than 2 % of the population. 
In Africa, this figure drops. Therefore, parties need to consider the ease with which business can be done in 






‘We might not be the com-
pany that produces the 
best chicken, but we are 
proud to be the best com-
pany managing the inter-
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NH began its business activity in 2005 and along the way the out-grower model has 
experienced substantial changes. 
Phases in the development of the model
❶ First phase 
Absorbing the risk
Initially, NH partnered with 210 small-scale 
farmers who produced 500 birds per cycle 
on average. At the time the poultry sector 
was taking its first steps in Nampula, so NH 
was bound to absorb much of the financial 
risk associated with any new business. Not 
only were the farmers given the day-old 
chicks, feed, medicines and vaccinations, 
but the company also carried the financial 
burden of building the chicken runs and 
providing the feeders and drinkers.
❷ Second phase 
Problems mount
During the first three years the company faced increasing hardships. 
Problems were detected in almost every step of the chain. But the biggest 
struggle was the scant regard shown by growers for the business in hand. 
Broiler chicken requires efficient management and a great deal of honesty. 
The latter entails the avoidance of chick/feed side-selling and long-term 
commitment to the endeavour. Whether as a result of erratic management 
or deceptive behaviour, margins were squeezed and losses ensued.
The decline in business sent a clear message to Cunningham: the model 
had to be redesigned. From the initial 210 growers, only 50 continued 
with the scheme, this time producing about 1 500 chicks per cycle. With a 
more sizeable supply base, NH laid the groundwork for a lasting recovery.
❸ Third phase
Sharing the risk—and profits—with the out-grower
Over the following months neighbouring farmers started to show a genu-
ine interest in the activity. Chastened by early events, NH only allowed 
farmers with demonstrable upfront commitment to join the company. In 
other words, farmers had to build the chicken run to NH specifications at 
their own expense, as well as provide drinkers and feeders. These measures 
had a two-fold objective: to share the risk of setting up a new chicken 
farm with the farmer and to make farmers implicitly responsible for the 
success/failure of the company.
❹ Fourth phase
Letting the farmer fly
The new requirements set by NH catalysed the creation 
of a new generation of farmers with a strong sense of 
responsibility and good business skills. The number 
of farmers quickly increased from 50 to 190 producing 
2 000 chickens per cycle. Of the current growers, about 
5 to 10 grow about 6 500 birds each and most of them 
plan to continue operating under the umbrella of the 
company.
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Mechanisms that promote inclusion
NH is a vertically integrated poultry operation. From the breeding process to the 
chicken sale, NH monitors every step thoroughly. But what makes the business model 
inclusive is the out-grower model put in place. Commonly, the business operations of a 
poultry company are clustered on the company’s site under intensive or semi-intensive 
productive systems.
 
NH, staying true to its principles, employs a different scheme: small-scale farmers are 
responsible for growing the day-old chicks off-site using inputs provided by the com-
pany. To help make the scheme inclusive, NH has come up with simple but effective 
mechanisms over the years that have spurred greater inclusion of farmers in the com-
pany’s supply base. 
NH only works with husband-wife households 
Many of the first farmers who joined the company back in 2006 often spent their profits 
unwisely. What followed next was an abandonment of activity after pay-day. To put an 
end to this problem, NH decided to engage more actively with the farmers’ wives, who 
were believed to possess superior management skills. Results proved that the em-
powerment of the women has brought about noticeable improvements to the house-
hold’s quality of life. For example, the family would invest part of the profits in paying 
off their debt (if any), buying water buckets or installing a new roof.
Sharing risk and profits with farmers
NH spread the risk associated with the operation by having numerous growers. Those 
with a proven record of reliability and high performance make up for the losses accrued 
during unprofitable cycles. Meanwhile, farmers who do perform well earn higher re-
turns and face almost no risk of being excluded in the near future.
By contrast, starters or struggling farmers need to turn their efforts into profits in the 
space of two to three cycles if they want to stay in the company.  However, those 
farmers with the right motivation are bound to succeed under the current model.
Daily supervision
In the words of the head of the out-growers division at NH, ‘provided with feed and 
water, chickens will grow, surely’. The winning formula is clear; with basic management 
farmers will obtain the required 1.1–1.2 kg chickens at the end of the cycle. However, 
managing feed and water might be problematic for some farmers. These factors, 
coupled with the need to vaccinate chickens at days 1, 7, 14 and 18, have the potential 
to increase bird mortality drastically.
For these reasons, five technical officers make daily visits to all farms in their assigned 
area to monitor activities. Each farm has a record sheet in which details about weight, 
vaccinations or feed consumption are registered.
As one might expect, daily supervision not only helps solve problems on the farm, 
but also motivates farmers to play an active part in the success of the business.
Enabling environment for farmers to realize their potential
NH usually encourages the best farmers to take on a larger number of birds in future cycles.
Financial model
Payment to farmers is based on the so-called ‘Efficiency Performance Factor (EPF)’. 
The model combines the weight of the birds, the days taken to achieve that weight, 
mortality and the feed conversion ratio to estimate the earnings owed to the growers. 
As it is conceived, growers can significantly increase their earnings by improving their 
management skills. NH does not negotiate credit or debt with growers.
Method of payment 
Upon agreement, farmers can receive cash, goods or a combination of both at the end 
of the cycle. Goods can be as diverse as drinkers, feeders or toys for the children. In 
addition to the payment NH also provides farmers with empty feed sacks and 10 chickens 
worth MZN 100 each on the market.
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Short-term challenges
 › Water
Although growers are currently well integrated in the 
company’s structure, access to water poses a risk of 
exclusion in the near future. The majority of farmers 
have access to boreholes near their farms. However, 
with likely increases in the number of birds under 
management the demand for water will inevitably 
increase. This, together with the pressure of cli-
mate change, makes water a limiting factor for 
further inclusion. 
 › Side-selling
Looking at the big picture, a flock size of nearly 
2 000 birds is worth the equivalent of 10 years of 
the monthly minimum salary (MZN 2 000). Growers, 
especially those recently included, may feel tempted 
to sell a fewer number of chickens (or feed) hoping 
that the wrongdoing will go unnoticed. However, 
with the financial model in place, this type of prac-
tice is duly reflected in the final profits made by the 
growers. If, despite good husbandry practices, profits 
are still minimal, side-selling is the next likely reason 
behind poor performance. Should low revenues 
continue in future cycles, NH would have no choice 
but to terminate the contractual relationship with 
the growers.  
Medium- to long-term challenges
The following is a list of issues that pose a risk for the company 
in the medium to long term and by extension to the out-grower 
scheme, an instrumental part of the business.
 › Cash flow issues/feed
Above all, NH must ensure the flow of feed to growers. Any dis-
ruption at this end can cause tremendous damage to the company. 
 › Logistics and access to information
To support business growth, the company constantly revises its 
data management system and logistics. Aiming to ease the manage-
ment of the two factors, NH is working towards implementing a 
dynamic information system across the company. As for the lo-
gistics, NH hopes that the state of roads and access to farms will 
improve in the future, so that transportation time could be reduced.
 › Committed workers
NH carefully selects its personnel according to its values and the 
general commitment to NH’s mission. Misalignment between com-
pany and workers should be avoided for the benefit of the business 
in the future. 
 › Challenges posed by the environment (grain/poultry market)
According to Cunningham’s projections, the price of maize and soya is 
likely to go down in coming years, which may consequently increase 
the pressure on demand. On the other hand, the poultry market is 
growing steadily and no changes are expected in the near future.
Challenges Success factors
NH’s success relies on the mechanisms for 
business inclusion described earlier, as well 
as the following factors:
 › Managing the interface between 
different farmers’ size 
NH grows at a rate of 40 % every year. 
To sustain this growth some growers 
have effectively increased the amount 
of birds under management. However, 
the majority of farmers need to build 
capacity at a slower rhythm before 
they can take on more production. As 
a result, NH efficiently manages a wide 
range of growers with different de-
mands and needs. 
 › Understanding cultural/family issues
Besides the technical/logistical challeng-
es, engaging with small-scale farmers re-
quires a proper understanding of cultural 
and family issues. NH uses the knowledge 
gained by working with local communi-
ties to strength relations with growers. 
We can differentiate between short-term challenges and medium- to long-term challenges that might 
pose a risk for the model, the company or both.
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In the poultry business, the cost of feed represents up to 70–80 percent of the total 
business expenditures. For NH, the feed manufactured on site and composed of a 
mixture of maize, soya and additives, represents 70 % of total costs. To keep up with 
the monthly demand, NH—through intermediaries—buys large amounts of maize 
and soya produced by smallholders in northern Mozambique. To foster inclusiveness 
in the future, NH plans to source only from farmers that take part in the out-grower 
model. Diversifying the farmers’ portfolio of products not only strengthens relations, 
but also results in a greater developmental impact on the local economy.
Yet, the scheme is far from completion. The main constraint at this point is to develop 
the appropriate business model for the future. Farmers should diversify their opera-
tions to manage risks, and NH could be instrumental to this process.
NH is considering two scenarios:
1. An external company takes over the diversification endeavour and becomes a 
business partner of NH.
2. NH works directly on the diversification with current or future suppliers (growers).
External factors should also be considered when developing the business model. 
Severe weather conditions, water shortages and agricultural policies will play a role 
in the shaping the future model.
Other areas likely to foster inclusiveness (by virtue of higher productivity or extra 
source of income) is manure. It can be recycled in the coming cycle, used as fertilizer 
for crops or sold to neighbouring farmers. Still, growers need to realize the beneficial 
impact that manure can have on the farm and take advantage of the situation. 
Possibility to increase 
inclusiveness
3
Interior of broiler house
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Yes. In the first section we have provided the 
principles that have guided the company over 
the years. However, it must be emphasized 
that principles do not guarantee immediate 
success. Rather, principles should be used as 
a guidance tool subject to local conditions. 
According to the World Bank, the term ‘scale’ or ‘scaling-up’, in the development context, ‘is used with reference to 
replication, spread, or adaptation of techniques, ideas, approaches, and concepts, as well as to increased scale of 
impact’. If replication is possible, how can the business model studied here be scaled up?
Under the current conditions, NH predicts a steady business growth anchored on an increased flock size per grower 
and larger numbers of growers taking part in the business. For that to happen, the following conditions should be met:
Is the business model scalable?
Investing a share of the profits in increasing efficiency
NH is looking for ways to improve the efficiency of chicken production. Although competition is not yet notice-
able, the competitiveness of the market will increase and the company will have to adapt. In other words, invest 
today and be in a privileged position tomorrow. 
Addressing the social impact 
Providing a steady source of income to growers is only the first step. There must be a follow-up program with families 
that focuses on the household, use of the wealth gained from the poultry production and helps families to develop 
plans for their future.  
Assessing the financial model periodically
Can the financial model sustain the inclusion of more farmers? Will limiting factors influence the model? If yes, 
how? All these questions (and more) need to be considered in the future.
Desire for greater developmental impact
As for the first stage of the business, patience and 
drive are required. Cunningham explains it as such: 
‘whether your drive is Christian faith or something 
else, you must have a long-term vision of this type 
of business otherwise your short-term expectations 
may never be matched’.
Market share 
As mentioned in previous sections, the poultry sec-
tor is ready to absorb more production as demand 
grows. Furthermore, competitors are far from catch-
ing up on the company’s success. All of the above 
conditions reassure the poultry market in the future. 
Diversification
NH plans to sustain part of its business growth by 
producing 2.1 to 2.2 kg chickens, to be sold in parts. 
From the growers’ point of view, producing heavier 
chickens only adds one extra week to the produc-
tion cycle and a slightly different feed. Revenues 
would certainly be increased. For NH, diversifica-
tion would involve a slight increase in costs against 







Cunningham lays out the medium-term 
objectives of the company: ‘…in two or 
three years we expect to be working with 
nearly 360 farmers producing nearly 
2 500–3 000 birds average per cycle’.
Is this business 
model replicable? 
Once business growth is underway, other factors play an 








In 1994, with the end of Apartheid in South Af-
rica, a wide land reform program was set up. 
At the time, 90 % of land was owned by white 
South Africans, who made up less than 10 % of 
the population. The goal of the land reform was 
to transfer 30 % of these lands to black residents 
as part of the wider context of Black Economic 
Empowerment, a central government program to 
empower disadvantaged blacks and coloureds¹. 
Within this policy, empowerment was defined 
as access to land. The land reform had two main 
ways of achieving redistribution: restitution and 
redistribution. Restitution involved financial com-
pensation for people who could prove legal claims 
to land but where a direct land transfer was not 
possible. These were often lands in the cities. 
These claims can no longer be made. Redistribu-
tion involved a grant for claimants to directly buy 
land at market prices. These transfers were based 
on the willing buyer willing seller concept. In other 
words, when the current owner does not want to 
sell the land, no transfer takes place. 
Petrus Bosman, managing director 
of Bosman Family Vineyards
Introduction1
¹People of mixed race.
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Equity share schemes (ESS) are an intermediate form, where land is not directly 
transferred but the grant is used to purchase ownership rights to an existing com-
pany that owns land. Rather than breaking up the actual farming unit, ownership 
is divided between owner and workers. The government makes a fixed amount of 
money available per worker which is used to buy shares in the company. These shares 
give workers a right to dividends as well as some decision-making power. In exchange 
for the grant, the workers are expected to provide ‘sweat capital’, a number of hours 
outside of their regular working hours they work for free for their partly owned business 
as a symbolic payment.
Such a scheme is attractive for different reasons. First of all, by leaving the farming unit 
intact, beneficiaries can benefit from existing production structures, such as economies 
of scale, on-going contracts, and management experience. Second, it creates an incentive 
for the white farmer to sell his land. In equity share schemes, the farmer voluntarily gives 
up part of the ownership in exchange for a capital injection, the size of which is based on 
the market value of his land and the number of participating workers. 
There are three main kinds of equity share schemes: 
Equity share schemes were imple-
mented throughout South Africa. In the 
Western Cape, the southernmost prov-
ince, there are currently 83 equity share 
schemes active. There are two govern-
ment departments involved with the 
share schemes: the national Department 
of Rural Development and Land Reform 
(formerly Land Affairs) and the provin-
cial Department of Agriculture. The 
Department of Rural Development is 
responsible for approving the share 
schemes and providing the financial 
resources. The Department of Agricul-
ture provides training and support, and 
supervises the implementation of the 
project.
Workers gain ownership rights to 
land within an existing farming 
operation.
Transferred money is used to buy 
new land. The farmer co-finances 
this new land, creating a new 
company which is partly owned by 
workers and partly by the farmer. 
The original farming operation re-
mains 100 % owned by the farmer.
In this type of scheme there is no 
land bought, but rather infrastruc-
ture. Most commonly this infra-
structure is a pack house, which 
can be 100 % owned by workers or 
partly owned by both workers and 
farmer. The pack house is operated 
as a separate business, but with 
fixed off-take agreements with the 
original farm.
ON-FARM OFF-FARM NON-FARM
Equity share schemes 
(ESS) are an intermedi-
ate form, where land is 
not directly transferred 
but the grant is used 
to purchase ownership 
rights to an existing com-
pany that owns land.
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Background information 
on the company
The Bosman farm is located near Wellington, in the 
South African province of the Western Cape. This farm 
started in 1699 and has been in the hands of the same 
family since 1798. It is currently managed by the 8th gen-
eration. Although it was traditionally a wine business, 
since the middle of the last century the family started 
focusing more on their vine nursery. This shift in focus 
paid off: they currently operate the largest vine nursery 
on the continent. In 2007 the winemaking business was 
actively re-started by attracting a master wine maker 
and re-investing in their 250-year old wine cellar. Wine 
making now generates 30 % of company revenues. The 
estate covers 430 hectares and employs 260 workers. 
It is the largest equity share scheme in the wine industry.
Wine production in South Africa has a long history. On 
2 February 1659 Jan van Riebeeck, the founder of the 
Cape colony, pronounced the famous words:
‘Today, praise be the Lord, wine was pressed for 
the first time from Cape grapes’. 
From humble beginnings, the wine industry has grown 
quickly and currently covers over 100 000 hectares and 
produces 520 million liters of wine, representing 4 % of 
global production. This makes South Africa the 11th wine 
producer in the world in planted hectares and 8th in pro-
duction volume.
Current inclusiveness of 
the chain
Bosman Family Vineyards had a history of empowering their workforce which began before they set up 
the equity share scheme. With the end of Apartheid in 1994, a workers’ committee was created with two 
bi-annually elected representatives from each of the eight farms making up the company.
Most workers live on the farm and have access to a wide 
range of facilities including sports clubs, social clubs, a 
music school, library, and a retirement home in Wel-
lington for retired employees. 
In 2007, at an information meeting held by the com-
pany’s accountants PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), 
Janny and Petrus Bosman first learned about equity 
share schemes (ESS). They immediately realized the potential for their own company. When they 
found support for their enthusiasm with their family board members, the idea was shared with the work-
ers’ committee. The workers’ committee visited all farms one by one, proposing the idea to the workers. 
It was met with great enthusiasm. 
The decision was made to hire a consultant to provide guidance in the process. This consultant was 
R.C. Olckers from Agri-expert, an independent consultancy specializing in Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment (BBBEE) in the agricultural sector. His fees were paid for by the company. Based on 
meetings with the workers’ committee and company management, he suggested an extensive training 
program to familiarize all 260 employees with finances and management. These trainings were meant to 
develop a complete understanding of what the project entailed before implementation. The outline of a 
business plan was completed by the consultant in early 2008. After discussions with the committee and 
employees on what was needed and what was feasible, the business plan was finalized and presented to 
the government on 14 July 2008. It was accepted the same day.
‘A credible example of BEE (Black 
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Actors and drivers Phases in the development 
of the modelThree main groups of actors were involved in realizing the equity share scheme: the 
government, the Bosman family and the farm workers. Although other parties, includ-
ing external consultants and training organizations, contributed to the process, they 
did not have any decision-making power. The government was represented by the 
national Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (RDLR) and the provincial 
Department of Agriculture (DA). Representatives from both departments were present 
during the presentation of the business plan. RDLR was interested in the scheme because 
it would contribute to achieving the land distribution target set out in the land reform 
program. They were responsible for verifying listed land values and existence of partici-
pating beneficiaries as well as providing the financing. The viability of the business plan 
itself was evaluated by the provincial Department of Agriculture. 
The Bosman family wanted to take the empowerment of 
their workers to the next level. 
At the time they heard about the existence of government-funded Equity Share Schemes 
they already had a long history of empowering their workers. They hoped to increase 
their workers’ intrinsic motivation by actively involving them in the running of the farm 
as co-owners. Since the structure required to successfully integrate their workers in the 
operation of their farm was already largely in place, the project required little investment. 
At the same time, it provided a large injection of interest-free funds which could be used 
to take the development of their wine-making business to the next level.
Most workers considered the chance to become co-owner of the business they and their 
families were so involved in, often for generations, as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. 
Their active involvement in the process and the willingness of management ensured 
that none of the existing reward structures, including bonus payments, were changed. 
In addition, they would receive dividends whenever a profit was made—however small 
these payments might be, this resulted in increased income—and the paying out of the 
principal when the owner of the share passed away—in effect free life insurance. All 
employees that had worked at the farm for at least three years were eligible for par-
ticipation, as were all recently retired employees. Every eligible employee participated.
❶ First phase 
Set up of the Equity Share Scheme (ESS)
Bosman Family Vineyards consisted out of eight separate farms and one ‘running farm’. 
The separate farms had only land on their balance sheet; all equipment was owned 
by the running farm. This structure was favorable for the implementation of the ESS 
because it allowed the government to spend most of their money on land, the redis-
tribution of which was the main justification for the financial transfer. R 110 000 was 
made available for investment per worker, allowing the purchase of 50 % shares in 
two of the largest farms and a 5 % stake in the running company. The initial transfer of 
R 24 million took place in October 2008, with an agreed additional transfer of R 5.2 mil-
lion conditional on the provision of matching funds by the Bosman family. 
The additional transfers were required to invest in equipment needed to make currently 
unused lands on the purchased farms ready for wine grape production. This purchased 
equipment was put on the balance sheet of the farms on which it was used and which 
previously contained only land assets. The equipment were put on the balance sheet 
of the two purchased farms in order to justify the 50/50 co-investment structure and 
to make the separate farms as viable as possible, in the interest of the Department of 
Agriculture. Whenever the equipment owned by the farms was insufficient, they could 
rent equipment from the running company. Over time, as equipment needs fluctuated 
between farms, the worker owned farms also started renting out their own equipment 
to the other farms at the same rate, creating a situation where worker owned farms 
and running company rented equipment from each other.
Employees are represented by the workers committee and a Trust. The workers commit-
tee is composed of 16 members. For each of the eight farms, two representatives are 
chosen at bi-annually held elections. The workers committee is the voice of the workers 
in matters concerning working conditions and other labor relations. Since the start of 
the ESS, it is also responsible for selecting the members of the Trust. The Trust is com-
posed of five members and represents the workers in their position as shareholders. 
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It participates in board meetings and shares informa-
tion regarding the financial position and management 
strategy of the company with all employees. The annual 
meeting of the Trust is held in October each year. 
The company board consists of the Trust and Bosman 
family members involved in the company, currently 
consisting of Janny Bosman, his daughter, and three 
sons. The board meets quarterly to review financial 
performance and discuss company strategy. Decisions 
regarding large investments are made at these meet-
ings. Day-to-day management is the responsibility of the 
executive committee, which consists of Janny Bosman, his 































Situation before and after introducing the equity scheme
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Rights and responsibilities of the shareholders of the Trust are defined in the Trust 
Akte. There are three types of shares:
Only type A shares are transferrable after being held for at least five years or when the 
Trust grants an exemption to this rule. When an employee wants to sell shares, he or 
she first has to offer them for sale to the Trust. When the Trust cannot or does not want 
to buy the shares, the shares are then offered to other shareholders. The shares on sale 
are distributed evenly between all interested buyers unless the Trust considers this 
inappropriate, in which case they are distributed amongst interested buyers through 
a lottery system. When shares are sold internally, the price is determined by their fair 
value. Only when neither the Trust nor any of the beneficiaries is interested in buying 
the shares, can they be offered for sale to employees who are still in the process of 
receiving their first shares. When none of these parties are interested in buying the 
shares, the shares are converted to type C shares, making the holder eligible to receive 
their fair value at the latest within five years after their conversion. 
❷ Second phase 
Centralization
The equity share scheme was initially structured to accommodate the preferences of 
company management, workers, and the government. The structure where ownership 
was balanced between company management and workers for two of the farms was 
preferred by the government, as it allowed them to invest the bulk of the money in 
land assets. Moreover, on paper it ensured an equal distribution of ownership and 
hence power between owners and workers. However, well-functioning farms require 
more than just land. The inclusion of equipment in the farm units partly overcame this 
hurdle but introduced the problem of equipment rentals. This proved administratively 
burdensome. In addition, because the workers owned shares in three separately regis-
tered companies, three government audits were required to verify compliance. This 
administrative burden was further increased when the vineyard acquired Fair Trade 
certification. Other motivations to change company structure concerned taxes and 
cash flow. In the old structure, it could happen that one of the companies was paying 
taxes while another was making a loss. Similarly, one company could have a large 
positive cash flow while another needed to borrow to maintain liquidity. 
To counter these issues, in 2012 the various farms and companies were merged into 
one. This company contained the assets of the entire farm, both land and productive 
assets. Wine sales are still done by a separate company, which is a 100 % subsidiary. 
The new company is owned by the Adama Appolo Trust (26 %) and by the Bosman 
family (74 %). The management organization of the company has hardly changed. Each 
farm still has a farm manager who is responsible for overseeing all activities and em-
ployees still work primarily on the farm where they live. 
Looking back, the only regret mentioned was not having 
implemented the re-organization earlier. 
On the other hand, the initial structure did prove useful because it forced all actors 
to accurately keep a record of equipment rentals. This forced accountability removed 
possible sources of distrust, enabling the new partners to get used to the new way of 
running the business. After four years in operation, sufficient trust had been built to enable 
a structure which relied less on paper trails and accountability and more on trust.
Type A shares are those held by original beneficiaries and give rights to yearly 
dividends and to a final capital payment. Each person eligible to receive shares 
when the ESS started, received 11 shares. After retirement, beneficiaries con-
tinue to receive dividends. They lose this right only when they pass away. Then, 
as soon as the financial position of the Trust allows it, but always within five 
years, the value of the shares is paid out.
Type B shares only give rights to receive dividends and are given out to new 
employees i.e. those who joined the company after the scheme had started. 
After working for the company for four years, new employees receive the first 
five shares. Four years later, they receive an additional six shares. Type B shares 
do not give rights to a capital payment. 
Type C shares are held by those who have lost their right to receive dividends 
due to death or having been discharged. They are held until the Trust is able to 
pay out the shares in cash but always within five years after the date at which 
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Support for the process
The most significant support for the project was undoubtedly the initial transfer pro-
vided by the government. Although the process of empowerment was already well 
underway at the Bosman farm, without the equity share scheme it would have taken 
much longer to reach the current level of involvement of workers in the management 
and decision-making at the company. At the same time, this support would likely have 
been far less useful if the employees were less prepared to handle these respon-
sibilities. In addition to the initial investment, funding was made available through 
Casidra², a semi-governmental development organization residing under the provincial 
department of agriculture. This funding was used to expand the business through 
purchasing of land and other assets. 
Extensive training of all company staff before embarking on the development of the 
business plan was crucial to make effective use of the initial government funding. 
Topics for the trainings were suggested by the consultant in agreement with the 
workers, and primarily concerned finance and management. Both the consultant and 
the trainings were paid for by the company. By ensuring all employees understood the 
implications of the change before ne-
gotiating the terms and conditions of 
the business plan, a sense of common 
purpose was created which increased 
the willingness of the partners to accept 
their responsibilities and honor their 
commitments.  
To ensure the continuous development of the program, the board decided to hire an 
external consultant, Frans Van Wyk. As a former director of PricewaterhouseCoopers at 
their sustainable agriculture division, this consultant is regularly asked for advice 
regarding how to make the best use of existing regulations to the benefit of the company, 
in particular regarding optimizing the company’s BEE score and accessing funds. Since 
the objectives of management and employees are well-aligned in the company 
structure, the benefits of his suggestions are shared. 
All interviewed parties 
indicated the outcomes 
of the project exceeded 
initial expectations. 
²www.casidra.co.za
Vine planting at Bosman Family Vineyards
Outcomes
Before starting the project, each of the stakeholders had clear expectations. The 
company expected increased employee commitment and productivity, the workers 
expected increased incomes, and the government expected successful employee em-
powerment. All interviewed parties indicated the outcomes of the project exceeded 
these initial expectations. 
The company has seen stellar growth since the start of the project. In 2008, the 
year in which the project started, company revenues were at R 26 million. By 2012, 
these revenues had more than tripled to R 85 million. Integrating the ESS with their 
long-term growth strategy allowed the company to constructively re-invest the equity 
injection into their business. A large share of the funds were allocated to developing 
their wine production capacity. 
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SpilloversFast growth enabled consistent dividend pay-outs. These dividends were a direct evi-
dence for employees that the project was delivering on increasing their incomes, and 
encouraged their enthusiasm. In the run-up to the project, every care had been taken 
to create realistic expectations regarding the size of the dividends. Employees were told 
that it could be many years before the first dividends would be paid out and their size 
might be limited. In fact, in the first year of the project the company made a substantial 
dividend pay-out, even though the funds could have been used for additional invest-
ment. These above-expectation pay-outs greatly increased the belief of the employees 
in the potential of the project. Just how satisfied the employees are is evidenced by 
their exceptional non-participation in the agricultural strikes for increased wages in the 
aftermath of the 2012 mining strikes. 
Employees are actively included at different management layers in the company. 
Whenever a position opens up, employees are given an opportunity to fill the posi-
tion. Where 20 years ago all employees were general staff, now several have joined 
management positions. Two of the high risers in this regard are Ivan, who is now on the 
company executive committee, and Rita, who is responsible for human resources. Both 
are also members of the Trust. Education of employees and their families is encouraged. 
Each year several scholarships are given to promising students to pursue tertiary edu-
cation. After obtaining their degree they are encouraged to apply for work within the 
company. There are now several children of employees occupying administrative posi-
tions at company headquarters and management hopes many more will continue to 
join. These increased opportunities for both employees and their families might have 
an even stronger effect on employee satisfaction than the dividend pay-outs. As one 
employee remarked: ‘we are all family here’. 
Not only do employees grow through promotions, they also start taking more respon-
sibility for their work without being promoted. Even though the company has almost 
tripled in size since the start of the project, field management staff have not been 
increased. In fact, two farm managers that left the company over the last two years 
have not been replaced because the farm workforce is able to do their work inde-
pendently. Company management is hopeful that this trend will continue, creating 
opportunities to further reduce management staff.
Certification
In 2009, Bosman Family Vineyards obtained Fair Trade accreditation for all their wines. 
Currently as much as 70 % of all their wine is sold under the Fair Trade label, with the 
majority going to the United Kingdom. For every bottle of wine sold, a fixed sum is 
transferred to the Bosman Foundation. This fund is used to undertake community 
projects. One of the funded projects concerns the construction and operation of a day 
care center for children of the employees.
Extra benefits
Talks are underway with the government to make benefits that are currently avail-
able to all companies in the wine sector restricted to BBBEE-certified companies. These 
benefits include tax reductions and preferential access to the European export market. 
Companies can attain BBBEE certification if they score high enough on including 
previously disadvantaged people in the fields of ownership, management, em-
ployment equity, skills development, preferential procurement, enterprise develop-
ment and socio economic development. 
Bosman Family Vineyards is certified and, 
if the planned changes to the preferential 
treatment for certified companies is put 
into place, they stand to gain a substantial 
competitive advantage over their rivals. 
This dependency [on the 
main farm] undermines 
the bargaining position 
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Challenges of the Equity Share Scheme (ESS)
Dependency on the main farm
The equity share scheme as implemented by Bosman 
Family Vineyards can be seen as a real success story. 
However, most ESS have not fared quite so well. The 
most commonly encountered issues are purchase of 
non-viable production units, incomplete employee 
involvement, unequal power distribution, reduced em-
ployee incomes, and distress sales. Non-viable production 
units are often purchased because the majority of the 
government grant has to be directed towards land. 
Especially in more capital-intensive production processes, 
the extra money available to purchase non-land produc-
tion assets is insufficient to form a stand-alone unit of 
production, in effect making the ESS dependent on the 
original farm. This dependency undermines the bargain-
ing position of the employees versus the farm owner 
and severely limits opportunities for empowerment.
Lack of real a decision-making authority 
for employees
Most ESS are initiated by the farmer/owner because 
they so crucially depend on his willingness to par-
ticipate. In most cases it is therefore the farmer that 
writes the proposal and applies for funding, a process 
which might take place without any involvement of the 
employees. Although employees do need to sign up in 
order to become eligible, often they do so without fully 
comprehending what they have signed. In such cases, 
the structures put in place to give employees decision-
making authority existed primarily on paper. 
Unequal power distribution between 
farmer and employees
This inequality does not necessarily result from un-
willingness of the farmer to include employees, but 
often stems from historical inequality and lack of edu-
cation. Before the ESS, the employees had a traditional 
boss-employee relationship with the farmer. This power 
difference is tremendously aggravated by the legacy of 
the Apartheid regime. For many employees, making the 
transition from seeing the farmer as a boss to seeing him 
as an equal business partner is almost insurmountable. 
Another cause of inequality is the employees’ lack of 
education. From one day to the next, they are expected to 
go from working the fields to managing an often large 
agribusiness. Many—especially the older—employees 
only finished primary school and these schools were 
not amongst the best in the country. With such a limited 
background, the employees can hardly be considered 
equals in management decision-making. 
Income is not increasing as expected
Employee incomes are expected to increase because of 
participation in ESS but in fact might also decrease. The 
main culprit for this decrease is the removal of bonuses. 
At most farms, employees receive bonuses when they 
meet certain production targets. With the introduction 
of an ESS, often these bonus schemes are ‘replaced’ 
by dividends. Because dividends can only be paid out 
when a profit is made, in some years employees would 
actually earn a lower income than before the ESS was 
introduced. Moreover, because many schemes start 
with mostly land assets, it is common that in the first 
year all accrued profit is retained within the company 
for investment in non-land production equipment, 
meaning no or little dividend can be paid out.
In other cases, employee incomes might decrease be-
cause as owners they are expected to work for free for 
their own company. After all, an owner is expected to 
receive his income mostly from company profits. In 
structures where work for the equity scheme is not 
remunerated, but work for the ‘old’ farm still is, there 
is usually a distinct labor shortage at the ESS. Further-
more, officially workers are expected to provide ‘sweat 
capital’ in exchange for receiving the grant from the 
government. This sweat capital are hours they are ex-
pected to work for the ESS outside their regular working 
hours as a symbolic repayment of the grant. 
Change in situation of the main farm
Finally, many ESS schemes failed when the main farm 
became insolvent or changed ownership. The schemes 
are usually dependent on the willing cooperation of 
the main farm. Because usually an ESS cannot operate 
independently, when the main farm ceases to exist or 
the new owner refuses to cooperate, this heralds the 
end of the ESS. 
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Solutions to challenges Unaddressed issues
At Bosman Family Vineyards, these common issues were either prevented or overcome. 
Goodwill of the owner
The assets acquired by the Adama Apollo Trust were essen-
tially non-viable to the extent that the ESS would not have 
been able to operate independently of the main farm. 
However, through the goodwill of the owners and the setting 
of reasonable renting rates for equipment, they were able to 
operate from the start as efficiently as they had done before 
the transfer. Given that the money of the grant was effectively 
invested, the ESS became more productive over time. 
Future ownership
An issue that might still affect the long-term success of 
the equity share scheme at Bosman Family Vineyards is 
the future of share ownership. Although the participation 
of new employees is ensured by issuing them type-B 
shares, no new type-A shares are issued. Therefore, 
over time the capital base of the ownership will erode. 
It is not yet clear how this will affect the share in the 
profit of the Trust. There are two alternatives. 
One is that with every capital payment, the equity share 
of the Trust in the overall company falls. However, the 
number of people have a right to share in company 
profit increases with every new issue of type-B shares. 
Therefore, over time the profit per share will fall until 
the last capital payment on type-A shares takes place, 
at which point dividends will be zero. 
The other alternative solution is to maintain the initial 
26 % equity stake as the percentage of profits the holders 
of type-A and type-B shares have rights to. However, in 
that case there is no underlying equity justifying this 
profit distribution. Currently this issue is not very salient, 
because very few type-A shares have been paid out. 
Over time, however, this problem could jeopardize the 
survival of the equity share scheme.
The power inequality was also 
reduced through the engaged 
leadership of some employees.
…through goodwill of the own-
ers and the setting of reasonable 
renting rates for equipment, 
they were able to operate from 
the start as efficiently as they 
had done before the transfer.
Employee empowerment
Employee involvement in the ESS was clear from the very beginning. 
Although the process was initiated by the farm owner, the employees 
were completely informed about the plan and asked explicitly for their 
permission before the actual proposal was submitted. Furthermore, exten-
sive training on finances and management was given to ensure employees 
understood the full implication of the scheme. Finally, after having 
completed the trainings, they were involved in drafting the business plan 
through consultations with an external consultant.
The inequality which is often inherent in an employer-employee relation-
ship was definitely present at the company, although it might have been less 
severe than in some other cases. There were already several community pro-
jects active even before the end of apartheid. However, the knowledge gap 
was likely lower than on average. Several schooling initiatives were active at 
the farm, and talented children were always encouraged to develop. Moreo-
ver, the extensive training helped overcome part of the gap in management-
specific knowledge. The power inequality was also reduced through the 
engaged leadership of some employees, who took responsibility and main-
tained open communication between management and other employees.
Stable income and risk-
sharing
Care was taken to maintain employee 
incomes at least at their pre-ESS levels. 
All wages and bonus payments were 
maintained as usual at both the com-
pany and the ESS farms. Furthermore, 
dividends have been paid out every single 
year since the very start of the scheme. 
Financial distress is a risk that is hard 
to curb. However, for the Bosman ESS 
the risk of such sales are born equally 
by family and workers. In the new 
structure, the entire farm is owned 
like a joint venture, meaning that if 
financial distress forces a partial or 
complete bankruptcy, both family and 
employees would be equally affected.
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Possibility to increase 
inclusiveness
3
Rotation of employees in different functions
Employees enjoy different levels of involvement in the business and hence different de-
grees of empowerment. The degree of inclusiveness within the farm could be increased 
by enforcing the rotation of committee and Trust members. Although representatives 
for the workers committee are elected every other year, the same persons have been in 
the Trust since its inception. Although there is a risk of reducing efficiency, the explicit 
opportunity for more complete participation in itself should have a beneficial effect 
even for those workers who are not elected. 
Transferring ownership over managing the business
An area in which progress is already being made concerns the shifting of traditional 
management responsibilities to employees. This progress is exemplified by the non-
replacement of two farm managers, whose original supervision and management 
functions are now taken over by the farm employees themselves. Not only does this 
lead to cost reductions, it also allows employees to further develop their skills, increas-
ing their labor market potential.
The business model currently involves all employees on the farm and their family 
members, and the extent of the inclusiveness is unlikely to increase beyond that. The 
current structure already allows new employees to participate in the equity scheme, 
but the nature of the scheme does not allow for anyone outside the permanent staff 
to become involved. Therefore, the extent of inclusivity is directly tied to the size of the 
business as a whole.
Vine planting at Bosman Family Vineyards
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A necessary pre-condition for scaling any inclusive busi-
ness model is that the model is successful in delivering both 
commercial and social returns. Both conditions are met 
by the equity share scheme at Bosman Family Vineyards. 
In the five years since its inception, company revenues 
have more than tripled, and this success can at least be 
partly attributed to the equity scheme. By making the 
pie bigger, rather than merely changing the way it is dis-
tributed, all stakeholders have benefited. Social returns 
have also been substantial, as shown in increased in-
comes, increased participation of employees in manage-
ment functions and drastic reductions in staff turnover. 
Through funds generated by Fair Trade certification, there 
is also an increase in social activities and quality of life, for 
example through the acquisition of a school bus.
Is the business model scalable?4
Due to the structure of the equity share scheme business model, scalability can only be increased by growing the 
business or replicating the business model in other organizations. Business growth over the last few years has been 
stellar, but this has not yet had a large impact on the number of people the company employs. If current growth rates 
are sustained, over time it should create new employment opportunities. The success of the expansion of the business 
model depends crucially on the sustained demand for company products, especially in the wine business, and the 
availability of land suitable for vineyards. For the foreseeable future, the business model is unlikely to require 
structural changes to sustain such growth.
A more promising expansion of the business model is replication by other companies. These companies do not need 
to be in the vine or wine business in order for the business model to work, and therefore do not necessarily pose a 
threat to the company. However, given the current policy environment, such replications are unlikely to occur in South 
Africa. The government has stopped financing equity share schemes from the land reform budget, thus removing the 
opportunity for companies or employees to apply for the initial cash grant. Without this grant, it is extremely unlikely 
companies will decide to hand over a large share in the company to employees. Perhaps a model in which employees 
slowly build up shares over time might be an alternative.
Although new start-ups of equity share schemes are unlikely, there are a number of equity share schemes across South 
Africa that are far less successful than the Bosman Family Vineyards case. In cases where either the whole scheme is 
unsustainable or inclusiveness is incomplete, important lessons could be drawn from the Bosman case. The most 







Sugar is one of the largest agricultural industries 
in South Africa. It provides around 79 000 jobs in 
direct employment in cane production and pro-
cessing and 350 000 jobs in indirect employment 
in support industries. Approximately one million 
people, more than 2 % of South Africa’s popula-
tion, depend on sugarcane for a living (SASA, 
2013). Sugarcane is grown and processed in the 
provinces of KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga and 
the Eastern Cape, which are among the poorest 
in the country. The industry produces an aver-
age of 2.2 million tons of sugar per season. More 
than half of this sugar is marketed in South Af-
rica and in other members of the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU), which includes Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland. The remainder 
is exported.
Sugar is grown by 29 130 registered sugarcane 
growers, of which 1 550 are large-scale commer-
cial farmers and 27 580 are small-scale growers. 
Around 19.9 million tons of sugarcane is produced 
annually, of which 84.69 % by large-scale growers 
and 8.59 % by small-scale growers. The remaining 
6.72 % is grown on sugar estates owned by milling 
companies.
Cooperative director on his farm with cooperative 
buildings in the background
Introduction1
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The risk-sharing agreement provides for the calculation of a price by SASA which is equal for all growers, the so-called 
RV price. This price is based on the sales of local sugar, exported sugar, and molasses. After deducting levies, the 
remaining proceeds are distributed between millers (36 %) and growers (64 %). The final price received by the growers 
depends on the quality of the cane delivered to the sugar mill and is determined by the sucrose, non-sucrose, and 
fiber content of each batch of cane. Out of each batch, a sample is taken at the mill which determines the price. The 
fixed components of the price are recalculated and published monthly by SASA.
Sugarcane milling is highly concentrated. There are six milling companies operating a total of 14 mills and five refineries.
 › The two largest companies, Illovo and Tongaat Hulett, each own four of these mills;
 › TSB Sugar owns three;
 › Gledhow Sugar Company, UCL Company, and Umfolozi Sugar Mill own one mill each.
In addition to sugar, some of these mills also produce ethyl alcohol, furfural and its derivatives, and animal feeds. 
In order to curb power relationships in the chain, the South African Sugar Association (SASA) was created to 
ensure adherence to the Sugar Act of 1978 and the Sugar Industry Agreement. It is an industry body with equal 
representation by the Sugar Millers’ Association Ltd (SASMAL) and CANEGROWERS. The members of SASMAL are the 
six milling companies. CANEGROWERS was established in 1927 to represent the interests of independent sugarcane 
growers. Individual growers are members through one of the 26 grower groups. In each milling area, these groups are 
represented by a Local Grower Council. At each level, representatives are chosen through elections.
The sugar industry benefits from government support in three ways:
1. First, through a tariff 
which is levied on sug-
ar imports only when 
the world price is be-
low a certain level.
2. Second, by the Sugar 
Cooperation Agreement 
between members of 
the Southern African 
Development Commu-
nity (SADC). This agree-
ment contains a set 
of policies to stimu-
late sugar production 
and consumption in all 
member countries.
3. Third, a risk-sharing provision between millers and 
growers which is formalized through the Sugar Act 
and the Sugar Industry Agreement. This provision 
enforces a pre-determined distribution of proceeds, 
such that the consequences of fluctuations in world 
sugar prices are shared between growers and mill-
ers. As a direct consequence of these agreements, 
the sugar price in South Africa consistently exceeds 
world prices.Contractor spraying recently planted cane
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After cane is harvested, 
it should be at the mill 
within 72 hours, other-
wise the cane becomes 
harder to crush and its 
value deteriorates.
Sugarcane is quite a particular crop because of its high bulk-to-value ratio and the impossibility of pro-
ducers to side-sell. The only way to generate value out of sugarcane is to crush it at the mill, and given 
the distances between mills, there usually is only one viable buyer. The immense bulk creates high 
transport costs, meaning farms need to be located close to the mill in order for supply to be profitable. 
At Tongaat Hulett, they use a 40-kilometer radius around the mills as a rule of thumb. These factors give mills 
monopsony power, which is curbed by the central price-setting done by SASA. Growers depend on millers.
To set up a sugar mill requires a substantial capital investment. Therefore mills should always operate 
near or at full capacity. After cane is harvested, it should be at the mill within 72 hours, otherwise the 
cane becomes harder to crush and its value deteriorates. However, because prices are fixed, no price 
incentives can be used to encourage timely supply. Millers depend on growers.
Sugarcane develops from a perennial rootstock. When well maintained, replanting only has to take place 
once every ten years. In the first months after planting, the sugarcane requires intensive maintenance, 
including fertilizer and herbicide applications, until it reaches canopy stage at 6-7 months after planting. 
At canopy stage the foliage is so thick that no more weeds develop. There is also no more need for 
fertilizer applications. The cane is left on the field until the plant is 12-15 months old, when it can be 
harvested. Before the cane can be cut, the field is burned to remove excess plant material. This also kills 
any snakes that might be hiding in the undergrowth. Cutting needs to take place within three days after 
burning and is done manually. After cutting several tons, the cane is bundled up and tied together using 
a chain with a special locking mechanism. Each cutter cuts and binds one bundle per day; bundles weigh 
several tons. The bundles are pulled on a cart with a built-in leveraging mechanism which is pulled by a 
tractor. Carts are offloaded at loading areas, from where 
the cane is hoisted up by a specialized crane into a truck. 
Before loading, each bundle is weighed to determine 
how much the cutter gets paid. This is registered. The 
truck carries the cane to the crushing mill and is paid 
based on tonnage.
There are three main types of land tenure in South Africa: 
At the end of Apartheid in 1994, land ownership was very unequally 
divided between whites and blacks. A Land Reform program was set 
in motion that aimed to redistribute 30% of private land owned by 
whites to previously disadvantaged people. This process is still on-
going and has caused divestment of large parts of company-owned 
plantation land to black entrepreneurs.
Sugar production Land tenure
Government land covers only a small area of the country 
and is mainly confined to infrastructure, public spaces, and 
undeveloped nature.
Communal land is not held by individuals but by tradition-
al authorities. Often this land has been used by the same 
family for generations. When children reach maturity, they 
receive a piece of this land on which they build their own 
house. This continuous subdivision has led to communal 
lands being easily recognizable because of being covered by 
a patchwork of houses. Due to steady population growth, 
most landholdings are small. Community leaders give user 
rights to families.
Private land covers the majority of the country, and is gen-
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Background information on the company
Tongaat Hulett is an integrated agri-business company in sugar and starch products refined from sug-
arcane and maize. It employs over 40 000 people in its operations in South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, 
Swaziland, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Revenues over the financial year of 2013 were R 14.373 bil-
lion¹. Of companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, it is the 14th largest employer and the 
largest single private employer in Zimbabwe and Mozambique. In 1994, at the end of Apartheid, it sold 
half its sugar land holdings to previously disadvantaged individuals, comprising 11 871 hectares of cane.
In the 1990s SASA developed a loan scheme called Umthombo to help 
farmers who had no access to traditional financing. These access prob-
lems existed because farmers had small landholdings and no deed to their 
land, since they farmed on communal lands provided through tribal au-
thorities. Although this scheme helped farmers to overcome their liquid-
ity problems, the knowledge gap and coordination problems persisted. 
Therefore, after almost 10 years in operation, the scheme was abandoned. 
Over time, productivity continued to decline and more and more farmers 
left farming altogether because they were unable to finance re-planting, 
causing a steady fall in overall production. In addition, production from 
land redistributed from large commercial farmer operations under the 
Land Reform of 1994 was also dwindling. 
The fall in production put tremendous pressure on 
the profitability of sugar millers, who were now 
operating far below full capacity, which, in an in-
dustry as capital intensive as sugar milling, is an 
outright disaster.
To get up to full capacity, supply to the sugar mills needed to increase. 
In the short term, millers sometimes buy from producers slightly outside 
their normal delivery zone. Although transport costs are higher, a non-
working mill is often even more expensive. However, because of the way 
the mills are distributed, the opportunities to buy from farmers outside 
the zone are limited, especially since no price incentives can be used to 
encourage a grower to switch buyers (prices are fixed). In other words, 
Tongaat had to increase production within their delivery zone, where 
there was almost no unused private land still available. Buying and pro-
ducing using their own estate was therefore out of the question. The most 
likely source of supply were the communal lands, the small-scale farmers. 
Capacity utilization
Tongaat Hulett produces sugarcane on its own 
plantations and purchases sugarcane at arm’s 
length from three main sources: 
 › Large-scale commercial growers typically 
dedicate over 100 hectares of land to cane 
production, the larger farms owning several 
thousand hectares of land. 
 › Land-reform growers are medium scale, with 
farms typically between 50-80 hectares in 
size. These farmers received land and train-
ing from the company as part of the Land 
Reform in 1994. They now own the land.
 › Small-scale farmers usually have only a few 
hectares of land, with the largest of them 
owning around 30 hectares. This land is not 
privately owned, but communal. 
Well over half of the purchased sugarcane comes 
from large commercial farms (around 65 %); 
the rest is provided in about equal shares from 
land-reform farmers and small-scale growers. 
Tongaat Hulett has been sourcing sugarcane 
from small-scale growers for several decades. In 
the traditional model, farmers were completely 
independent and had a straightforward off-take 
agreement with Tongaat. However, this model 
suffered from limited and low-quality cane 
production, originating from limited use of in-
puts and insufficient coordination. Shortly after 
harvest, cane needs to be weeded and fertilized 
to make sure it outgrows weeds. Many small-
holders had insufficient knowledge to properly 
manage their cane and did not have the funds to 
invest in such maintenance, reducing cane har-
vests over time and aggravating the problem. 
Furthermore, when cane is not well maintained, 
it needs to be replanted more frequently, which 
is costly. While a well-maintained field only re-
quires re-planting every ten years or so, badly 
maintained fields might require re-planting after 
as little as six years. In addition, insufficient coor-
dination frequently led to cane not arriving at the 
mill within 72 hours of harvesting, reducing the 
quality and thus the price received. This problem 
is called burn-to-harvest-to-crush delay (BHTCD) 
in the industry and considered a wide-spread 
problem. Low-quality cane can even cause hold-
ups in the cane crushing process. Because of too 
high fiber content the process would some-
times grind to a halt, costly business.
¹Equal to slightly less than USD 1.4 billion at exchange rate of 8.11.2013. 
113












Sugarcane planting and the first 6 months of 
ratoon maintenance are jointly financed by 
Tongaat Hulett and the DEDT through a grant. 
This work is done by contractors. Harvesting is 
also done through contractors After cane is 
harvested, it should be at the mill within 72 
hours.
ADDITIONAL COMMENTARY ON VC
Supply of inputs
Land: farmers that decide to join offer all or 
part of their land to the cooperative and sign a 
lease contract, giving the cooperative use 
rights to the land for a period of 10 years
Markets
The value of the company's Huletts® brand 
continues to be optimised in South Africa, the 
largest sugar market in the SADC region The 
Huletts® brand remains the leading sugar brand in 
the South African direct consumer market.
Processing
Sugarcane milling is highly concentrated. There 
are six milling companies operating a total of 
14 mills and five refineries in South Africa. 
Tongaat Hulett owns four of these mills with 
capacity to produce more than 1 million tons 
of raw sugar, and has a central refinery in 
Durban producing over 600 000 tons of refined 
sugar per annum
Day-to-day monitoring byt 
Tongaat’s extension staff




Value chain of Tongaat Hulett
at Hulett
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Current inclusiveness of the chain
The plan: Project VuselelaIncreasing production and quality required more intense 
coordination, which is costly; economies of scale were 
needed. In order to reach this scale, land units would 
need to be grouped together into larger farming units, 
which could be managed more effectively by using ma-
chinery and benefiting from economies of scale in input 
purchases. In addition, extension services would be 
more effective by making group trainings possible. During 
a discussion of the supply problems with the manage-
ment team, consisting of the leader of the Small Scale 
Grower unit and the area managers who led the exten-
sion staff, cooperatives were suggested as a possible 
solution. This way, the ownership and decision power 
would remain within the community and its members, 
and there would be a production unit large enough to 
benefit from economies of scale. Internal support for the 
project was strong, going up all the way to top manage-
ment. In 2008 a proposal for funding was written to the 
KwaZulu-Natal Department of Economic Development 
and Tourism (DEDT), which has an on-going call for pro-
posals that encourage inclusive regional development. 
After some negotiations, the partners-to-be sat down 
together and agreed on a plan. The contract was signed 
on 12 October 2009.
Vuselela is the Zulu word for revival. The project aims to 
‘revive’ areas formerly used for cane production. Farmers 
that used to deliver sugarcane to the mills, but for some 
reason or other had not been able to deliver in the last 
few years, would be invited to join a cooperative:
 › Farmers that decide to join offer all or part of their 
land to the cooperative and sign a lease contract, 
giving the cooperative use rights to the land for a 
period of 10 years.
 › The cooperative pays the farmer rent equal to 10 % of 
gross proceeds of sugarcane sales. This rental fee is 
10 % of gross proceeds and treated as an expense for 
the cooperative (for tax reasons). 
 › At the same time, the farmer is a member of the 
cooperative, giving him the right to vote and to be 
elected to the management committee, and the right 
to share in the profits of the cooperative. 
 › His share of the profit is equal to the share of the land 
he brought in, ensuring that all farmers, regardless 
of the size of their landholdings, can participate.
 › Finally, the farmer can make money by working for 
the cooperative or for contractors—if the cooperative’s 
management decides to work with contractors. For 
this work he will be remunerated based on his hours of 
work, using a fixed, pre-determined wage rate. 
Sugarcane planting and the first six months of ratoon 
maintenance are jointly financed by Tongaat Hulett and 
the DEDT through a grant. This work is done by contrac-
tors. In order to comply with government regulations, a 
tender process is opened by Tongat Hulett Sugar (THS) 
for local contractors. An advertisement is placed in the 
newspaper and the extension officers and participating 
farmers are encouraged to spread the message. Those 
interested in taking up the contract have to attend a 
mandatory meeting in which the requirements that 
contractors are expected to meet are explained. Initially, 
contractors are offered 30 hectares to work on. They are 
encouraged to visit THS extension staff to show them 
around the fields where they are expected to do their 
work. Each contract includes a clause stipulating that 
within two weeks of signing, the first two hectares need 
to be finished. These two weeks are, in fact, a trial pe-
riod. If the contractor does not meet the target, THS can 
terminate the contract unilaterally. There are different 
contracts for field preparation and planting, and ratoon 
maintenance, which entails applying herbicides and fer-
tilizer. All these services and input costs are paid for 
through the grant until the sugarcane reaches canopy 
stage, about six months, when the responsibility for 
the sugarcane is handed over to the cooperatives.
2
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After the sugarcane has reached canopy stage, no more maintenance is required. The 
cane stays in the field until harvest, which takes place 12-15 months after planting. 
Harvesting is done through contractors, who bring in experienced cutters from the 
Eastern Cape who live in temporary shelters on the field or close to the contractor’s 
house. Zulu men do not cut cane, as this is considered to be below their stature: 
Ponda work. The harvesting contractor is responsible for cutting and bringing the 
crane to the loading area. Here, it is loaded onto trucks owned by a transport company, 
which is then responsible for bringing the cane to the crushing mill.
Cooperatives get paid at the end of the month following the month in which the cane 
was harvested, meaning that profit from cane harvested in July gets put on coopera-
tive accounts at the end of August. The harvest season is spread over eight months, 
from mid-March to mid-November. Cooperative accounts are managed by the Project 
Office at Tongaat Hulett, which was put in place especially for the project. Harvesting 
contractors and transport companies submit a claim for payment each month, which 
needs to be signed by at least half the members of the cooperative board. Their pay-
ment is directly deducted from payments to the cooperative accounts by the Project 
Office. A deduction is also made to contribute to a sav-
ings fund managed by SASA. This savings fund is based 
on the same structure as the Umthombo retention fund 
and consists of three parts:
1. Land rental is 10 % of gross proceeds. The amount 
required for ratoon maintenance gets determined 
by Tongaat and is set per ton of cane.
2. Ratoon maintenance includes the cost of fertilizer, 
herbicide, and labor required by the contractor to 
reinvigorate the cane after it has been cut so it can 
produce again the next season. Payments for ratoon 
maintenance will be taken out of the savings ac-
count, rather than out of gross proceeds. 
3. The last category—‘other’—is set by the cooperative. 
Here, money can be saved for re-planting the cane at 
the end of its productive life-cycle or whatever other 
needs the cooperative might have. 
The money that remains after deducting the cost of 
harvesting and transport, saving for ratoon maintenance 
and next year’s rental, and the current year’s land rental, 
is transferred to the cooperative’s account. This amount 
can be converted into extra saving, invested or distributed 
to the cooperative members as dividend. 
The project office at Maidstone sugar mill
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Tongaat Hulett and the DEDT also have a monthly 
meeting to discuss project progress. The finances 
are examined and there is a check to see how 
many hectares have been planted in how many 
cooperatives. More specific organizational prob-
lems are discussed within cooperatives.  Problems 
with management election, or any other issues 
dissatisfied members might have, can be debated 
at cooperative level meetings, and a plan of action 
is formulated to tackle them.
Day-to-day monitoring is done by extension staff. 
They consult with the cooperative committee and 
contractors on planting, fertilizing, and weeding 
schedules. These meetings take place weekly. 
Perhaps most importantly, harvesting schedules 
are discussed. Harvesting is particularly crucial as 
it needs to take place evenly throughout the sea-
son, to keep the mill running constantly. Cane con-
tains mostly sucrose and thus has higher value at 
the end of the season, which is why it is important 
to distribute harvesting evenly over cooperatives 
to ensure a fair average price. Planning is compli-
cated by cane fires. The area in which cane grows is 
populated. There are no villages; everybody lives 
on their own piece of land. People start fires to 
burn rather than cut the vegetation around their 
houses. These fires often spread into the sugarcane. 
As soon as a field of sugarcane has been burnt, it 
needs to be harvested. The shifts of the harvesting 
schedule are discussed at these meetings.
The extension staff supervise and direct contractors 
hired by THS to re-plant the sugarcane. They also 
assist in supervising the contractors employed by 
the cooperative. This support is crucial to the suc-
cess of the project, as many contractors have little 
or no experience in ratoon maintenance or cane 
harvesting. Extension staff actively visit fields where 
contractors are working to ensure they are doing a 
good job and to provide advice wherever needed. 
The project office was created specifically for the 
project and is staffed by three people: Cliff Ingle, 
the manager and project coordinator, and two 
people primarily responsible for finances and oth-
er administration. They are responsible for doing 
the finances of the cooperatives. 
Governance structure
Of these structures, the extension staff were already in place. The other structures were created to support 
the project. Whereas before the project extension staff were responsible for supervising 10 000 individual 
small-scale growers, they are now able to work far more efficiently through the cooperatives.
Coordination throughout the chain is achieved through regular interaction at several levels. The project 
steering committee consists of Tongaat Hulett, SASA, SA Canegrowers, and the Kwa-Zulu Natal Depart-
ment of Economic Development and Tourism (DEDT). This body meets quarterly.
Wellington Ntshangase, manager  
Small Scale Grower Unit at Tongaat Hulett Sugar
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Too high requirements in the tendering process
Part of the agreement with government was to have contracting work 
done by local contractors to generate employment in the region where 
the scheme was active. Because in most of the region sugarcane produc-
tion from small-scale growers had been declining, there were few local 
contractors available. In order to select a contractor, the government 
required an open tender process. The requirements, which contractors 
needed to meet to enter in the process, proved to be prohibitive. Another 
problem was the high investment required by contractors to apply. Most 
contractors had no background in agriculture and those that did had 
insufficient equipment to be eligible.
Lack of staff
The contractors were introduced to the community where they were 
going to be working. This served both to ensure the community allowed 
and accepted their presence as well as to provide contractors with an 
opportunity to find workers. However, most contractors found it difficult 
to find staff. In the end, staff were found through visiting the extension 
officers, who recommended people. 
Challanges
Type of contractual arrangement
Contractors are offered one-year contracts. The open bids received through the 
tender process determine which bidder receives the contract. Price is not the only 
criterion, but definitely the most important. The contract duration is only one year 
for reasons of flexibility. Contracts are hard to dissolve, often requiring legal involve-
ment, and the company does not want to run the risk of being forced to work with a 
non-performing contractor. Due to the risk of non-renewal, contractors have a strong 
incentive to meet performance targets. On the other hand, because contracts are 
only for a year, the company has little or no incentive to make substantial invest-
ments in contractor management training or training of field staff.
Irregular labor force 
Staff control and management is a constant 
challenge for contractors. Most people in the 
communal areas receive a monthly stipend 
from the government which is just about suffi-
cient to survive on. As workers are afraid to lose 
this stipend, few of them are willing to sign a la-
bor contract. Rather, they work whenever they 
need the extra money and receive the money 
cash-in-hand every fortnight. This existence of 
irregular staff complicates production planning. 
Insecurity
Furthermore, the regular delivery of large amounts of cash into the com-
munal areas, which are ridden with violent crime, is a serious challenge 
for the contractors. They regularly change payment locations and times to 
prevent holdups. A conscious effort is underway to give workers free 
bank accounts. Some contractors are considering making bank accounts 
mandatory. 
Insecurity in the area also creates costs for the contractors. The chains 
which are used to bind the sugarcane together before transport are 
regularly stolen and sold for scrap metal. These chains are so expen-
sive, because of the specialized locking mechanism, that the loss of a 
single batch of chains could eat away most of a contractor’s profit. 
Hence, many contractors are forced to hire security guards to protect 
the chains. Diesel is also in constant threat of being stolen and although 
this does not pose a huge cost, long delays may result because there 
are no fuel stations in the area.
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....lack of comprehension in 
combination with returns 
that do not meet expecta-
tions generate distrust and 
endanger the project.
Lower land rental than expected
However, due to the delays, land is being planted far 
slower than initially envisioned. In some of the coopera-
tives, only a quarter of signed-up land is planted, and even 
less is producing. Hence, the actual amount of money re-
ceived by the farmers for land rental is far below their initial 
expectations. They expected that removal of inefficiencies 
would increase productivity and reduce costs, leaving 
more profit to be shared amongst the members. Especially 
the farmers whose land is already producing feel that they 
are not getting the share they are entitled to. Some say 
they might prefer switching back to the old system. 
Expectations of Tongaat regarding active 
farmers
There is a difference in reaction between active and in-
active farmers. The farmers that were active and pro-
ductive before the project, but simply did not have the 
foresight to save for re-planting and therefore saw their 
production dwindle, are most likely to leave the scheme. 
Inactive farmers are happy that they can get at least some-
thing from their land, although of course they would 
like to receive more money if this would be an option. 
The scheme was specifically designed to allow for pas-
sive farmers to participate. This allowed the company 
to access more cane fields within a region, and benefit-
ted the cooperative by allowing for economies of scale. 
The problem is that the scheme depends on the active 
farmers taking a lead role in managing the cooperative. 
If these farmers end up leaving, they endanger the long-
term survival of the project.
Growing distrust
Part of this dissatisfaction stems from a lack of under-
standing of the scheme. Land rental is paid per hectare, 
while proceeds and costs are calculated per ton. Be-
cause finances are handled by the project office, and 
not directly by the cooperative, farmers tend not to un-
derstand the details of this process. Although currently 
there is complete trust between THS and the farmers, 
probably due in large part to the close support provided 
by extension staff, this lack of comprehension in com-
bination with returns that do not meet expectations 
generate distrust and endanger the project.
Need for initial grant
The success of the project depends crucially on the grant 
nature of the initial planting. This grant allows buy-in 
from the farmers. The savings scheme successfully 
avoids the lack of maintenance and falling production 
which plagued the traditional system. By also includ-
ing the land rental retention in the savings scheme, 
potential financial mismanagement problems which 
might plague the sustainability of the cooperative are 
also avoided. However, not all decision power can be 
taken away from the farmers. It is, after all, their land, 
their cooperative, and their money. Until now, perhaps 
partially because the earnings per shareholder were so 
low, all profit that was transferred into the cooperative 
account has been paid out as dividends. There is no 
money saved yet for re-planting.
Planting delays and low productivity
Problems with finding contractors and disappointing 
productivity of active contractors affected the entire 
project. Having fewer contractors than anticipated and 
many contractors unable to meet performance targets 
caused delays in the planting schedule. 
These planting delays in turn cause tension within the 
cooperatives. Cooperatives expand gradually, adding 
more members and hence more land over time. The 
problem is how to define members’ eligibility to share 
in land rental or dividend income. Do they become eli-
gible when they sign up for membership, when their 
land is being planted, when their land is harvested, or 
at some time in between? Most cooperatives decided 
that because they did not want disagreements over 
whose land was to be planted first, everyone would 
share from the moment they sign up. That way, the risk 
of unequal planting gets spread evenly between the 
cooperative members. 
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Solutions to challenges Outcomes
Project extension
Although currently the scheme is running well, there is 
a clear understanding at Tongaat Hulett and the Depart-
ment of Economic Development and Tourism of threats 
to the long-term sustainability of the scheme. It is in the 
best interest of both partners to keep the scheme up 
and running and the farmers engaged, which is why they 
agreed to extend the project to five years. Although this 
does not overcome the planting delays, it at least ensures 
that all hectares planned for planting will contain sugar-
cane at the end of the project. No additional funds were 
required to extend the project, but the existing project 
funds will be spread over a longer period.
The increased longevity of the planting caused by the 
delays has a positive consequence as well: it reduces the 
pressure on saving funds. Instead of having to re-plant 
the entire acreage of the cooperative at once, planting 
can now be staggered over several years. Over time, 
each cooperative should work towards replanting 10 % of 
their total acreage each year, funding the re-planting out 
of profits, rather than savings. 
Insurance scheme
When fires burn down cane fields in the months when the 
sugar mill is not crushing, the value of the lost sugarcane 
cannot be salvaged. Within the sugar industry, there is a 
specific insurance to cover this risk. Extension officers are 
actively encouraging cooperatives to take this insurance.
At the time of writing there were 31 cooperatives in the project with a total of 2 555 members farming 3 534 hectares. 
In addition, the project aims to create a total of 726 permanent and over 6 000 seasonal jobs. When fully up and run-
ning, the land within the project has the potential to produce 167 000 tons of sugarcane per year. At the current rate 
of marginal milling profit of R 190 per ton of cane, this equals R 31.73 million of potential profits. It is supported by 
71 extension officers from THS’ Small Scale Grower (SSG) unit, a newly created project office. The total planting costs 
amount to R 64 million and are financed for R 52 million by the government and R 12.37 million by THS. The annual 
costs for the SSG unit amounts to R 20 million and R 2 million for the project office.
Productivity of the small farmers in the project is quickly approaching the productivity achieved by independent 
medium-scale farmers. Although still slightly behind, participants in the project are confident that small-scale farmer 
productivity will soon be comparable. 
Loading recently harvested cane for transport to the sugar mill
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Unaddressed issues
Some of the issues that are currently unaddressed 
are the extent of the responsibility of Tongaat Hulett 
regarding safety, health and environmental regulation. 
Whereas staff working directly for THS have to adhere 
to very strict regulations, these conditions are less 
stringent for contractor staff working on cooperative 
fields. Currently, staff from THS visit the contractors 
in the field to show them where they are not meet-
ing requirements and how they can change to do so. 
However, whether the contractors follow this advice is 
completely up to them. This problem is especially im-
portant when it comes to the application of chemicals, 
which are often quite potent and can have negative 
health consequences. However, the protective suits 
required by regulation are burdensome, especially in 
the heat of the KwaZulu-Natal summer. At the moment, 
this issue does not pose a threat to the success of the 
project, but could be a source of future contention.
When asking the farmers 
about what they see as the 
benefits of the project, they 
frequently mentioned em-
ployment generation within 
the community.
Spillovers
The farmers are intended to be the main beneficiaries of the project. Tongaat Hulett sees the project as a way 
for the farmers to make money out of their often unused lands. However, when asked about what they see 
as the benefits of the project, farmers frequently mentioned employment generation within the community. 
Some farmers even went as far as saying that they were happy with the project as long as they were not losing 
money on their land. They were happy to see that their fields were productively used and that people were 
benefitting. It has to be said that the majority of landowners are living off their state pension and therefore, 
do not urgently need the money from the scheme to survive.
The employment generated by the project stems mainly from the contractors. It is a big step to go from 
a situation with independent smallholder farmers to having local businesses with the capital and capacity 
to undertake contract work for the cooperatives. Often these contractors had little or no experience in 
sugarcane contracting before entering in this process. Their willingness to take big risks involved in 
starting up a business of this scale shows the perceived size of the opportunity they saw. Together, 
the contractors are generating employment for hundreds of workers in the project area. All contractors that 
are currently doing well are actively looking for possibilities for expanding operations, both within and 
outside the project.
Within Tongaat Hulett the project has broad management support. After recognizing the initial success 
of the project, a corporate social responsibility (CSR) attaché was placed within the cane sourcing unit 
and is responsible for THS’ newly started community development program, which involves supporting 
local schools and health centers, and other needs identified 
in community meetings. In addition, the CSR attaché runs 
the ‘one home, one garden’ project, which assists house-
holds in the community to develop a diversified garden with 
foods for home consumption. The company invests in these 
projects because they want to be seen as a partner, not as 
an extractive profit-minded business. So far, this strategy has 
definitely paid off.
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Possibility to increase 
inclusiveness
3
Increasing the number of farmers
The scheme is designed to be as inclu-
sive as possible. Tongaat Hulett has a clear 
incentive to include as many farmers and 
farmlands in the project as possible, up to 
the point where their sugar mills are at 
full capacity. Their expectation is that even 
when all smallholder farmers in the catch-
ment area are fully producing, the mill will 
still not be able to reach its maximum ca-
pacity. One of the main reasons for this is 
high population growth and subsequent 
subdivision of landholdings between family 
members. Each family member builds his 
own house on the property. Because of 
snakes and the risk of fires, nobody likes to 
have sugarcane right next to their house, 
dramatically reducing the land area suitable 
for cane production. To make as much effec-
tive use of the remaining productive land 
as possible, there is no lower limit to the 
size of the contribution of land to a coopera-
tive. Some members hold less than half a 
hectare of land, and anyone who has land 
in the catchment area and wants to plant 
cane on it, is welcome.
Involvement of women
Due to government involvement, more em-
phasis is given to the inclusion of women 
in sugarcane production. It is included in 
the tender process as one of the ‘soft’ re-
quirements. Contractors that work with 
women are preferred over contractors that 
do not, if they are identical on other condi-
tions. Positive discrimination of women 
for contracting work is easier than it might 
sound. Traditionally, Zulu men do not work 
the land: it is women’s work. In addition, 
many of the men work and live in the city, 
but leave behind their children with their 
wives, meaning women bear the brunt of 
the responsibility for feeding the children. 
As a consequence, many of the contract 
workers are women. Some contractors even 
work exclusively with female staff.
Providing support to local contractors
Some of the contractors are not really local, although they do hire local staff. In the 
tender process, contracts are given for one year only, which is insufficient time to 
justify the financial expense of extensive support. Creating local contractors is not 
in the direct interest of THS, and there are no funds within the project to do so. 
So if it is going to happen, there would need to be increased support. However this 
carries a risk. Currently, the one-year contract keeps the contractors incentivized. 
It puts tremendous pressure on them to make it work, and they have every reason 
to try their best. If there was financial support available, many people might join 
that do not really want to be a contractor just to benefit from the funds. This is a 
fear expressed by all stakeholders, including farmers and existing contractors, the 
latter fearing unfair competition. In other words, although inclusiveness could be 
increased, it will not come easily.
Soil preparation and planting contractor. 
’Used to work in the city hospital but came 
back to contribute to local development.‘
Pest and weed control contractor 
employing only local women.  
‘Women are better employees because 
they feel responsible for their children.’
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The model is scalable. In its current form it depends crucially on the initial grant from government and THS. However, 
THS believe the project can profitably be run through a loan system, but since a loan system is less profitable for the 
farmers, they expect buy-in to be lower at farmer level.
The current form of the model, the cooperative, was 
developed partly to comply with government regula-
tion regarding inclusiveness—a condition to receive the 
grant. Tongaat also has a direct lease contract close 
to Richard’s Bay. Here, land is leased directly from the 
farmers and production is organized by THS. For now, 
this model operates at a lower cost than the cooperative 
model. However, in the long run Tongaat hopes the co-
operatives will become independent, removing a large 
part of production from the THS books. This would be 
the ideal outcome, but before investing their own funds 
Tongaat wants to see how the current project develops. 
Is the business model scalable?4
Plowing equipment stored in the yard of a cooperative member
Lessons learnt from the Analysis 
of Inclusive Business Models
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As emerged from the Seas 
of Change background 
research, there are spe-
cific mechanisms through 
which business can pro-
vide inclusiveness. In or-
der to understand what 
works and what does 
not in inclusive business 
models, it is crucial to 
know what the incentives 
are and how they can be 
aligned. Incentives lead to 
different mechanisms for 
inclusiveness and, in turn, 
these mechanisms create 
different incentives. In the 
case studies in this book, 
the following incentives 
were identified for large-
scale businesses, local 
and regional small- and 
medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) and small-scale 
producers.
Build and manage 
brands Ensure supply Build reputation
 › Market  
differentiation
 › Revitalize  
stagnant sales
 › Product  
development
 › Align brand with key 
clients
 › Build a more produc-
tive, higher quality, 
and loyal supply base
 › Comply with legal 
mandates 
 › Develop new sources 
of supply to meet 
future demand and 
secure future supply
 › Lower costs
 › Responsible image 
 › Risk mitigation from 
activist campaigns
 › Improved image in 
the national market 
for better government 
relations
What have been the incentives 
for inclusiveness?
1
❶ Large-scale businesses (multinationals)
There are strong incentives for companies to move closer to farmers to 
secure consistent supply. The key incentives that lead many companies 
to set up inclusive businesses are brand, reputation and supply.
Figure 1
Key incentives for multinational businesses to engage in inclusive business models
Source: From islands of success to seas of change: a report on scaling inclusive 
agri-food markets. Centre for Development Innovation, Wageningen UR (University & 
Research Centre). Wageningen, 2012.
Table 1
Different incentives for large multinationals to engage in inclusive business models
Source: Increasing social impact through smallholder sourcing (PPP) Sustainable 
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The critical change for a company is to adapt its practices for sourcing and purchasing 
and to work with key partners in the supply chain to restructure trading relationships 
or develop new chains. However, to enable change of this kind to happen, companies 
also need to adapt their
 › corporate culture: from a competitive mind-set to a partnership-oriented outlook;
 › operations: create incentives for buyers to invest in creating long-term stability and 
development benefits in supply chains;
 › corporate or brand communications: integrate verified commercial and develop-
ment benefits delivered through these changes.
Examples of key incentives for large-scale businesses from the 
case studies
Out of the 10 companies/organizations interviewed, four of them can be considered as 
large-scale businesses based on the size of their operations. These are Tongaat Hulett, 
Dairy Business Hubs (DBHs), DADTCO and Brarudi. The following are examples of key 
incentives identified from the case studies.
Secure supply: Tongaat Hulett, DADTCO and DBHs have clear incentives to include as 
many farmers as possible in their supply base in order to source enough produce to 
ensure maximum capacity utilization of the processing plants and units they operate. 
The same supply driver applies to DBHs: ‘There is the need to create a large farmer and 
supply base, in order to bulk a substantial amount of milk, to attract cheaper services 
and to improve the negotiation position towards buyers’.
Brand and supply: both social and economic goals drove the move of Brarudi SA when 
in 2008 they launched a new beer product, Nyongera, made from locally sourced 
sorghum. This product marked the company’s strategic switch from reliance on imported 
raw materials to sourcing from the local economy in the hope of gaining significant 
economic benefits through cost-saving for the company. At the same time, the initia-
tive aims to improve the livelihoods of 8 000 sorghum producers by sourcing 5 000 tons 
of sorghum.
According to the cases introduced in this book, SMEs have the following key incentives 
to engage in inclusive business models: 
 › Maintaining a strong drive to contribute to greater development impact by en-
gaging with the local community.
 › Cultivating future customers by doing business with people through offering inputs 
and, at the same time, market outlets for their produce (selling animal feed, 
buying chickens back).
 › Ensuring stable quality supply for operations of SMEs.
❷ Local and regional SMEs
The following case studies concerned SMEs: Mozambique Fresh Eggs, Novos Horizontes 
(New Horizons), Gadisa Gobena Commercial Farms Plc, africaJUICE, Depasa Agro Industry 
and Bosman Family Vineyards.
Figure 2
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❸ Small-scale producers
For smallholders, the key incentives to engage in inclusive business are:
 › Increased resilience: securing stable markets and increased income for smallholders 
can lead to enhanced food security.
 › Revenue growth of smallholders: this can stem from a variety of sources:
 ▪ Increased access to markets e.g. at premiums for higher-quality and 
certified products.
 ▪ Guaranteed prices through contracts with companies are sometimes 
even higher than market prices e.g. Depasa Agro Industry, a fair trade 
registered company, pays higher than the market price for produce under 
its existing arrangement with smallholders. 
 ▪ Even if prices are not increased substantially, the increased productivity 
through better agricultural practices can still lead to higher yield per 
hectare and to higher overall returns from farm activities.
 › Access to risk management options and finances: by engaging in the supply of 
produce to companies, farmers are more exposed to different options for risk man-
agement and access to credit:
 ▪ Price risk management: stable agreements on prices for produce, e.g. 
in the case of DADTCO which pays a reasonable and steady price for 
cassava, even though growers’ aspiration is always to receive the highest 
return for their produce. DADTCO pays 1.5 MZN/kg of cassava collected 
at the growing area and 2 MZN/kg of cassava delivered by growers them-
selves to the AMPU (processing) site. Usually, the company issues the 
payment to the growers on the site.
 ▪ Production risk management: examples include the use of improved 
varieties, better agro technology such as spacing of plants which results 
in greater yields, and good management practices such as replenishing 
soil nutrients (DADTCO).
 ▪ Access to finance: in case of Dairy Business hubs, the costs for hub estab-
lishment were financed through 10 % farmer equity, 30 % interest-free 
loan provided by the project and 60 % commercial loan.
Examples of key incentives for local SMEs from the case studies
Greater development impact: the vision of both Novos Horizontes and Mozambique 
Fresh Eggs is to invest in activities that foster entrepreneurship and innovation among 
growers. In their view, investment should occur in a way that benefits all actors in the 
chain and have a long-lasting effect on their economies. Both companies could have set 
up their own farm or sourced only from farmers with larger operations, but based on 
company values and beliefs, they consciously source from farmers with small, medium 
or large-scale operations.
Business and social factors drive the engagement between Gadisa Gobena Commer-
cial Farms Plc and small-scale farmers. Gadisa Gobena Commercial Farms Plc sees the 
seed sector as an opportunity that fits its business model of working with small-scale 
farmers. There is a chronic shortage of seed in the area where Gadisa Gobena Com-
mercial Farms Plc is based and the company stepped in to fill the supply gap. 
Supply/business return: while large companies are struggling with proving the business 
case for inclusive business models, smaller companies such as Novos Horizontes have 
a lot less trouble doing so. As the manager of Novos Horizontes put it, ‘For us, the busi-
ness case is a matter of life or death. If there is no business case, we cannot survive.’
Cultivating future customers: one very interesting aspect about the way the SMEs 
work with smallholders is how the companies nurture their future customers. This is 
an area which was not evident in the cases looked at by the researchers, as they did 
not look at bottom-of-the-pyramid (BoP) initiatives i.e. smallholders as buyers. But an 
example could be a feed company selling poultry feed to poultry farmers and, at the 
same time, buying up the chickens from the farmers and putting them on the market, 
thereby motivating the customer base to buy more feed and raise more chickens. 
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Figure 3
Key incentives for small-scale producers 










 › Access to inputs: examples are fertilizer, pesticides, water, irrigation infrastructure, 
information, etc. 
 › Geographical location: proximity to buyers and marketing channels in general. In 
the case of Depasa Agro Plc, smallholders are eager to sell their sesame to the 
company because the alternative of delivering their sesame to the nearest Ethiopian 
Commodity Exchange (ECX) warehouse is challenging. Most ECX warehouses are 
located in towns and therefore coordinating logistics and transportation of produce 
to warehouses and trade is difficult for the farmers.
 › Membership of an association: this provides a range of services and enhanced 
negotiating power.
Smallholders are included or excluded in the evolving supply chain depending on their 
ability to undertake the necessary technological, managerial and organisational changes:
 › The required change should not be such a big hurdle for farmers that they would 
shy away from meeting the challenge. Technological simplicity is key. In the case 
of africaJUICE, pollinating passion fruits puts a lot of pressure on farmers who do 
not always see the benefits of their efforts.
 › Interventions of government, businesses and development partners can strengthen 
the capacity of farmers to make the changes that are necessary for inclusion in the 
evolving chains, whilst at the same time ensuring that these changes do not pose 
insurmountable hurdles for them.
Examples of key incentives for local SMEs from the case studies
Secure stable market and price: in the case of Depasa Agro Plc, the primary coopera-
tives collect farmers’ produce on behalf of the company at the market price plus an 
extra 85 birr. The local market price for sesame is determined by the international 
market price which can be accessed via the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX). 
AfricaJUICE guarantees market for its farmers based on floor pricing. Farmers get this 
minimum price even when international prices are lower. However, when international 
prices increase, adjustments are made. 
Often skilful small-scale farmers struggle to find suitable markets for their crops. In 
contrast, private companies possess the capacity to access modern and developed 
markets. Hence agri-businesses and farmers can capitalize on each other’s strengths 
by establishing fruitful partnerships, as in the case of Mozambique Fresh Eggs (MFE).
Farmers are also attracted by market stability, as one farmer stated about the impor-
tance of dairy business hubs (DBHs): ‘As Muki […] established the milk factory and has 
permanent offices in the village, I can be sure they will stay’.
Knowledge: this is where farmers can make a meaningful impact on the business and, 
by extension, on their lives. Before Mozambique Fresh Eggs (MFE) was created, Novos 
Horizontes (NH) produced eggs for consumption on a small scale. Mortalities oscillated 
between 10–15 birds per week. Today, mortalities have dropped significantly thanks to 
the growers’ good management. 
Access to inputs: for the farmers this is an opportunity to get access to improved seed 
at affordable prices equivalent to that of the local unions or public seed enterprises. 
This is the case for Gadisa Gobena Commercial Farms Plc in Ethiopia. For africaJUICE, 
farmers are attracted by access to water, inputs and business development services.
Access to capital: in the MFE case study, capital was identified as a constraining factor 
for farmers wanting to start their own business. A company, however, can allocate or 
invest resources when needed. 
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What makes the business model 
inclusive?
What are the mechanisms that stand out for promoting 
or sustaining inclusiveness?
2
Based on the analysis of the business model principles and the business 
models that were studied, a series of spider graphs were developed (see 
below). Each graph offers a glimpse of the smallholders’ inclusion at the 
company-smallholder interface.
The indicators were scored based on the experience gained during the field 
visits. Ideally, scores should reflect the opinions of the different actors in-
volved in the chain, resulting in as many spider webs as actors, to be able to 
identify the pressure points (what dimensions create disagreements among 
the stakeholders during evaluation) and to offer opportunities for interven-
tion. However, this type of research would have required more time in the 
field, which was not possible. Therefore, the graphs below represent the 
views of the researchers on each business model as a whole.
For each case, one or two principles stand out in compliance. The last 
column in Table 2 illustrates examples of mechanisms that made those 
principles fare better than those of the others. In other words, described 
mechanisms give hints on how the business model promotes or sustains 
the inclusion of smallholders in each company’s sourcing strategy. These 
mechanisms are further depicted below.
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AVERAGE SCORE: 2.5 
Table 2
Mechanisms for increasing inclusiveness
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AVERAGE SCORE: 3 
The key inclusiveness-enhancing mechanisms are explained in more detail below, with 
examples of mechanisms that promote and sustain the engagement with smallholder farm-
ers. Mechanisms are classified according to which business model principle they reinforce.
Business model principles
Principle ❶—Chain-wide collaboration
Farmer-processor collaboration: Dairy Business Hubs (DBHs) 
The aim of the model is to enable all actors involved (input/service providers, pro-
cessors and farmers) to become a sustainable business after an initial investment in 
capacity-building, infrastructure and equipment. As a result, the transaction costs 
throughout the chain are expected to drop and milk production and quality to increase 
by virtue of service and input availability.
Harvesting contractor for critical supply chain link: Tongaat Hulett (TH)
The harvesting contractor is responsible for cutting and bringing the sugarcane to the 
loading area. Here it is loaded onto trucks owned by a transport company, which is 
then responsible for bringing the cane to the crushing mill. 
External finance: Bosman Family Vineyards (BF), Tongaat Hulett (TH)
In addition to the initial investment by government, the Bosman family accessed extra 
funding through Casidra, a semi-governmental development organisation residing 
under the provincial department of agriculture. This funding was used to expand the 
business by purchasing land and other assets.
In the case of Tongaat Hulett, the success of the project depends crucially on the nature 
of the grant provided for the initial planting. The grant from the KwaZulu-Natal Depart-
ment of Economic Development and Tourism allowed buy-in from the farmers. 
Farmer-firm co-investment: Mozambique Fresh Eggs (MFE)
Commercial egg production requires bio-secure, equipped chicken runs. MFE provides 
most of the material and equipment needed, although growers also contribute some 
of their own materials, such as bamboo, rows of cut grass and blocks. Financially speak-
ing, setting up a chicken run is an investment worth USD 5 000 (excluding layers), and 
the expenses are covered by the company. MFE is nevertheless entitled to remove all 
materials in case of continued poor performance or theft.
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Principle ❷—New market linkages
Guaranteed market: africaJUICE (aJ)
Farmers receive a floor price set above the market price. 
If international prices increase, africaJUICE  immediately 
adjusts the price in accordance with the new higher 
price. This has two important benefits. On the one hand 
it creates a stable market for farmers who traditionally 
suffer from the impact of market imperfection for fruits 
and vegetables such as onion, pepper and cabbage. 
On the other hand, farmers can see how the floor price 
minimizes the risks associated with the activity.
Depasa Agro Industry’s strategic price-setting 
The company guarantees the market and provides in-
terest-free loans (USD 500 000 in 2013) to the out-grow-
er cooperative reaching more than 1 600 households. 
The primary cooperatives collect farmers’ produce on 
behalf of the company at the market price plus 85 birr. 
Principle ❸—Fair and transparent governance
Farmers’ views represented on the Steering Board 
Important decisions in each dairy business hub are taken by their steering boards. Sub-
sequently the management is responsible for executing these decisions. The boards 
always consist of representatives of different areas or cooperatives. Board members 
are elected by the farmers and usually serve for a period of three years, meaning that 
one-third of the board is changed every year. Ideally, the farmers are represented by 
the board member from their area or cooperative. However, average farmers are 
usually not elected to be board members. 
Access to market information from different sources 
Farmers of Depasa Agro Industry have access to information from different sources 
such as the Ethiopian Commodities Exchange (ECX), mobile networks, NGOs and other 
development partners working in the region.
New Horizons (NH) only works with husband-wife households 
Many of the first farmers who joined the company back in 2006 often spent their profits 
unwisely. What followed was an abandonment of activity after pay-day. To put an end 
to this problem, NH decided to engage more actively with the farmers’ wives who were 
believed to possess outstanding management skills. Results proved that the empower-
ment of the women has brought about noticeable improvements to the household’s 
quality of life. For example, the family would now invest part of the profits in paying off 
any debts, buying water buckets or installing a new roof. 
Financial model based on the ‘Efficiency Performance Factor’ 
Payment to farmers is based on the so-called ‘Efficiency Performance Factor’. NH’s finan-
cial model combines the weight of the birds, the days taken to achieve that weight, 
mortality and the feed conversion ratio, to estimate the earnings owed to the growers. 
As it is conceived, growers can significantly increase their earnings by improving their 
management skills. NH does not negotiate credit or debt with growers.
132
Lessons learnt from the Analysis of Inclusive Business Models
Principle ❹—Equitable access to services
africaJUICE’s service provision on a credit basis 
Under the existing out-grower arrangement, africaJUICE provides new 
technologies such as access to water, fertilizer, chemicals, trailers and 
other materials required to grow passion fruit on a credit basis. The out-
grower project team provides technical support, agronomic advice, coopera-
tive management and mobilization to the farmers.
After-sales services
After-sales services such as coaching and extension support are provided 
to farmers who purchase seed from Gadisa Gobena Commercial Farms Plc. 
The after-sales service (consultation on planting, weeding and harvesting, 
and provision of harvesting equipment) is strongly regarded as an effective 
means of technology and knowledge transfer. The fact that the farm is 
located close to the farmers is also seen as a positive factor which creates 
emotional attachment and a sense of belonging.
Dairy Business Hub check-off system 
The check-off system allows farmers to use services or buy inputs through-
out the month without the need to pay cash. When a farmer wants to 
use a service, the service provider checks the farmer’s creditworthiness. 
This is based on the amount of milk that the farmer has supplied and the 
services he has taken. At the end of each month the cost of the services 
will be deducted from the payment. Cooperatives are usually registered 
as a single supplier and therefore the check-off system also has to pass 
through the cooperatives. Although the use of the check-off system is re-
stricted, usually non-members or inactive farmers are not excluded from 
the services provided by the hubs.
Training staff before expanding the commercial relationships with smallholders 
Bosman Family Vineyards’ extensive training program of all company staff before embarking on the 
development of the business plan was crucial to the success of business expansion. Topics for the 
trainings were suggested by the consultant in agreement with the workers and primarily concerned 
finance and management. The company paid for both the consultant and the trainings. By ensuring 
all employees understood the implications of the change, before negotiating the terms and condi-
tions of the business plan, a sense of common purpose was created which increased the willingness 
of the partners to accept their responsibilities and honour their commitments.
Sharing improved local varieties and best practices with farmers 
It is in the interest of both DADTCO and small-scale growers to work closely together towards a 
vibrant and reliable cassava sector. Concerned players agree that this transformation needs to be 
supported by improved local varieties and better management practices. In this way, DADTCO would 
get a steadier and high starch-content supply of improved cassava. Additionally, growers would 
pave the way for a successful transition to commercial cassava farming. The International Fertilizer 
Development Centre (IFDC) plays a central role in cassava development. The NGO undertakes the 
training of farmers and facilitation of improved seeds. The former revolves around provision of train-
ing on topics such as best crop practices (i.e. proper weeding and spacing), intercropping or land 
management. Training takes place in the sourcing areas and brings together growers from different 
regions and community leaders. 
Spill-over, community projects: Tongaat Hulett started a community development programme, which 
involves supporting local schools and health centres, and other needs identified during community 
meetings. In addition, they launched the ‘one home, one garden’ project, which assists households 
in the community to develop a diversified garden with foods for home consumption. The company 
invests in these projects because they want to be seen as a partner, not as an extractive profit-
minded business. So far, this strategy has paid off.
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Principle ❺—Inclusive innovation
Mobile processing unit for fresh cassava 
DADTCO’s innovative and collaborative approach is creating an emerging market for a previously 
mostly subsistence crop (cassava) in Nampula, Mozambique. At the core of the business lies the Mo-
bile Processing Unit, an exciting, versatile and innovative machine designed to process fresh cassava 
into cassava cake onsite.
Introduction of the first legally binding contracts in Ethiopia 
Depasa is a pioneer in adopting contract farming in Ethiopia for out-grower schemes. Since then, 
many other companies have followed similar footsteps. But prior to lobbying for a legal framework, 
the company engaged at the grassroots level to sign informal contracts with three farmers’ coopera-
tives, out of which one defaulted on payments.
Aggregation of smallholders (Tongaat Hulett) 
Increasing production and quality at Tongaat Hulett required more intense coordination, which was 
costly; economies of scale were needed. In order to reach this scale, land units would need to be 
grouped together into larger farming units, which could then be managed more effectively by using 
machinery and benefiting from economies of scale in input purchases. In addition, extension ser-
vices would be more effective by making group training possible. During a discussion of the supply 
problems with the management team, consisting of the leader of the small-scale grower unit and 
the area managers who led the extension staff, cooperatives were suggested as a possible solution. 
This way, the ownership and decision power would remain within the community and its members, 
and there would be a production unit large enough to benefit from economies of scale. Internal 
support for the project was strong, going up all the way to top management.
Equity share scheme 
The Bosman family wanted to take the empowerment of their workers 
to the next level. At the time they heard about the existence of govern-
ment-funded Equity Share Schemes, they already had a long history of 
empowering their workers. By actively involving the workers in the running 
of the farm by making them co-owners, the company hoped to increase 
farmers’ intrinsic motivation.
Most workers considered the chance to become co-owner of the busi-
ness they and their families were so involved in, often for generations, 
as a one-off opportunity. Their active involvement in the process and 
the willingness of management ensured that none of the existing reward 
structures, including bonus payments, were changed. In addition they 
would receive dividends whenever a profit was made, however small 
these payments might be. This resulted in increased income and pay-out 
of the principal when the shareholder passed away—in effect free life in-
surance. All employees who had worked at the farm for at least three 
years were eligible to participate in the share scheme, as were all recently 
retired employees. Every eligible employee participated.
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Principle ❻—Measurement of outcomes
Measuring yield as the main performance indicator (africaJUICE)
Economic return per hectare is the key index for measuring outcomes from this venture. 
Generally, the outcome is well known and predictable. The fact that a minimum price 
is set at the start means that farmers know roughly what to expect by estimating their 
yield. Normally harvesting and delivery takes place on a daily basis for 10 months and 
farmers are paid every two weeks. There was also a baseline survey at the beginning of 
the project to profile the livelihoods and income of the farmers involved in the project. 
An external research institute to measure project outcomes 
The International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) is currently monitoring the progress 
of the East African Dairy Development (EADD) project. According to personal communi-
cation with an employee of ILRI, the task of monitoring was characterized by a shift from 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) to monitoring, learning and evaluation (MLE). 
Daily supervision and monitoring 
Day-to-day monitoring is carried out by Tongaat Hulett extension staff. They consult 
with the cooperative committee and contractors on sugarcane planting, fertilizing, and 
weeding schedules. These meetings take place weekly. Perhaps most importantly, 
harvesting schedules are discussed. Harvesting is particularly crucial as it needs to take 
place evenly throughout the season, to keep the mill running constantly. The extension 
staff supervise and direct contractors hired by Tongaat Hulett to re-plant the sugarcane 
and assist in supervising the contractors employed by the cooperative. This support is 
crucial to the success of the project, as many contractors have little or no experience 
in ratoon maintenance or cane harvesting. Extension staff actively visit fields where 
contractors are working to ensure they are doing a good job and to provide advice 
wherever needed. 
From pilot to scaling-up phase: bridging the identified gaps 
Most of the activities undertaken by Brarudi at the scaling-up phase aimed at increas-
ing the number of farmers within the pilot regions and in other potential provinces—
Makamba and Rutana. However, prior to the start of this phase, project partners 
evaluated in great detail all challenges encountered during the pilot phase. In this way, 
concrete actions to bridge these gaps could be undertaken effectively (i.e. price revision 
or new variety selection). 
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Inclusive businesses engage with low-in-
come households for their mutual benefit. 
The corporate interests vary i.e. reputation, 
securing supply return, or brand positioning. 
When viewed from the angle of smallhold-
ers, benefits come from higher prices, im-
proved access to markets, financial services 
or labour markets.
However, often certain areas within the 
smallholder-company interface can be rein-
forced for the betterment of the poor. On 
the basis of the New Business Model Prin-
ciples, the following areas were identified 
for intervention.
New market linkages
 › Holistic approach to increasing the income of smallholders: over-
all, diversifying farmers’ portfolio of products not only strengthens 
relations, it also results in a greater developmental impact on the 
local economy. To give an example, the provision of dried cassava 
peel by DADTCO can motivate cassava farmers to diversify their 
economic activity and ease their dependence on agricultural pro-
duction (cassava in animal feed). The same applies to Gadisa Gobena 
Commercial Farms Plc, where a possible area for further inclu-
siveness is to introduce new seed assortment, particularly fruit and 
vegetable seed. In the case of africaJUICE, intercropping of passion 
fruit with crops like onion, pepper, cabbage and haricot bean gives 
substantial and quick returns for the farmers, to compensate for 
the lost income from growing passion fruit.
 › Use of animal by-products: the use of manure at the end of the 
production cycle might foster inclusiveness by virtue of providing 
farmers with an extra source of income. Manure can be recycled in 
the coming production cycle, used as fertilizer for crops or sold to 
neighbouring farmers. 
 › New product development: current suppliers of sorghum to 
Brarudi SA in Burundi have stated their willingness to also grow 
rice on a commercial scale should trading conditions with the com-
pany remain stable or improve. The company also expressed their 
interest in exploring this possibility. 
Fair and transparent governance
 › Fostering gender involvement: the value chains 
studied showed that women were more productive 
on crops that require intensive farm management. 
Consequently, this presents a big opportunity for fos-
tering women’s participation and improving yields in 
the out-grower project. 
 › Increased transparency: this can be achieved through 
better collaboration with other actors in the chain and 
involving more farmers in steering board committees.
What are the possible areas 
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Equitable access to services
 › Set up a one-stop shop for farmers where they could 
get seed, fertilizer, herbicides, pesticides, veterinary 
services, artificial insemination services or training on 
agronomic practices. A service package of this type 
would enable smallholders to cater more effectively 
to the needs of the businesses.
 › Improved access to financial services: project partners 
in the Brarudi case are in talks with a local microfi-
nance institution to facilitate loans to the sorghum 
farmers. This is an important step in attracting more 
farmers, as well as addressing the cash shortage faced 
by the existing out-growers.  
Inclusive innovation
 › Strengthen management skills: most of the inter-
viewed farmers underscored the need to prepare for 
and manage their own risks. So to improve efficiency 
and foremost to control costs and mitigate risks, 
companies could provide farmers and farm business 
managers with practical business planning skills.
Measurement of outcomes
There is a lot to be improved in this area. In the case of inclusive business models where only businesses 
are involved, measurement of outcomes is limited to measurement of profits. In addition, there can be 
weaknesses in the process, such as lack of transparency. 
In the case of dairy hubs in the East African Dairy Development (EADD) Project, it is clear that progress 
of the program is being monitored, a task mainly performed by ILRI. According to one of the farmers at 
the Metkei dairy hub, balance sheets are presented to farmers. However, another shareholder of Metkei 
indicated that he would like the company to be more transparent about its performance as he believes 
the figures are manipulated so that farmers cannot understand them.
Where other actors are also involved, such as development or government agencies, it is likely that other 
parameters, such as increased incomes for farmers, will be measured in addition to profits. However, 
indicators that can be benchmarked against those of other similar inclusive business initiatives were 
found to be missing.
Scaling out and up
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Unless scaled up, good initiatives are likely to remain 
‘islands of success’, instead of becoming accepted com-
mon practice and functioning as ‘seas of change’. Scal-
ing up, however, requires specific and explicit effort. The 
challenge for ‘scaling’ is that, what works successfully 
at small scale will not necessarily work at a larger scale. 
What works in one situation, will not automatically work 
in another. The analysis of the case studies shed some 
light on this complexity by identifying some of the fac-
tors that lead to successful scaling.
Scaling out refers to quantity while scaling up refers to quality. Depending on what 
is being scaled, scaling out means replication, copy-paste, expansion, extension, dis-
semination, transfer (of technology), mainstreaming, or roll-out. Scaling up means 
transition, institutionalisation, transformation, integration, incorporation, evolution, 
development. In business, scaling up can happen via internal growth, or through part-
nering with other private or public sector actors.
Scalability in scaling up is different from scalability in the process of scaling out. 
Scalability in scaling out essentially involves replication; there must be a prototype. In 
scaling up, there is no such thing, because scaling up entails a change in qualities/prop-
erties which involve more complexity. Most challenges in scalability will therefore 
relate to scaling up. 
When scaling up, one of the major differences emerging from the case studies between 
SMEs and large companies, is that while large companies can set up and experiment 
with research and development (R&D) pilot projects on developing inclusive business 
models, identifying the right business models for SMEs means ‘life or death’, as the 
manager of Mozambique Fresh Eggs put it. SMEs generally have neither the time nor 
the resources to set up pilot projects. They have to get it right the first time.
Why scaling is 
important?
Types of scaling1 2
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Critical factors for scaling 
based on the 10 cases studied
The Business Innovation Facility (2013) identified seven 
reasons why inclusive business models might fail to scale 
out or up:
The business model is not sufficiently commercial.
Other external factors limit the commercial proposi-
tion and ability to scale commercially.
Market demand turns out to be very limited.
The business cannot access growth capital.
There are structural or capacity constraints to grow-
ing the business.
There are no, or very limited, economies of scale for 
the business model. 








In the studied cases, the following key factors were identified as critical to scaling: 
1. Commercial viability
2. Ambition level and experience
3. Attractive value proposition for farmers both existing and new 
4. External environment
5. Access to finance and financial viability
6. Structural challenges to scaling up
7. Organizational and capacity constraints to up-scaling
8. Ground-level presence by company
9. Partnerships
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The different factors are further elaborated below in relation to the different case 
studies and from the perspectives of the farmers and companies where applicable.
To ensure economic sustainability and growth (scaling) of the business 
initiative, the following factors are critical:
1 consumer demand for the product at the offered quality and price;
2 cost structure in the value chain that meets the price point of 
the market;
3 attractive value proposition for farmers (existing and new).
❶ Commercial viability
Market demand/Cost structure
New Horizons (NH) plans to sustain part of its business growth by producing 
2.1–2.2 kg chickens, to be sold in pieces. From the growers’ point of view, pro-
ducing heavier chickens only requires adding an extra week to the management 
cycle and slightly different feed. Revenues would certainly be increased. For NH, 
diversification would involve a slight increase in costs against higher expected 
revenues. (NH)
Demand across Africa for other cassava by-products (such as high-quality cassava 
flour [HQCF], starch and glucose) is expected to rise due to urbanization and global 
increases in grain prices. (DADTCO)
The growing success of the Impala beer brand reassures DADTCO in its efforts to 
promote commercial cassava production. (DADTCO)
Attractive value proposition for farmers
A holistic approach to smallholder commercialization is key to success. 
The guaranteed and stable market access for passion fruit is an innova-
tive model, but the cost of production and farm management makes 
it comparatively less profitable for farmers. Intercropping of passion 
fruit with onion, pepper, cabbage and haricot bean gives substantial 
and quick returns for farmers and compensates for the lost income 
from growing passion fruit alone. (africaJUICE/AJ) 
Farmers’ decision on cropping-mix depends on a complex set of 
parameters, including household food security, economic return, 
susceptibility of crop to different risks, impact on soil fertility and 
farming simplicity. It is important for an out-grower model to focus 
on crops that meet at least three of these parameters. (AJ) 
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Ambition should not be limited to economic returns , but include 
development impact and experience with agriculture and inclusive 
business models. Working with smallholders in ways that encourage 
setting up close trading relationships and investing together in busi-
ness models takes time and patience. Therefore the company needs 
to have the ambition and appetite to include additional smallholders 
as the business grows. This requires ambition in terms of business 
and social impact, as well as the ability to offer different develop-
ment trajectories to different segments of smallholders depending 
on the needs of the farmers.
❷ Ambition level and experience 
The founder and owner of Depasa Agro Industry Plc is an agronomist by profession and has served at 
different governmental and non-governmental offices before he set up his own business in Ethiopia. He 
also has the required networks in the private and public sectors to manage his business. (DAI)
Andrew Cunningham is determined to make a real and significant impact on the local community. He 
believes today’s African society must be developed for a more promising future and certainly not at the 
expense of the poorest. (MFE)
MFE could have decided to simply increase the number of birds that each grower must produce. Instead, 
the company is committed to reaching out to more families that could benefit from the activity. (MFE)
The Bosman family wanted to take the empowerment of their workers to the next level. As a result of their 
initiative, social returns were substantial, as reflected in increased incomes, increased participation of em-
ployees in management functions and drastic reductions in staff turnover. (BV)
The potential to commercialize the farm opera-
tions, at least partly, is key.
The new requirements set by NH led to the crea-
tion of a new generation of farmers with a strong 
sense of responsibility and good business skills. 
Farmers who perform well earn higher returns and 
face almost no risk of being excluded in the near 
future. By contrast, starters or struggling farmers 
need to turn their efforts into profits in the space 
of two to three cycles if they want to stay in the 
company.
NH grows at a rate of 40 % every year. To sustain 
this growth some growers have effectively increased 
the number of birds under management. However, 
the majority of farmers need to build capacity at a 
slower rate before they can take on more produc-
tion. As a result, NH efficiently manages a wide range 
of growers with different demands and needs. (NH)
Providing a steady source of income to growers is 
just the first step. There must be a follow-up program 
with families that focuses on the household and 
helps them develop plans for their future by using 
the wealth gained from poultry production. (NH)
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An attractive value proposition, including household food security, 
is the most important determinant in the case of smallholders who 
prefer products that
 › can easily be consumed at home;
 › can be converted into cash or other food items;
 › are already produced in excess.
❸ Attractive value proposition for farmers  
both existing and new
Inclusive business initiatives often depend on 




Improvements in productivity promise to increase 
the supply of cassava in Nampula. On the other 
hand, some growers may take the opportunity to 
sell much of their increased production in bulk, 
leading to food shortages later on in the year. 
(DADTCO)
The government has stopped financing equity share 
schemes from the land reform budget in South 
Africa, thus removing the opportunity for compa-
nies or employees to apply for the initial cash grant, 
which put a stop to further scaling of the model. 
(BV)
Attractive value proposition for farmers
An issue that might threaten food security is the 
harvesting time. Sometimes, households face a di-
lemma at harvest, selling the cassava when income 
is needed rather than at the optimal point in its 
growth cycle. (DADTCO )
Government influences smallholders (input supply, 
extension) and decides on what to produce (Ethio-
pia), which impacts business decisions on where to 
invest, and whether to upscale or not.
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Key decision criteria for farmers regarding financial viability of their 
operations:
 › comparative return of the product to other produce of the farm;
 › payoff period;
 › cash inflow during the phase of critical need;
 › produce can be converted to cash to purchase food crops.
With scaling up, access to finance becomes increasingly important 
for inclusive business models operating in low-income markets. 
There have been a variety of innovative financial mechanisms de-
veloped in recent years: grants, insurance, guarantees, various risk-
sharing instruments and, as one of the cases illustrates, equity share 
schemes.
The financial model needs to be assessed periodically. Can the fi-
nancial model sustain the inclusion of more farmers? Will limiting 
factors influence the model? If yes, how? All these questions (and 
more) need to be considered.
❺ Access to finance and financial viability 
Access to finance
Tongaat Hulett adopted an inclusive business model with a govern-
ment grant, but strongly believes that the project can be run profitably 
through a loan system. (TH)
Viable financial model
Defaulting: all hubs are struggling to keep farmers loyal to them and 
prevent side selling to other buyers. (DBH)
Access to finance
The government of South Africa financially sup-
ported workers of Bosman Vineyards allowing the 
purchase of 50 % shares in two of the largest farms 
and a 5 % stake in the running company. (BV)
MFE provides most of the materials and equipment 
needed for farmers to build chicken runs, although 
growers also contribute some of their own materials. 
Financially speaking, setting up a chicken run is an 
investment of USD 5,000 (layers aside), and the ex-
penses are covered by the company. MFE is never-
theless entitled to remove all materials in case of 
continued poor performance or theft. Therefore, 
without the financial back-up, growers would face 
insurmountable challenges. (MFE)
The costs of establishing the dairy business hub 
were financed through 10 % farmer equity, 30 % in-
terest-free loans provided by the project and 60 % 
commercial loans. (DBH)
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With increasing scale, structur-
al factors can pose challenges 
for business: legal, operational, 
economies of scale.
❻ Structural challenges 
to scaling up 
As the scale of operations grows, so does its complexity. It is questionable 
whether key personnel will be able to deal with the increased workload, 
whether qualified personnel can be hired, or whether staff can be trained to 
meet the challenges of scaling operations.
❼ Organizational and capacity constraints to up-scaling
Legal
The hubs that were established or supported by the EADD con-
sortium are registered as companies. In Kenya several options 
for registration exist, but the Companies Act was preferred over 
the Cooperative Act because it limits government interference. 
Under the Cooperative Act, dairy business hubs (DBHs) are re-
strained to a certain catchment area and are not allowed to 
make a profit. (DBH)
Operational
As the business grows financing, logistics and data management 
issues set the limits to further development. (MFE)
Economies of scale
Consolidating several hubs into a cluster should be considered 
as a way of improving the financial performance of a hub. (DBH)
Management capacity
Because the board is established through democratic elections, it will not nec-
essarily consist of people who know how to run a business, but of people who 
are popular or respected within the community. EADD tried to overcome these 
challenges by facilitating capacity-building for boards and establishing structures 
that make sure new board members receive training as well. (DBH)
Technical capacity
In the case of MFE, skilled personnel—who are not easy to get from the local 
labour market—are required to run the hatchery and rearing of chickens. (MFE)
Economies of scale
Optimal farm size is very important for the 
out-grower model. The average family 
holding for passion fruit is below 1 ha, 
which is not efficient. This raises the 
question: what are the factors that deter-
mine efficient farm size? (AJ)
Technological simplicity
A major challenge in scaling up technologies to farmers is getting the full under-
standing of the technology and its related benefits. Generally, farmers do not 
want to spend too much time and energy on crops with a high cost of produc-
tion (input, agronomics, and post-harvest) and limited immediate return. In the 
case of africaJUICE, the level of technology proved to be quite a high barrier for 
farmers. (AJ)
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Out-grower Farmer (left), EUCORD Extension Agent (middle), 
Government Extension Agent (right)
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By establishing ground-level presence, companies can gain 
a thorough understanding of farmers, their mind-set and 
their culture, which can lead to more respect from farm-
ers and more fruitful business relationships. Ground-level 
presence can lead to emotional attachment, which is useful 
when quick solutions are needed to emerging issues.
However, with up-scaling the challenge inevitably remains. 
How do you establish and nurture this kind of relationship 
when the number of suppliers grows substantially? 
❽ Ground-level presence by the company 
Defaulting
Having legally binding contracts is important to minimize risks related to advance fi-
nancing, but even more important is the soft relationship with farmers, cooperatives 
and authorities at the grassroots. Farmers attach a higher value to relationships than 
to contractual obligations, partly because they do not understand the implications of 
contract default, and they could be misguided by other interest groups. (Ethiopia, 
Mozambique)
Setting up operations
Throughout its eight years of existence, the parent company New Horizons has gained 
a profound understanding of community standards and cultural values. This knowledge 
played an instrumental role when setting up the fresh eggs operation.  Aspects such as 
selection of growers, training and supervision, were diligently addressed beforehand. 
(MFE, NH)
Specific intervention
Artificial insemination (AI) is not accepted in all cultures, therefore it makes no sense 
to start offering smallholders an AI service where it is culturally not acceptable. (DBH)
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To achieve success, many different players with comple-
mentary competencies may need to share resources and 
experience to create common goods such as knowledge, 
new policy frameworks, intermediary organizations and 
other market infrastructure. However, the possibility of 
free riding might discourage actors from contributing.
❾ Partnerships
IFDC and DADTCO work in unison to bring about positive changes in Nampula’s rural households. 
DADTCO manages the cassava value chain and IFDC is responsible for the knowledge transfer of 
best agricultural practices and dissemination of improved genetic material. (DADTCO)
In a joint venture, New Horizons (25 %) partnered with brothers, Bruce and Kim Dooyema, part 
owners of Center Fresh Egg Farm (50 %), a privately held chicken egg company in Iowa, USA, and 
with Eggs for Africa (25 %).
 ▪ Center Fresh Egg Farm provided the capital needed to start the business;
 ▪ New Horizons produces the layer chicks and feed; and
 ▪ Eggs for Africa commercializes the eggs produced. (NH)
In Ethiopia, public institutions control supply and distribution of seed, fertilizer, pesticides, herbicides 
and other inputs, as well as provision of extension and research services. In addition to enforcing 
contracts, authorities can also influence farmers’ cropping decisions via extension agents, which 
impacts the planning of the companies. Engaging with public-sector actors is key to success. (AF)
Companies need structures appropriate to resolve the 
resource and capability constraints and the associated in-
centive problems they face. In the case studies analysed, 
three basic structures were identified.
 › Platforms (formal or informal) that allow many different 
players to coordinate with each other e.g., alignment with 
the government seed strategy and governmental organi-
zations in the case of focus crops. (Ethiopia)
 › Project-based alliances between a company and one or 
more organizations, and synergy with development organi-
zations and projects. (Mozambique, DADTCO with IFDC)
 › Private initiative: partnering with other businesses. (Mo-
zambique Fresh Eggs)
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Recommendations for next steps regarding 
inclusive business models
4
Include more companies in the assessment
The researchers had the opportunity to visit 10 companies altogether (large and SME), 
some of which were quite sceptical at the beginning to be part of the process of ana-
lysing their inclusive business models. As the process picked up, they became more and 
more interested, and a few of their representatives even joined the second international 
workshop of the Seas of Change learning initiative in February 2014 in Amsterdam. 
However, it is essential that more companies are studied to get a more in-depth view on: 
 › What works when it comes to inclusive business models and why?
 › What is the impact at the level of business and at the level of the wider community?
Include companies that do not receive any form of support
Most of the companies in the current assessment received support from different 
donors through some kind of mechanism. SMEs and large companies emerging in 
Africa that do not have access to external funding mechanisms must also be looked 
at, as they might be better at utilizing resources to build inclusive business models. 
Malcolm Harper, John Belt and Rajeev Roy are exploring this topic in their forthcoming 
book: ‘Commercial and Inclusive Value Chains—Doing Good and Doing Well’.  
‘This book is about “inclusive” value chains, which include 
and substantially benefit large numbers of poor people. These 
people are usually smallholder farmers, but they may also be 
artisans, or small-scale retailers, or customers. The “develop-
ment community” and the governments of poorer countries 
themselves have in recent years become involved in promoting 
and assisting such value chains, as it becomes recognised 
that economic development and the alleviation of poverty are 
unlikely to be achieved by the public sector alone; the private 
sector is seen as the main source of growth, and development 
assistance is increasingly a matter of partnership between pub-
lic and private entities. For-profit businesses are also engaged 
in building inclusive value chains; large international businesses 
often label their work as part of their “corporate social respon-
sibility” or “CSR” activities, as if social responsibility was not 
something that businesses should aim at in all their operations.
The value chains which are described in the book however 
have not been developed by companies in order to achieve so-
cial goals, or to promote a favourable “image”, but because 
they are good business.’ (John Belt, KIT)
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Include different supply chains and different sizes of companies 
in the assessment
The small number of companies participating in the assessment did not allow the 
researchers to compare companies working either on the same commodity in different 
countries or in different regions. The number was also too small to draw many mean-
ingful conclusions on differences in how SMEs and large companies set up, manage and 
scale up inclusive business models. Key questions are: What are the lessons learnt in 
setting up, managing and scaling up inclusive business models that can be transferred 
from small to large companies and vice versa, and across different chains or in similar 
chains across different countries and regions?
Identify inclusive business models with proven business cases
Especially for larger companies, the questions still remain: Is there a proven business 
case? What is working and at what scale? There is still much scepticism in terms of 
costs and benefits of inclusive business models.
Maturity of the company
In case of SMEs, how does the maturity of the company influence the success of the 
inclusive business model that the company set up? Do start-ups have more problems 
setting up inclusive business models? Why? Why not? What are the key issues for 
start-ups and for mature companies when setting up inclusive business models?
Use research strategically
Engage with companies already in the design phase of the assessment, to increase 
buy-in from the company, and also to contribute to its learning experience through 
the assessment process.
Engage with donors on how they spend money; the hypothesis is that some of the 
money that is invested does not necessarily produce system change, neither scalable 
nor sustainable. 
Extend field research to allow for more contact time with key 
people on the ground
In the current assessment process, the researchers spent 2–3 days on site interviewing 
key stakeholders to avoid disruption of business activities. It is clear that the above-men-
tioned recommendations for further research cannot be implemented in a 3-day visit 
to companies. Therefore, it is crucial that more resources are allocated to the research 
trajectory on inclusive business models for change to take place from Islands of Success 
to Seas of Change. 
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